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Most Europeans arriving in Zambia for the first time are struck by the sense of 
empty space. The population of 11,862,740 is spread across a land area of 752,618 
Square Kilometres. The country has large deposits of copper and cobalt; most of the 
known deposits are concentrated in the region known as the Copperbelt, close to the 
border  with the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo.  The general  elevation  is  around 
1,000 metres varying from 329 metres to 2031 metres.1 The climate is tropical - mod-
ified by the elevation - with three main seasons: hot and wet, cool and dry, hot and 
dry. The hottest months are October and November. The coming of the rains, nor-
mally sometime  in  November,  moderate  the  temperatures  and usher  in  the  main 
planting season. The season usually ends in April, although in recent years the whole 
pattern has varied a good deal.
These simple geographical facts shape the history, culture and life of the peoples of 
Zambia, whether they are of African or European origin. The focus of life, even for 
urban dwellers, is on the rhythm of the returning rains, which bring hope and the re-
newal of life. Religious and cultural rituals mark the changing seasons, the patterns 
of rain, flood, harvest and dry. It was, however, the discovery of the vast copper de-
posits  which shaped the  recent  history of  Zambia.  The mines  of  Copperbelt  still 
provide a large percentage of the industrial employment in the country and most of 
the country’s foreign earnings.2 As a result the Copperbelt is the most urbanised and 
1 “CIA - The World Factbook -- Zambia,” n.d., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/za.html (Accessed 15 April, 2009).
2 “Copper Mining in Zambia - Overview,” n.d., 
http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/cppr/af/za/p0005.htm#5 (Accessed 9 September, 2009).
1
densely populated area of the country apart from nation's the capital, Lusaka. The 
economic activity of these urban centres attract people from every inhabited contin-
ent and from every cultural and linguistic group in Zambia. It is upon these cultural 
and linguistic groups that this work is focused.
Most  sub-Saharan  African  countries  are  products  of  their  colonial  past.  Their 
boundaries, drawn upon European maps to settle European conflicts, are careless of 
ethnic  or  kin  group identity  and  territorial  claims,  often  dividing  kin  and ethnic 
groups between two or more quite different colonial entities. For all their artificiality, 
the emerging post-colonial states of Africa have retained their colonial boundaries. 
This has left them with a particular form of identity crisis:
The future of the state in Africa will depend on two very different factors: iden-
tity and HIV/AIDS. Can the nationals of each African country forge a common 
idea of what it means to be Nigerian or Angolan, Ugandan or Malian? In too 
many cases the different is perceived as alien, tolerated as such but never al-
lowed full rights as a citizen.3
Zambia is no different in this respect from most other African states. Prior to the ar-
rival of the European settlers there was no particular historical imperative for the dis-
parate ethnic groups which now constitute Zambia to coalesce into a single nation 
state. It is therefore difficult to see to what Zambia's people can appeal to as the 
source of some common identity which can provide a sense of empathy and belong-
3 “Royal African Society - The State of the State: The past, present and future of the nation state 
in Africa,” n.d., http://www.royalafricansociety.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=282&Itemid=281 (Accessed 15 January, 2009).
2
ing with one another which transcends ethnic or regional loyalties. Like other African 
states, Zambia's future depends upon her finding at least the source of an inclusive 
common identity.
Reflecting on the well-known parallels between the coming of the Holy Spirit in 
Acts Chapter 2 and the story of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11, Miroslav Volf 
writes:
A theological... reading of the Pentecost account suggests that when the Spirit 
comes, all understand each other, not because one language is restored or a new 
all-encompassing meta-language is designed, but because each hears his or her 
own language spoken. Pentecost overcomes “confusion” and the resulting false 
“scattering”, but it does so not by reverting to the unity of cultural uniformity, 
but by the advancing toward the harmony of cultural diversity.4
Identity brought to us through the Spirit, identity in Christ, is therefore the identity 
through which we come to our true unique humanity bound in the love of God to the 
true unique humanity of others. It is part of the mission of the Church to bear witness 
to this identity “in Christ” which transcends other forms of human identity, yet does 
so without collapsing human distinction into a dystopian uniformity which would, ul-
timately, be a loss of all identity. 
This work is a search for a theology which will offer a resource capable of inform-
ing the church's mission in Zambia as it engages with the particular problem of iden-
tity. The theology which we will attempt to construct is what Robert Schreiter terms 
a “local theology”, a means of making the church's missionary response to the Good 
4 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and  
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 228.
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News “as concrete and as lively as possible”5. Our method is therefore a contextual 
method, coming to an understanding of the specific circumstances of Zambian life 
and formulating our theology as a second act. We will discuss the issues raised by 
this method below. First, however, we will make some effort to clarify the thesis we 
propose to test.
Any analysis of a society requires an interpretive perspective. A fuller discussion of 
the need for and the difficulties raised by any such perspective takes place below. We 
will for the moment simply state that as our interests are in the area of conflict and 
identity we have chosen to found our understanding of the conflicts in Zambia upon 
the work of René Girard. We do so in the initial belief that Girard's work, which is 
focused upon conflict and identity formation, will provide an effective and appropri-
ate means to come to an adequate understanding of the conflicted aspects of Zambian 
life. This, however, cannot be simply stated and passed over; it is part of our thesis 
and must also be tested. Our method of constructing theology entails that our theo-
logy emerges out of our understanding of the context. Our choice of Girard's work as 
a foundation upon which to build our understanding of Zambia inevitably shapes the 
theological outcomes. We therefore state our thesis as follows: it is possible to con-
struct an adequate and effective theology based upon an adequate and effective un-
derstanding of the conflicted aspects of Zambian society based upon the “revelatory 
anthropology”6 of René Girard. We shall attempt to assess how far we have proved 
this to be a valid thesis towards the end of this work.
5 Robert J Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1985), 1.
6 James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter Eyes (New York: Cross-
road, 1998), 25.
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In the course of exploring this thesis we shall ask a number of questions as to how 
the identity of Zambia as a nation arose, the tensions which have strained that iden-
tity in the early years of the 21st century, the ability of that identity to resist those 
tensions and where, should Zambia continue along the path we discern, those ten-
sions will lead in the short to medium term future. Prior to exploring these questions 
there are a number of further matters which we must clarify, the first of these being 
the nexus of issues related to doing theology.
1.1 Contextual Theology
Traditionally theology has been understood as a systematised set of propositional 
statements about the Christian faith founded upon Scripture, and, to a greater or less-
er extent, the early strata of Church tradition. Both theology and its sources were 
considered to be fixed expressions of eternal truth. Since the middle years of the 20th 
century a number of different factors have converged to give rise to an understanding 
of theological truth as more dynamic, relational and contingent upon human experi-
ence and culture. Human experience or context has therefore become a third source 
for theological reflection and expression.7 At the heart of the more recent views of 
theology is a focus upon the Incarnational nature of God’s self-revelation.8 This self-
revelation is not a matter of propositional truths but an offer of relationship with God 
in the midst of human daily life. Reflecting on the process of translation, Andrew 
Walls suggests that the Incarnation is “a divine act of translation”.9 This translation of 
the divine into the human implies specificity. God does not become human without 
7 Stephen Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, Revised edition. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books (USA), 2002), 4.
8 David J Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission, American So-
ciety of Missiology series no. 16 (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1991), 426; Bevans, Models  
of Contextual Theology, 13-14.
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becoming a particular human person, living at a particular time. There are specific 
historical and cultural constraints upon this Incarnate God if he is to be comprehens-
ible to those whom he addresses.10 The Incarnation then, is the fundamental act, not 
only of revelation, but of contextualization. This act of translation and contextualiza-
tion gives rise to a succession of new translations as the Divine Word is made present 
in those distinctive features which make each ethnic community or nation culturally 
and linguistically unique.11 The process of Incarnational translation involves a dialo-
gical relationship. On the one hand, something new is brought into the life and lan-
guage of a community as any text is translated. On the other hand, any alien text can 
only be understood in the already loaded terms of the receptor language, so that the 
receptor language stretches the meaning of the source. Likewise, incarnational trans-
lation implies that the Word becomes fully human, taken into the deepest recesses of 
human existence. This in turn calls for the response of conversion: “the opening up 
of the functioning system of personality, intellect, emotions, relationships to the new 
meaning, the new expression of Christ”.12 As in translation this dialogue takes both 
divine and human on a heuristic journey.
Inevitably there has been some debate as to how any re-translation of Christianity 
should proceed or how it should balance the demands of fidelity to the Gospel and 
the need to effectively enter into the lives of peoples and communities. Older terms, 
including “adaptation”, “accommodation”, or “indigenization” were based around a 
9 Andrew F. Walls, “The Translation Principle in Christian History,” in The Missionary Move-
ment in Christian History: Studies in the Transmission of Faith (New York: Orbis Books, 
1996), 26.
10 A. E Harvey, “Jesus and Historical Constraint,” in Jesus and the Constraints of History (Lon-
don: Duckworth, 1982), 1-10.
11 Walls, The Missionary Movement in Christian History, 28
12 Ibid., 28
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model of “kernel” and “husk”. The kernel is the eternal unchanging core of objective 
truth as always taught, the husk represents expendable accidents. There was, how-
ever, little agreement on the extent of the “kernel” which was, in any case, shaped by 
European presuppositions.13
A different approach emerged, in part, from the work of the Theological Education 
Fund (TEF) set up in 1957-58 by the International Missionary Council (IMC). Ini-
tially intended to resource theological education in the Majority World, its remit was 
later extended to a second mandate after the IMC joined the World Council and again 
to a Third Mandate. The term “contextualisation” made its first acknowledged ap-
pearance in the document. “Ministry in Context: The Third Mandate Programme of 
the Theological Education Fund (1970-1977)” published in 1972. The “Third Man-
date” was intended to assist local Majority World Churches in training for ministry. 
This  was  to  be  undertaken  with  “the  determinant  goal….that  the  Gospel  be  ex-
pressed…in response to (a) the widespread crisis of faith, (b) the issues of social 
justice and human development, (c) the dialectic between local cultural and religious 
situations and a universal technological civilization”.14 The Third Mandate was there-
fore focused upon enabling the local church to develop local responses to the Gospel 
which met the needs of the local context, and the idea of a “dialectic” between local 
culture and a globalized technical culture suggests a considerably more radical ap-
proach than the “kernel husk” methods. 
13 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 449.
14 David J Hesselgrave and Edward Rommen, Contextualization: Meanings, Methods, and Mod-
els (Leicester, England: Apollos/IVP, 1989), 25-29.
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Adopting the term “contextualization”, however, did little to clarify how theology 
should be carried out, and the term came to cover a wide variety of approaches.15 At a 
more radical extreme are the “Revolutionary” or “Liberation” models of theology.16 
Gustavo Gutiérrez argued that theology arises out of a reflection on social and eccle-
siastical  praxis  as  “second  step”.17 Such  a  theological  reflection,  he  maintained, 
would entail a critique of the social and economic life of a community as much as the 
inner spiritual life of human beings. A more conservative approach is proposed by 
David Hesselgrave and Edward Rommen. They argue that there is “one basic theolo-
gical orientation which can be thought of as both biblical and orthodox”.18 The form 
of contextualization arising out of this conviction they term “The Orthodox Didatic 
Method-Teaching the Truth”.19 Their  intention is  to  establish “a communicational 
bridge so that unbelievers can be convinced of the truth of the biblical gospel and to 
teach the scriptures to those who are so convinced”.20
Some order to the chaos was brought by Stephen Bevans.21 He described six models 
of contextual theology: The Translational Model, The Anthropological Model, The 
Praxis Model, The Synthetic Model, The Transcendental Model, and The Countercul-
tural Model. These models range in approach from the relatively conservative meth-
odology of the “Translational Model”, of which the model presented by Hesselgrave 
and Rommen is an example, to the more radical Anthropological Model represented 
by Robert E. Hood and Vincent J. Donovan. No one model, argues Bevans, is prefer-
15 Ibid., 144-148.
16 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (S.l.: Orbis 
Books, 1973), 15.
17 Ibid., 11.
18 Hesselgrave and Rommen, Contextualization, 145.
19 Ibid., 155.
20 Ibid 156
21 Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology.
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able to any other. Each has its advantages and its disadvantages and each has its ap-
propriate uses in missiological practice and thinking depending upon the context.22 It 
becomes apparent from this that theology is contextual in a fractal manner, the con-
textual pattern repeated at both the level of content and at the level of methodology.23 
Bevans suggest that there are two basic theological orientations underlying the vari-
ety of models: a creation-centred orientation and a redemption-centred orientation. In 
broad terms creation-centred approaches would hold a more positive and affirming 
attitude toward culture. The Word of God is already present, at least in outline, and 
the church's witness is to articulate and clarify its presence. A redemption-centered 
theology holds a more negative view of cultures, arguing that they are in need of 
either radical transformation or total replacement. The Word of God can only come 
as something which breaks in from outside and manifests itself as a call to reject the 
world in order to embrace and accept God. The choice of orientation will determine 
the models of contextual theology one espouses.24
Once more it can be argued that these basic orientations are not entirely mutually 
exclusive. Robin Gill described five possible methods of engagement with pastoral, 
social and moral issues on the part of British Churches.25 These possibilities sit along 
a  spectrum not  dissimilar  to  the  spectrum between creation-centred  and redemp-
tion-centred theologies described by Bevans. The engagement represented by Gill's 
“Transposition  of  Christian  Values”  being a  “creation-centred  approach” close  in 




25 Robin Gill, Beyond Decline (London: SCM, 1988), 39-63.
9
by long tradition in British society and the Sectarian Prophecy approach being re-
demption-centred, espousing a negative assessment and demonstrating a rejection of 
prevailing culture similar to that of the Countercultural Model.26 Gill cites the South 
African Council of Churches' Kairos Document as a paradigmatic example of Sec-
tarian Prophecy.27 However, not every form of engagement is appropriate to every 
situation. British society, argued Gill, for all its faults, is not Apartheid South Africa 
and  “sectarian  prophecy  may  not  appear  the  most  appropriate  way  for  British 
Churches to engage in moral and social issues”.28
Walter Wink argues that what he calls “The Powers” - the spiritual dimension and 
reality of any culture - are to be considered as good, fallen and to be redeemed. 29 
There is a goodness inherent in all human cultures, stemming from their nature as 
created by God who does not create anything intrinsically evil. Yet the Powers are 
also defective; they have become self-serving rather than God-serving, imbued at 
times with real and radical evil. Part of the mission of the Church is to proclaim their 
fallen nature to the Powers and to call them through word and practice to repentance 
and to co-operate with the redemptive purposes of God.30 Thus any missiological en-
gagement is bound to encounter both the goodness and the fallen nature of culture. 
This further elucidates the nature of contextual theology. Our basic orientation, meth-




29 Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 65.
30 Ibid., 65-85.
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theology are all responses to the context at different levels creating a complex fractal 
and heuristic pattern of dialogue between the church's witness and tradition and the 
local situation 
1.1.1 Fidelity and Flexibility
The very flexibility and localised nature of theology raises the question of how one 
might ensure that our local theology remains faithful to the historical (and contextu-
al) witness of the church to the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.31 One immediate 
response might be to consider redemption-centred models to be protected against this 
kind of failure. We must bear in mind, however, that any judgement upon the values 
of a culture may entail a negative assessment of what is culturally alien simply be-
cause it is alien, and that any theology which claims be, or to have privileged access 
to, the canon of orthodoxy is likely to conceal some form of imperialism. Any assess-
ment of theologies must therefore be applicable to all local theologies. 
Robert Schreiter provides five criteria of orthodoxy which, he argues, work in con-
cert. A failure to meet one of the criterion will elicit a negative judgement upon a 
theology while all five must be met in order for a theology to attract a positive as-
sessment.32 Schreiter's criteria are: The Cohesiveness of Christian Performance, The 
Worshipping Context and Christian Performance, The Praxis of the Community and 
Christian Performance, The Judgement of Other Churches and Christian Performance 
and The challenge To Other Churches and Christian Performance. 
31 Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, 22.
32 Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, 117-118.
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1.1.1.1 The Cohesiveness of Christian Performance
Schreiter argues that any local doctrinal symbol must be consistent with the entire 
body of Christian thought. Even a high degree of internal coherence is no guarantee 
that a doctrine is consistent with the rest of Christian teaching. Schreiter takes the 
Arian doctrine of Christ as a case in point. It was internally consistent, but under-
mined the Christian understanding that Jesus Christ was and is the incarnate self-rev-
elation of God, and thus also seriously undermined understandings of grace and sac-
rament. Schreiter also makes use of the doctrine of the hierarchy of truths, with cohe-
sion with some traditional doctrinal symbols being more important than cohesion 
with others. Schreiter admits that there is no real clarity about the notion of the hier-
archy of truths. As a broad guide, however, he argues that any formulation which re-
quires major alteration of the meaning of large parts of Christian traditional symbols 
or differs profoundly from them is likely to be inadequate.
1.1.1.2 The Worshipping Context and Christian Performance
Schreiter  argues that any faithful theology must lead the community to worship 
which is coherent with Scripture. He refers again to the case of Arius. The liturgical 
formula of baptism in the name of the threefold name, rooted in the very earliest 
stratum of Church tradition, indicated to Athanasius that the three must be equal.  
Arius' understanding of Christ as created was profoundly at odds with this central 
formulation and lead to what could not possibly be truly Christian worship and prac-
tice. 
12
1.1.1.3 The Praxis of the Community and Christian Performance.
Schreiter reflects that the biblical phrase “by their fruits shall you know them” is 
one of the oldest means of determining Christian identity. If a community follows 
through a theology which does not or cannot in principle give evidence of the fruits 
of the Spirit then the theology must be deeply questioned. Schreiter is particularly 
concerned about responses to the Gospel which call for violence. He asks, “what 
happens to those who see this pathway as the genuine response to the gospel in this 
situation”?33
1.1.1.4 The Judgement of Other Churches and Christian Performance
Schreiter argues that a theological formulation should always leave a local Christi-
an community willing and open to the assessment of the rest of the catholic Church. 
A local church which refuses to accept the judgement of the wider Christian com-
munity cannot fulfil this criteria. This, he notes, is particularly true in Roman Cath-
olicism with its centralisation, but it is also true of those Churches which put a strong 
emphasis upon the authority of the local congregation. The expulsion of the South 
African Dutch Reformed Church from the World Alliance of Reformed Churches is a 
case in point.34 Schreiter accepts that older European or North American churches 
can use this criterion as a means of exercising illegitimate control and authority over 
younger communities. He therefore argues that the older churches should equally be 
subject to the exercise of judgement and assessment by others, and be ready to re-
shape their theology and praxis accordingly.
33 Ibid., 119.
34 “Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa,” n.d., 
http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uk/encyclopedia/christ/cep/drcsa.html (Accessed 15 July, 2010).
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1.1.1.5 The Challenge to Other Churches and Christian Performance
All local theology should move beyond itself in order to contribute to the insight of 
the wider Christian community. This contribution, in balance to the fourth criterion, 
may well be a judgement on the praxis of the wider community, or some other local 
community.35
One of the tests upon which the proof, or disproof, of our thesis will depend is how 
far we can construct a theology which fulfils these criteria. We will therefore return 
to these criteria towards the end of this work.
1.1.2 The Orientation and Model Informing This Work
There are many aspects of Zambian life and culture which can and should be af-
firmed and from within which the Gospel can be drawn. We have chosen to reflect 
upon a specific issue in Zambian society, that of ethnic relationships and identity and 
have chosen a specific method of analysis, founded upon the work of Girard. Our ap-
proach tends to lead us to adopt an orientation and methodology more appropriate to 
the “redemptive” part of the spectrum of models described by Bevans. It could have 
been otherwise, had we chosen some other aspect of Zambian life upon which to re-
flect and deployed other interpretive perspectives. Girard leads one to a rather negat-
ive assessment of all culture, which he sees as formed by mimetic conflict expressed 
in myths of redemptive violence. The redemptive models described by Bevans take 
seriously those darker aspects of culture which entrap and entangle people in the 
35 Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, 117-121.
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“non-being” of Sin. One outcome of our thesis should be that the Girardian frame-
work we have adopted opens up insights into aspects of Zambian social life which 
are crippling and destructive of human existence. 36
Theology must not end at bleak descriptions of sin, it must become “part of the pro-
cess through which the world is transformed”,37 offering hope and liberation from 
that which cripples and destroys. This is particularly true of a redemption-orientated 
theology, which must both challenge current church life and provide opportunities 
for a new pastoral and missionary praxis leading towards transformed human living. 
To that end we make some tentative suggestions in our final chapters concerning the 
life of the church and the wider community in Zambia, well aware that such sugges-
tions must not be seen as the arrogant advice of an outsider but the humble offerings 
of one who was part of the life of a Zambian Church and continues to hold a genuine 
concern for its witness.
1.2 Sociological Research
Contextual theology, no matter upon which orientation it rests, must take seriously 
the social context within which it attempts to articulate the Good News. This in turn 
requires some sociological research.
36 Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, 117.
37 Ibid.
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1.2.1 Questions for Sociological Research
David Fraser and Anthony Campolo suggest that sociology asks four basic ques-
tions: “What is going on here?”, “Why is it happening?”, “What is it like for the act-
ors living in it?”, “How good or bad is it for humans?”.38
1.2.1.1 What Is Happening?
This is what Campolo and Fraser call minimal description, an effort to “get the 
facts straight”.39 It must, however, include the context in which actions are taking 
place as well as a straightforward description of the actions themselves. The meaning 
of actions alter as the context alters. Raising a fist may be a threat, a salute, a gesture 
of triumph, each differing meaning dependent upon the context. Thus “To understand 
the physical act is to locate it within its appropriate action-meaning sequence”40 This 
can apply to  simple events,  like the raising of a  clenched fist,  or more complex 
events, such as actions within the context of a conflict. Determining the facts accur-
ately entails getting the right description of not only the actions and their sequence, 
but also correctly identifying the context. 
1.2.1.2 Why is it happening?
This is the process of attempting to explain the processes and events which are be-
ing described. It is an attempt to “state what underlying forces and factors” bring 
events and actions about.41 This will include the socio-cultural factors which lead to 
events occurring, an analysis of what makes the event the sort of event it is: pro-





longed, brief etc. and what brings it to an end. It might also include the social and 
cultural effects of repeatedly engaging in certain types of activity: warfare; human 
sacrifice; and publicly blaming the poor for their poverty. To explain events it is ne-
cessary to build theories and models to posit systematic answers to the questions of 
human experience. These are distinguished from hypotheses which are “tentative ex-
planations of relationships between the facts of certain phenomena”.42 Good theories 
are a “system of validated hypotheses” which offer a systematic explanation of a so-
cial reality.
1.2.1.3 What is Life like?
This is the attempt to catch the inner feeling of the social world being studied. It in -
cludes attempting to construct, or reconstruct, the feelings of the actors, their motives 
and outlook, their hopes and fears. An in-depth description of the social world will 
include the small as well as the large details, the confusions and passions of the act-
ors as well as the larger structure and patterns of the social world which they inhabit. 
“One has to authentically reproduce the sense of a particular way of life when the ac-
tual actors would respond to the description with recognition: “That’s the way it was! 
Were you there?” 43
This is a highly subjective process which will be deeply dependent upon the so-
cially engendered view of the interpreter. It will require the acquisition of cultural 
“background” which the participants take for granted. This in turn will entail that the 




bers of the local society in order to ensure that they are adequate. An effort of em-
pathetic imagination will be required to enable an interpreter to “get inside” the ex-
periences which are being observed. The very vividness of description entails some 
evaluative interpretation which is, at least in theory, absent from the rather more dis-
passionate descriptions of events in physical sciences. The act of empathetic imagin-
ation assumes interconnectedness and common humanity, a value which is not “sci-
entific” because it is not open to the kind of process of falsification required by sci-
ence.
1.2.1.4 How Good or Bad is it For Human Beings?
This is a matter of putting a valuation on the social process. There are those who ar-
gue that “values” have no place in the scientific enterprise, and that sociology should 
be entirely non-judgemental and value free in its analysis of society. It is, however, 
hard to imagine how such evaluation can be absent from sociology in the way that it 
might  be  assumed to  be  absent  from the  physical  sciences.  Sometimes  even the 
“bald” facts carry with them implicit evaluation. A simple statistic of infant mortality 
carries with it a sense of this situation as bad or good for human beings. As the sub-
ject matter of sociology deals with human beings as they live in society, a more inde-
pth description of society cannot avoid evaluation. Neutral observation may well be 
appropriate for the dissolution of copper in sulphuric acid, but not for the dissolution 
of a nation into chaos with all the attendant death and destruction. 
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Anthony Giddens claims that sociology is of itself a “subversive” discipline in as 
far as it deals with problems which are of significant interest to all of us.44 Part of that 
subversive quality is that sociology has more than simple understanding as its aim - it 
intends to understand in order to change the social order. This in itself implies evalu-
ation; the point of change is to make things better, by more order, more peace and 
stability,  more prosperity more equitably distributed,  less crime, and less poverty, 
less of the malign effects of poverty and ignorance.
1.2.2 Difficulties in Sociological Research
There are a number of problems associated with any effort to answer these ques-
tions, revolving around the subjective nature of human interpretation of experience. 
These are problems with all efforts to interpret events so that they become meaning-
ful. The seemingly objective research in the physical sciences is not immune to being 
shaped by paradigms, and sociological research is in no way exempt.
The first difficulty is that the whole process of collecting data will be governed by 
the paradigm from within which the sociologist is interpreting the world. In fact there 
may well be several confusing paradigms in play, given that the sociologist has a 
variety of social identities open to her. This is compounded further by the nature of 
sociological data collection. Statistics of GDP or unemployment seem fairly imper-
sonal, and not unlike the kinds of data available in the physical sciences, but sociolo-
gical statistical data is not all that it seems. Much depends upon the interests and ob-
jectives of those collecting the data. When measuring unemployment, for example, 
what exactly is being measured. Is the parent staying at home to look after children 
44 Anthony Giddens, Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (MacMillan, 1986), 2.
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employed,  unemployed,  or  simply statistically invisible?  What  of  the  subsistence 
farmer in rural Zambia, is she employed, self-employed, or unemployed? When it 
comes to GDP matters are further complicated by the choices of accounting methods 
used to compile and present the data.45 
The second problem is that all data collection involves some element of social in-
teraction, which in turn affects the data collected. First, those whose actions one is 
studying may well modify their actions in unpredictable ways as a result of being 
studied. While this problem is most obvious in methods of study which involve a 
high degree of interaction between the observer and the observed, such as participant 
observer methods or focused interviews, it can also be true, even of methods which 
seem to require a very minimal and neutral interaction. Statistical surveys, for ex-
ample, can be affected by what is known as “preference falsification”, where people 
publicly state one view while privately holding another. Daniel Posner argues that 
statistical survey material on ethnocentrism in Zambian is rendered suspect by this 
phenomenon.46 
There are a number of further problems involved particularly in methods where 
there is a high degree of interaction between the observer and the observed. A parti-
cipant observer will become, at least in part, caught up in the events in which s/he 
participates; the interviewer will bring his/her own antipathy or sympathy with the 
person being interviewed or their point view. Even the dispassionate survey will have 
45 “World Bank: Data - Change in Terminology,” n.d., http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-
TERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20451503~menuPK:2236139~pagePK:641331
50~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419~isCURL:Y,00.html (Accessed 17 July, 2009).
46 Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 94.
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something of the surveyor stamped upon it. In all cases, the interaction between the 
observer and the observed will become part of the social interactions or events ob-
served. In effect, the act of observation changes the events observed.
Evaluation and proposals for social change are also imbued with difficulties. Evalu-
ation can only be derived from an ideological position. It is simply not possible to 
evaluate without some measure of what is “bad” or “better”, which is rooted in the 
observer's perspective. This is an inevitable part of any human interpretation. The 
major problems arise when a decision has to be made between ideologies. It is hard 
to say that this or that ideology is more or less humane in its intentions than another; 
all human social and political ideologies have created and legitimated some level of 
inhumanity and oppression.
With these difficulties in mind we will now attempt to describe how we went about  
our research in Zambia in order to answer sociological questions.
1.3 Research Methods
1.3.1 Fieldwork in Zambia
The main method of research was that of the “participant-observer”. In this method 
the researcher lives in the community which is being studied and immerses him/her-
self as far as is possible into the life of the community s/he is trying to understand. 
The process requires at least some acquisition of local language and a willingness to 
mix and participate in local society and social life. It is a slow method, requiring a 
long-term effort of getting to know people and building relationships. It is impossible 
to enter into an alien culture immediately. There is that inevitable part of crossing the 
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cognitive frontiers where nearly every interaction is alien, and/or open to complete 
misinterpretation.  Therefore  a  large  part  of  the  early phases  of  our  research  was 
simply “acquiring a background”: gaining a basic understanding of life as it is lived 
in Zambia. It is through this early acquisition of the background to Zambian life that 
one comes to discern and focus upon issues which appear to be important to the ob-
server. At this point we must admit that attention falls upon those aspects of life 
which are of personal interest. This writer has a long-held interest in matters sur-
rounding identity and conflict. It was this which became the focal point of the sec-
ondary stage of our sociological research. Ethnic conflict is not the sum total of Zam-
bian life, but it became clear from our interactions with others that it does pose a sig-
nificant threat to the stability of Zambia as a state and the well-being of its people.
Total immersion in the host culture is deemed rare and most keep a certain distance 
whilst participating sufficiently to study things in their context and there is always a 
risk of over-identification with culture and community studied.47 This writer spent 
just over six years in Zambia working with the Anglican Church in the primary role 
of lecturer at the Anglican Seminary of St. John The Evangelist, in the Copperbelt 
Province city of Kitwe and in a secondary role as part-time priest-in-charge of a 
series of parishes in a variety of settings. This gave the writer an immediate particip-
ation in the life of these communities, and allowed a natural working environment 
within which the constructive and informative relationships necessary for the parti-
cipant observer method were able to emerge in the course of normal interaction.
47 I. M. Lewis, Social Anthropology in Perspective: The Relevance of Social Anthropology (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 27.
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As a European in an African country this observer was always at a certain distance 
from the local community cultural differences and the difficult history of interaction 
between Europeans and Africans ensured that a total immersion was never entirely 
possible. Nor is it possible in a few short years to master every local language and 
dialect spoken in Zambia. English, however, is sufficiently universal, to allow the ef-
fective communication necessary to gain insights into the culture. 
1.3.1.1 Choosing Respondents
One of the difficulties in the participant observer method is the choice of respond-
ents.  Survey respondents  can  be  self-consciously  weighted  to  give  a  statistically 
meaningful cross-section of the community in which the survey is conducted. The 
observer  in  the  participant  observer  method  must  ensure  that  the  respondents  to 
whom s/he turns can be seen to be representative of the culture in which the observa-
tions are conducted. The choice of respondent, however, can be unconsciously sub-
jective. It is possible to choose respondents whose interpretation of events is similar 
to that of the observer, or who indulge in preference falsification. It is also possible 
to choose or avoid respondents on the grounds of personal preference for one person 
over another. 
Some of the respondents who informed this observer were members of parishes in 
which the observer was working. They were usually leading members of the parish, 
Enrolling Members of the local Mothers' Union, Church Wardens, small group lead-
ers, lay readers and members of the Church Council, filling those roles by virtue of  
their election by the local community, and therefore not chosen by the observer. The 
parishes ranged from town centre eclectic communities, usually relatively middle-
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class, in which the services were conducted in English, through geographically based 
parishes drawing members from both formal and informal townships and one small 
rural community of subsistence farmers. All of these communities were made up of 
people from every province and ethnic group in Zambia, migrant workers drawn by 
the opportunities of industrial employment. Together they represent a social cross-
section ranging from wealthy business people and senior company executives in the 
town centres  through skilled artisans and underground shift  leaders in the formal 
townships to unskilled casual labourers, the unemployed or retired labourers turned 
subsistence farmers of the informal townships and rural communities.
The other respondents were students at the seminary. Students for the ordained min-
istry in the Zambian Anglican Church are interviewed and nominated for training by 
an advisory panel. This writer played no role in the process, and thus had no role in 
choosing the student respondents. While the students represented a specific social 
group, relatively well-educated and fluent in English, they were also a cross-section 
of Zambian society, ranging from street-wise urban residents to those who had spent 
most of their lives in rural communities. As the Seminary is the only such institution 
in Zambia they came from every ethnic group and region in Zambia. They varied in 
age from young men and women in their early twenties to those who were well into 
middle-age.
We are therefore convinced that both our groups of respondents were representative 




The participant observer method requires that the observer participates in the life of 
the  community  and  ask  questions  as  to  the  meaning  of  events  and  the  feelings 
evoked. This observer had the privilege to be part of a wide range of social events: 
marriages and prenuptial parties, funerals and the baptism of children, many different 
celebrations and shared meals. Questions were asked when necessary, more often ex-
planations were volunteered. Students responded to assessment questions by giving 
opinions,  information and insight.  The material  was recorded in  written journals, 
sometimes with an accompanying photographic record. Students also participated in 
more focused and deliberate class discussions which were recorded on tape. Under-
standing of life in Zambia was fed back to respondents, and checked out thus testing 
our insights against the way Zambians understand themselves. Some of the material 
gathered  formed the basis  of  reflective  pieces  published as  an Internet  “blog” at 
www.cmsirelandireland.org/scott, now no longer available. Other material gathered 
was incorporated into longer and more academic pieces which also engaged with 
other known research, thus testing our own emerging insights in the light of other so-
ciological studies of Zambia.
In addition, material was gthered from both local press and international news me-
dia. Research in the Zambian press must be set with a caveat. Press freedom exists in  
theory in Zambia, but is precarious. There is only one privately owned daily newspa-
per, The Post. The Times of Zambia, The Sunday Times and the Zambian Daily Mail 
are all government owned. Government ownership of newspapers is more important 
than it might seem to be in media-rich Western nations. Access to electronic media is  
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exceptionally  expensive,  even  by Western  standards,  and is  limited  to  the  urban 
areas. Many Zambians rely on the newspaper, usually borrowed from a friend, for 
their main source of national and international news. The government owned news-
papers do report basic facts, such as court cases or traffic accidents, with reasonable 
accuracy. Opinion pieces and the choice of matter for the front-page headlines, how-
ever, most certainly reflect the interests of the government. The Post is a rather rauc-
ous newspaper which in one article professed to admire the British Sun. The paper 
does carry a certain amount of serious news and its choice of headline and opinion is 
up to the owner-editor Fred Mmembe. Mmembe has been arrested a number of times 
for “Insulting the President” and ran what might be best described as a rabid cam-
paign against President Ruphia Banda during the Presidential  By-election held in 
2008. While  The Post is genuinely independent of government control, Mmembe's 
opposition to Banda has become so entrenched that is difficult not to assume that the 
paper's reportage on political issues is driven by a political agenda.
The government press, together with The Post, do provide insights into life in Zam-
bia, into what concerns Zambians and what motivates them to action. They are, how-
ever, awkward sources to use as they do not keep extensive web accessible archives. 
This observer retained cuttings or clipped material from the on-line version of news-
papers,  and  on  some  occasions  made  contemporaneous  notes.  In  addition,  some 
archives were available, held in the libraries at the Anglican Seminary or Mindolo 
Ecumenical Foundation.  Judicious use was also made of international media. The 
BBC has a surprisingly deep influence in Anglophonic Africa, and its Africa service 
is popular amongst Zambians. The Africa service content is usually accurate and up 
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to date. South Africa's “Mail and Guardian” also reports frequently on Zambian af-
fairs  and offers  usually accurate  reporting and intelligent  analysis.  These  sources 
have been used to substantiate or document events which the observer experienced at 
first hand or came to know of through other means. 
Material gathered by our direct interaction method and from local media is difficult 
to subject to any meaningful statistical analysis, and tends to be somewhat anecdotal. 
More objective material was gathered from the Electoral Commission. The voting 
patterns published by the Electoral Commission have been particularly useful in elu-
cidating the more general impressionist and anecdotal evidence concerning the role 
of ethnic identity in Zambia. The source has its difficulties, and the evidence has 
been evaluated where it is used.
1.3.2 Theological Research
The theological research we have undertaken has been carried out as a second act. 
As our understanding of ethnic tension as a significant, if suppressed, aspect of Zam-
bian life developed, our research turned towards the theological questions connected 
with “person”, identity and conflict. Our research has been largely a review of theo-
logical literature on the subjects of identity and conflict. As our work begins with the 
work of René Girard, we also explore the writings of James Alison, a Roman Cathol-
ic theologian whose theology has been informed by Girard's work. We further engage 
with two theologians whose work has been shaped by conflicted contexts: Desmond 
Tutu and Miroslav Volf.  Tutu writes  from the perspective of the long conflict  in 
South Africa, and Volf from the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Volf's work is 
informed by the social model of the Trinity propounded by Jürgen Moltmann, and we 
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therefore also make an engagement with Moltmann. These are our main dialogue 
partners, and their presence in this work is entirely appropriate as those who have 
contributed considerably to a Christian response, both practical and intellectual, to 
what remains a highly charged and profoundly important question. In the develop-
ment of our own contribution to this question we have been strongly influenced by 
the work of John Zizioulas. We have also examined the works of Karl Barth and Karl 
Rahner, whose recovery of the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity and insistent 
call to return all understanding of God to a proper foundation in revelation has been 
of inestimable importance to the 20th and early 21st centuries.
1.4 The place of this work in Zambian research
In addition to our own fieldwork, we have engaged with a range of published schol-
arship on Africa in general and Zambia in particular. We have particularly engaged 
with the ongoing debate concerning the role of ethnic identity in Zambia. Zambia is 
not an “over-researched” country and its problems are not subjects that have attracted 
a great deal of “high profile” interest. There have, however, been a number of soci-
ological and anthropological studies of Zambian life. One of the earliest social sur-
veys carried out in the region was that of J. Merle Davis and his team, originally pub-
lished as  Modern Industry and the African in  1933, and cited extensively in  this 
work.  This  wide  and  important  survey  studied  the  emerging  Copperbelt  mining 
towns and the African migrant workforce. The Copperbelt continued to be the subject 
of sociological and anthropological studies, with Mitchell Clyde's study on Ndola 
and Luyansha published as African Urbanisation in Ndoloa and Luyansha in 1954 by 
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the  Mission  Press.48 Further  studies  include:  Ndola  and Hortense  Powdermaker's 
study of the Copperbelt city of Luanshya, published under the title  Copper Town: 
Changing Africa.  The Human Situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt originally in 
1962 by Harper Row; and Michael O'Shea's historical study of the Roman Catholic 
church on the Copperbelt published as Missionaries and Miners: A history of the be-
ginnings of the Catholic Church in Zambia with particular reference to the Copper-
belt,  published in 1986 by the Mission Press at  Ndola.  Current research includes 
Daniel Posner's work published as Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa in 2005 
and cited extensively in this work. In addition to his own recent focus group-based 
research, Posner draws on some of his own earlier survey work as well as that of oth-
ers. Other researchers on Zambia include Michael Bratton, and Alistair Fraser whose 
short papers, often published in the Royal African Society's journal African Affairs, 
are listed in the bibliography. 
Some research is also carried out by Zambians themselves. These studies are usu-
ally on very specific subjects, such as HIV/AIDs or public financial accountability 
which form the main subject of interest for an organisation which has supported or 
commissioned the work.
What appears to be absent from studies on Zambia is any significant theological in-
terest. Zambia has yet to produce a significant indigenous theologian, and the Zambi-
an church, while it does have very capable theologians, seems to have missed an op-
portunity to engage theologically with its own situation. The primary resource for 
Zambian Christian reflection is the Roman Catholic Church's Jesuit Centre for Theo-
48 Mission Press is a printer and publisher operated by the Roman Catholic Franciscan order in 
Ndola. 
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logical Reflection (JCTR). This organisation posts a number of (usually short) reflec-
tions, mostly by the Jesuit Priest Peter Henriot on its web site as well as publishing 
material in the Roman Catholic magazine. The focus of most of the material from 
this source is economic and social justice, with a usually trenchant critique of Gov-
ernment economic policy and a regular update on the “Basic Needs Basket” the cost 
of the most basic supplies necessary for “a decent lifestyle for a family of 6”.49
While the work of the JCTR is highly important and influential for Zambia and 
those interested in its plight, it still has not carried out a major theological reflection 
on the subject which forms the focus of this work: the question of identity and con-
flict. Other theological interest in Zambia includes the Anglican Bishop of Northern 
Zambia, Albert Chama, who has been carrying out research work on development is-
sues  under  the supervision of  the University of Western Cape;  Elizabeth Parsons 
whose doctoral thesis for Harvard University is as yet unpublished, and Anglican 
priest and seminary lecturer, Francis Mwansa, whose interest in witchcraft has led 
him to embark on research work supervised by the University of Pretoria. There are 
also some studies of church life in the context of Zambia, including a chapter in Paul 
Gifford's African Christianity: It Public Role.50
This study is therefore intended to fill a gap in theological reflection on Zambia.  
The  well  researched  areas  are  to  do  with  social  and  economic  justice,  or  with 
HIV/AIDs which  has  attracted  considerable  financial  support.  It  seems that  only 
Daniel Posner's work carries out an examination of the issue of identity, and does so 
49 “Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection-JCTR,” n.d., http://www.jctr.org.zm/ (Accessed 9 
September, 2009).
50 Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role (London: Hurst, 1998).
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without any theological content. A significant element of the original contribution of 
this work therefore lies in its carrying out a theological reflection in an area where 
none has, as yet, been carried out. The subject upon which we reflect, that of identity 
and conflict,  is one of considerable importance,  both to Zambia and to the wider 
world. Tension and conflict is a problem which afflicts all human societies, whether 
African, North American or European. There is little doubt, however one might con-
ceive of the relationship between the two, that conflict and identity are intimately in-
terrelated. Wherever the church is situated it will have to engage in mission in situ-
ations where this interrelationship plays a major role, and will require critical theolo-
gical reflection to be carried out in furtherance of what Volf terms a “politics of the  
pure in heart”.51
This thesis makes a further original contribution to the understanding of the emer-
gence of Zambia. There is a significant amount of documentary evidence and a num-
ber of good studies on the subject of Zambian history, most of which cover the peri-
od of British influence and rule until the present. Some of these works are cited in the 
bibliography, including David Mulford's study, Zambia the Politics of Independence  
1957-1964 published by Oxford University Press in 1967; Henry Meebelo's study 
Reaction to Colonialism published in 1971 by Manchester University on behalf of 
the University of Zambia and the series of papers edited by Samuel N. Chipungu 
published as  Guardians  of  Their  Time: Experiences  of  Zambians under  Colonial  
Rule 1891 – 1964 by Macmillan in 1992. A number of other works offer a brief intro-
duction to Zambian history as part of a study on other subjects of importance to those 
interested in Zambia or more general country studies. None of these historical works 
51 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 119.
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are focused on asking or answering any significant question about the formation of 
identity. They are focused on the process and politics of the formation of the country. 
Mulford is  somewhat unusual  in seeing the African Nationalist  identity emerging 
from the conflict52 but even he does not go as far as to ask or attempt to answer the 
question we have posed here about how or why the identity of Zambia emerged from 
this conflicted historical process. This work's original contribution is to deploy the 
insight of René Girard as an analytical tool to examine the emergence of Zambian 
national identity and thus to generate a new and original insight not only into the 
past, into the history of the formation of Zambia, but the repetition of the patterns 
which emerged in the formation of Zambia from independence to the early part of the 
21st century.
The use of Girard's thesis in analysing both the history and the present state of 
Zambia leads  to  a third original  contribution of  this  work:  the theology of “per-
sons-in-relationship” modelled on the Persons-in-relationship of the Trinity. This is 
not  the  only theology of  persons-in-relationship and the work of  Desmond Tutu, 
James Alison, Miroslav Volf and Jürgen Moltmann which explore this model, are all 
cited in the main body of this work. However, these all have their weaknesses. What 
is developed in this work is a unique contribution which attempts to address these 
weaknesses and make a constructive contribution to further the development of theo-
logies of persons-in-relationship that will continue to shape the missionary and pas-
toral praxis of the church.
52 David Campbell Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 333.
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1.5 Concepts, Language and Conventions
1.5.1 Race 
For some, the concept of race is a useful and meaningful term offering a means of 
categorising the physical differences between broad types of human beings and is 
rooted in genetic reality.53 In this view the human population of Africa can be classi-
fied into a number of differing “races”.54 Others argue that “race” is a “convenient in-
accuracy” and should be replaced.55 In this understanding “the various gene pools 
were so blended together and merging at the edges that it is not even convenient to 
distinguish different “races”, but rather to consider that all Africans belonged to a 
single large and diverse race”.56
“Race” is a fraught concept at the best of times. Throughout Africa’s modern his-
tory it has been thoroughly contaminated by its use in unwholesome European ideo-
logies. There is so much unhelpful “baggage” attached to the idea that it is difficult to 
use it in any uncontroversial way. 
The language of “race” however, is one that cannot be escaped in any examination 
of Southern Africa. The European settlers built societies in which “racial” identity 
was a significant factor. The language of race describes their perceived reality. Where 
the language is used in sources it is repeated in this work, elsewhere it is accepted 
that the concept of “race” is an invention which is unhelpful, and even misleading. 
53 John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, African studies series (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995), 10.
54 Ibid.
55 Philip D Curtin, Steven Feireman, Leonard Thompson, and Jan Vanisna, African History (Lon-
don: Longman, 1978), 14.
56 Ibid., 15.
33
Those who used the language of “race” were adverting to something that does exist: 
the significant cultural differences between ethnic groups. By “culture” we intend the 
whole broad range of human social production from artefacts and buildings, through 
aesthetic products to perceptions of the world and self-understandings. Culture ex-
ists; there are real and significant cultural differences between groups of human be-
ings. It is the contingent and malleable nature of cultural identity which forms a cent-
ral presupposition of this work.
1.5.2 “Tribe” and Ethnicity
There is some concern about the use of the word “tribe” amongst modern African 
scholars. As with “race”, so “tribe” is understood as an invention of late 19th and 
early 20th century European thought, which has since passed out of scholarly use. 
“Tribe”, it is held, covers too broad a range of social arrangements to express a use-
ful and meaningful concept.57 A range of differing words or phrases are used depend-
ing upon the relationships being indicated. Of these the terms most frequently used in 
this work are cognates or compounds of the term “Ethnic”, hence “ethnicity” and 
“ethnic group”. English-speaking Zambians, however, use the term “tribe” usually in 
place of the term “ethnic group” and its cognates. Thus Zambians will speak of the 
problem of  “Tribalism”  or  the  phenomenon  of  “Tribal  Cousinage”.  Where  these 
terms are used in direct conversation or documentary evidence they are quoted as 
they stand, elsewhere we have adopted “ethnicity” terms.
57 Chris Lowe, Tunde Brimah, and Pearl-Alice Marsh, “Talking about "Tribe" Moving from Ste-
reotypes to Analysis,” Talking About Tribe, February 1997, http://www.africaaction.org//bp/eth-
all.htm (Accessed 19 January, 2009)
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In many Zambian languages the language of a particular ethnic group is denoted by 
the use of a prefix. In most of the languages spoken in North and Eastern Zambia the 
prefix is “ici”.58 In some sources this is written “Ci” as there is a tendency to drop the 
initial vowel in the spoken language, thus for example a person may be referred to as 
“umuntu” or simply “muntu”. To complicate matters for the English speaker, vowel 
sounds elide into one another when one word ends with a vowel and the next begins 
with one. This changes the intervening vowel sound as well as making it difficult for 
the English speaker to be entirely sure where one word has ended and another begun. 
There is also a prefix to denote the name of the people in general, and in the North-
ern and Eastern languages this is “ba”, which is also used as a prefix to form the 
plural in one class of nouns and an honorific prefix to titles and names. Thus the 
people BaBemba speak the language IciBemba. When speaking English, most Zam-
bians simply drop the prefixes and speak of themselves as “Bemba” and their lan-
guage indiscriminately as “Bemba”. This can lead to confused and confusing practice 
amongst European observers and commentators. Most commentators adopt the com-
mon Zambian practice when referring to the people as “Bemba”, but refer to the lan-
guage as IciBemba or CiBemba or Icibemba or CiBemba and likewise with other 
ethnic group and language names. This is the practice we have attempted to adopt in 
this work.
58The “c” being pronounced ch as in church
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1.6 The Structure of this work
The main body of this work begins in Chapter Two with an exposition of the work 
of René Girard. In Chapter Three in we offer a short account of the history of the 
formation of Zambia. The fourth chapter explores this history using Girard's thesis as 
a tool for understanding the emergence of an African national identity. Chapter Five 
explores the patterns of fragmentation and coalescence which has marked Zambian 
political  life since independence, a pattern which cyclically repeats the pattern of 
conflict and exclusion through which Zambia was formed. In the sixth chapter the 
life of Zambia in the early 21st century is explored with questions raised by the iden-
tification of the cyclical pattern of conflict and exclusion in mind. The seventh and 
eight chapters explore the theological issues of identity and “persons-in-relationship” 
which the analysis of Zambia's conflicted society raises. The following chapter, nine, 
offers some reflections on the possibilities of our theology for the praxis of the Zam-
bian church. Chapter Ten assesses the effectiveness of our basic framework of inter-
pretation, asking whether Girard's thesis has contributed to the development of in-
sight into life in Zambia; specifically whether it has effectively explained the evid-
ence gathered, offered some predictive vision for how the present patterns might un-
fold and carried forward into the development of a theological and missiological un-
derstanding which can shape the praxis of the Zambian Church.
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2 René Girard: Mimesis, Violence and 
Culture
René Girard has spent a long academic career exploring issues of identity and con-
flict. His work has attracted both admiration and controversy.1 We propose to build 
our understanding of Zambia upon his work, and to attempt to incorporate some of 
his understanding of Christianity into our theological response. Girard's basic thesis 
is simple and spare. This is, however, deceptive; his simple insight into mimesis un-
ravels into complexity and has been adopted by a vast range of secondary literature.2 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a basic introduction to the work of Girard, and 
the concepts he deploys. We begin our introduction of Girard's work by considering 
some general questions of identity and conflict.
2.1 Flexible and Multiple Identities
It is often argued that people have a number of possible identities in their repertoire 
which may change depending upon context and the roles and identities of any inter-
locutors.3 Daniel Posner deploys Stacks'  terminology of “Identity Categories” and 
“Category Sets” to analyse this flexibility in identities. Identity Categories are the la-
bels  used by people to  identify themselves  as  belonging to  one particular  group: 
Scots, English, Catholic, Protestant etc. Category Sets are the wider sets to which a 
category may belong, like ethnicity and religion, for example. They define the nature 
of the question “which, of any given identity category, are you?” “Which province do 
1 Chris Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 4-5.
2 Ibid., 1-2.
3 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 11.
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you come from?”, “which tribe do you belong to?”. Category Sets are thus desig-
nated by words like “Religion” “Ethnicity” “Nationality” and so on. It is possible ac-
cording to this classification for an individual to have simultaneous access to a multi-
plicity of identities spread over a number of different category sets; but it is not pos-
sible to have access to more than one plausible identity in each category set. Identity 
categories within each category set are mutually exclusive. An individual's claim to 
any available identity category must be justifiable in terms agreed and accepted as 
valid within the context, in terms of ancestry, first language spoken, place of birth 
and so on. In this framework Zambians have available a repertoire of identities, and 
who they “are” in a relationship. Which of the available identities is prominent will 
depend upon the relational context in which they find themselves.
This conceptual framework has the advantage of offering some flexibility to the de-
scription of identity. It offers a viable analysis of how Zambians today can and do ad-
opt a variety of plausible identities in a variety of social interchanges. It also implies 
a contingent and relational element to personal identity. Who a person is depends on 
the interlocutor, the context and the nature of the interchange between them. Posner 
says little, however, about the relationships between category sets in general, how it 
is possible to adhere to or reject a label in one category set on the basis of adhering to 
or rejecting a label in another category set, or how one group may allow or dismiss 
claims of another group's claim to identity categories in one set on the basis of their 
claims to an identity in another set. The willingness of one group to accept or reject 
another's claim to identity is connected, according to Beth Elise Whitaker, to the uni-
versally fraught issues of migration, settlement and national citizenship rights which 
38
have  complex  historical  inter-relationships.4 These  form the  context  of  spiralling 
dances of conflict, exclusion and violence as actors seek to deny each other identity 
and belonging in pursuit of political and economic power which cannot, or will not, 
be shared to mutual gain.
Whitaker argues that the exclusion of political leaders on ethnic grounds spills over 
to fuel xenophobia and ethnic conflict.5 Effectively, groups deny a sense of secure 
identity and belonging to one another, to exclude a priori each other from the right to 
even take part in a contest as part of an effort to create what Posner calls a “minimal 
winning coalition”. This is an alliance based upon one of a range of possible identit-
ies available to the actors, through which a group or individual can achieve victory in 
any contest for social economic or political benefits with the least possible number of 
allies with whom to share, and therefore dilute, the spoils. This seems to lead logic-
ally to the thought that the identity of the alliance and of the individuals involved in 
it is called into being through conflict with other groups or individuals over desired 
social or economic goods. Posner, however, sees both individuals and groups as en-
tering into competition with one another on the basis of pre-existing identities. In this 
lies an element of incoherence. For the appeal is to an identity which exists, if it ex-
ists at all, only in potential, until it emerges as a result of the conflict as the identity  
of the potential minimal winning coalition. In other words, identity emerges from the 
process of competition itself. One may be, for example, an IciBemba speaker in as 
far as one has the facility to speak IciBemba, but this is a skill not an identity. The 
group identity of “IciBemba speakers” does not emerge until it becomes the basis of 
4 Beth Elise Whitaker, “Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion 
in Africa,” African Studies Review 48, no. 1 (April 2005): 109-126.
5 Ibid., 122.
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a potential “minimum winning coalition” which includes those who speak IciBemba 
and excludes those who do not. Group identity therefore emerges in situations of 
rivalry in which one defines oneself and others in terms of the competition for some 
advantage from which others must necessarily be excluded. The actors described by 
Whitaker define themselves and one another in terms of access to the benefits of cit-
izenship by an act of exclusion through which some are not members of the “nation”. 
This reduces potential competition and thus establishes a smaller winning coalition. 
In this framework, therefore, it seems that identities emerge in conflict and are given 
coherence through excluding some from the “minimum winning coalition”. That is 
stable identities, whether individual or communal, arise out of an act of exclusion. 
A further problem emerges from the analysis which Posner uses. He says nothing 
about the emergence of new category sets. Yet the category set “Nationality” in Zam-
bia, indeed in a good deal of sub-Saharan Africa, is a relatively recent arrival. Most 
commentators seem to take the existence of African nations and of a consequent na-
tional identity for granted and explore the questions of ethnic conflict within a nation 
with fixed boundaries. Given the novelty of the nation-state in Africa this is some-
what surprising.
Within the framework explored above it  is  possible to recognise that a national 
identity of sorts emerges out of the impetus to create a “minimal winning coalition” 
sufficient to overcome and displace the colonial power. Therefore this too is an iden-
tity called into being ex nihilo, by conflict and expulsion. How this identity is cre-
ated, how it might be made more secure is a question not only pertinent to Zambia. 
With one or two exceptions all the African states were creations of some colonial 
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power or another. Their stability and endurance should be a matter of concern not 
only for the Church but for all who invest considerable effort and money in “devel-
opment” and cannot possibly wish to see this washed away again and again in floods 
of instability and violence. To explore this matter further and shed some more light 
on the nature of Zambian society we now turn to the works of René Girard. 
2.2 René Girard 
One of the central features of Girard’s thought is the concept of “mimesis”. Mimes-
is is itself a rather complex and difficult concept and Girard's use of it somewhat 
idiosyncratic. The word itself is Greek in origin and gives us the root of English 
words such as “mime”, “mimic” and “imitate”. For Girard, however, there is some-
thing more than “imitation” going on in what he thinks of as “mimesis”. At its most 
basic the concept of “mimesis” describes how science and art - literature, plays, nov-
els, paintings, even the mathematical descriptions of cosmology, our very language 
itself - “represent” the world which they attempt to describe. As human beings we 
learn to represent the world in these ways by another form of mimesis, by actions  
which imitate and represent the actions of others. At this level, Girard's concept is  
unexceptional. It is inherent in our nature as human, “under specialised” as we are to 
learn what it is to be human through imitation of others. As small babies we learn by 
“mimesis” (by imitation), to shape our meaningless babbling into sounds that are fed 
back to us as having “meaning”. This is not just how we learn a language, but how 
we  become  people.  “Socialisation  is  contingent  on  learning  'how  to  do  things' 
through detailed processes of tacit and explicit imitation, it is, indeed, exceedingly 
difficult  to  think of  areas  of  human development  that  would be able  to  function 
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without this dimension”.6 To this Girard adds his more unusual and more controver-
sial claim that human desire is also mimetic, that is mimesis also incorporates “acts 
of and intentions towards acquisition”7. 
2.2.1 Desire
Mimetic  desire,  according to  Girard,  is  a  central  feature of  human identity and 
formation made necessary by our  underspecialisation.  We learn what  is  desirable 
through mimesis. Humanity is the creature which has lost its instinctual focus on bio-
logically predetermined objects of desire for something much more pliable. The food 
we eat, the houses we build, the partners to whom we are attracted, are all expres-
sions of much more than simple biological desires for comfort, security and satisfac-
tion. They are also expressions of more social and cultural realities. Moreover, “de-
sire” may arise even in the absence of any specific need. In advance of, or even in 
despite of, the satisfaction of basic needs, desire arises which has no clear biological 
appetite as its origin. A desire which arises from the desires of those around us: “If 
desire were not mimetic, we would not be open to what is human or what is divine”.8
Desire is not autonomous, arising out of the individual’s own pre-existing self, but 
something which is engendered by the desires of others: “We assume that desire is 
objective or subjective, but in reality it rests on a third party who gives value to the 
objects.”9 Desire exists before there is a “me” to experience and express it. It is the 
“me” that is constituted and shaped by the desire which pre-exists us as individual 
persons. The characteristic design for desire is the triangle. Desire is not the straight-
6 Fleming, René Girard, 10.
7 Ibid.
8 Rene Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 16.
9 Ibid., 9.
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forward desire of an individual for an object, but desire for an object mediated by a  
third-party, called a “model”, whose desire for the same object draws our attention to 
it as “desirable”. The modelling is at its weakest when the gap between the model is 
wide and at its most intense when the gap is narrow, for example between sibling 
age-mates or other close associates. The tenth commandment prohibits the desire of 
what the neighbour has. The same Hebrew word is used to denote the desire of Eve 
for the forbidden fruit10. The desire of Eve, the desire forbidden by the tenth com-
mandment is the desire of all human beings – “desire as such”.11 
2.2.2 Double Bind
Modelling is ambivalent, simultaneously encouraging and discouraging imitation12. 
At the heart of internal mediation is a double-imperative; the implicit demand 
of the mediator is the command “imitate me”; yet, if this were done 'to the let-
ter', the rival would need to assume the model's place (thereby placing the me-
diation itself under threat); therefore, the first message is coupled with another 
message, a warning: 'do not imitate me'. Internal mediation, then, is conflictual 
mimesis, as it entails the convergence of two or more desires on the same ob-
ject.”13
Thus mimesis involves rivalry from the outset, going further than wanting to have 
what the other has, to seeking to displace the other in order to be what the other is, 
instead of the other. Drawing from the Scriptures, Girard sees the concept of “scan-
dal” as a central expression mimesis. The Greek words “skandalon” and “skandal-
izein” and the Hebrew words they translate describe “paradoxical obstacles” which 
are not easily seen and avoided. “skandalizein”, he argues is rooted in the concept of 
10 Ibid., 8.
11 Ibid.
12 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 17.
13 Fleming, René Girard, 19.
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limping. “To someone following a person limping it appears that the person continu-
ally collides with his or her own shadow”.14 This seems best to describe the process 
of mimetic rivalry. The rivals continually collide with one another, each finding, and 
becoming for the other a fascinating and paradoxical obstacle; each becoming the 
shadow of the other’s rivalry and violence.
2.2.3 Conflictual Mimesis and Doubling
As rivalry  between  the  model  and  the  imitator  intensifies,  the  initial  object  of 
rivalry loses its importance or is entirely forgotten. “When the rivalry becomes so in-
tense that it destroys or disperses all its objects, it turns upon itself; kudos alone be-
comes the ultimate object.”15 Girard calls kudos the “Talisman of supremacy”, the 
state of being unchallenged and unchallengeable. It is the power to strike with irres-
istible violence; it is to stand alone, unrivalled. The model/rival is destroyed, swal-
lowed up and the victor stands in his/her place alone. This itself has a mimetic qual-
ity. All the contestants in what becomes a spiralling conflict seek ultimate kudos as 
the object of their mimetically engendered desire. As each seeks to finally eliminate 
the other blow after blow is struck, first by one then by the other, each blow respond-
ing to and repeating the other in a mimetic spiral. As the conflict intensifies kudos 
ebbs and flows between the contestants creating instability and dissolving distinc-
tions between them. Girard refers to this phenomenon as “Doubling”. 
14 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 16.
15 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 152.
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When differences begin to shift back and forth the cultural order loses its sta-
bility; all its elements constantly exchange places. So it is in tragedy the differ-
ences between the antagonists never vanish entirely, but are constantly inver-
ted….The antagonists never occupy the same positions at the same time, to be 
sure; but they occupy these positions in succession. There is never anything on 
the one side of the system that cannot be found on the other side, provided we 
wait long enough. The quicker the rhythm of reprisals, the shorter the wait. The 
faster the blows rain down, the clearer it becomes that there is no difference 
between those who strike the blows and those who receive them16.
Each protagonist enters into mimetic rivalry with the other in an attempt to outdo 
the other in the performance of unanswerable violence. Walter Wink, who accepts 
Girard’s analysis with some significant reservations,17 notes that in any conflict: 
Since our hate is usually a direct response to an evil done to us, our hate almost 
invariably causes us to respond in the terms already laid down by the enemy. 
Unaware of what is happening, we turn into the very thing we oppose.18 
2.2.4 Catharsis
As the distinctions dissolve mimetic impulses travel through what becomes essen-
tially an amorphous mob at high speed. This enables the about-faces and re-group-
ings which allow the transference of violence from one object to another. The mimet-
ic process can thus be seen in terms of a self-propagating contagion.19 This contagion 
of violence builds and leads to the culmination of the mimetic process: the “cath-
arsis” in which the rivals are unified in their imitation of one another against a single 
arbitrarily chosen victim whose murder or expulsion causes a temporary peace. Viol-
ence is withdrawn from the original protagonist and transferred to another more at-
16 Ibid., 158.
17 Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: 144-155.
18 Ibid., 195.
19 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 8, 32; Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 52.
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tractive object, and the others are forgotten, or at least laid aside. The attraction of 
one object of violence over another is determined by the prestige and number of 
those who are initially in conflict with it/him/her. Smaller conflicts are absorbed into 
larger conflicts, which in turn absorb one another until one predominates and the po-
larisation of all against all is replaced by the polarisation of all against one. “The 
creature that excited its fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen only because it is 
vulnerable and close at hand”.20 It is the vulnerability of the final most polarising ob-
ject of violence which is important. He or she is usually someone outside or different 
from the immediate community, some person or group who is both close at enough at 
hand to be readily blamed for an essentially internal conflict and yet who can be dis-
cerned as “different” and marginal. It is important that the victim/s does/do not have 
any advocates within the conflicted community and is genuinely marginal to it, as 
choosing a victim with potential advocates simply risks perpetuation of a spiral of re-
ciprocal violence.
Girard uses the term “scapegoat” to denote the victim of this kind of mob violence. 
Restoration of peace and harmony results from the explosive catharsis of what he 
terms the Scapegoat Mechanism. The conflicts forgotten or laid aside remain buried 
for some period, at least until the next outbreak of mimetic rivalry. Girard sees the 
victim or “scapegoat” as entirely innocent of the crimes of which they are accused. 
The term “mechanism” is also important as the process is entirely “mechanistic”. 
There is no conscious conspiracy to choose a victim in order to heal social conflicts.  
20 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 2.
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The process simply happens, indeed, its effectiveness relies on a failure to recognise 
what is actually happening. It simply would not work if all  the participants were 
totally aware of their actions. 
2.2.5 Myth, Ritual and Religion
For Girard and his followers this mechanism underlies the development of all hu-
man religion and cultural identity. Often the mechanism’s victim comes to be divin-
ized, as both the creator of disorder and the bringer of peace and an elaborate myth 
grows up around the events which conceals their full reality behind a false transcend-
ence, thus giving rise to religion. It is possible for mythologisation to be incomplete 
in some way, in which case something of the murderous violence of the events may 
be apparent. The fullest examples of mythologisation take place where the victims 
inspire the most terror, and whose death brings the most relief.21 It is notable that in 
many cultures spiritual beings are often ambivalent, both nurturing, caring and creat-
ive, bringing order and peace, but also dangerous, deceptive, chaotic and violent.
Religion allows human communities to re-enact as closely as possible through ritu-
al the original events of the murder as recalled in myth, and re-establish the peace 
which those original events engendered. Religion's sacrificial rites become mechan-
isms for projecting the potential for violence onto the cult's sacrificial victims which 
become the substitutes for the real objects of rivalry.22 This process relies upon a cer-
tain amount of misunderstanding, or deception, concealing the displacement upon 
21 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 67.
22 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 5-6.
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which it relies. Yet the concealment cannot be entire; some awareness of the dis-
placement and of the original object is necessary, otherwise the sacrificial rites lose 
their efficacy. 
The cult allows human beings to walk the fine line of “controlled violence”. Reli-
gion blurs the nature of the sacrificial rite, constructing the necessary aura of mystery 
and transcendence which conceals the human origin of the impulses to violence and 
yet at the same permits, even commands, the exercise of violence in certain well-
defined and closely constrained situations. 
Men can dispose of their violence more efficiently if they regard the process 
not as something emanating from within themselves, but as a necessity im-
posed from without, a divine decree whose least infraction calls down terrible 
punishment.23
It allows human beings to overcome sympathy for, or empathy with, the victim 
while retaining sympathy and empathy with members of the community. This is im-
portant in maintaining social peace and order. In allowing human communities to di-
vert the impulses for conflict and violence onto one single victim in this controlled 
fashion, the religious cult forestalls the outbreak of conflict in which all sympathy 
and empathy is dissolved and a reciprocating spiral of violence begins.24 
23 Ibid., 14.
24 Gareth Higgins, “God's Politics - Jim Wallis blog, faith blog, religion, christian, christianity, 
politics, values,” Sweeney Todd and the Spiral of Violence, January 17, 2008, http://blog.be-
liefnet.com/godspolitics/2008/01/sweeney-todd-and-the-spiral-of-1.html (Accessed 25 Febru-
ary, 2009).
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Girard argues that human societies are first ritualistic, rather than institutional and 
that  later  cultural  institutions  develop out  of the ritual  repetition of the founding 
murder and the social stability this engenders. These institutions have become refined 
over the centuries and have lost their direct connection with religion; nevertheless 
they remain, at root, religious, shaped by the constant repetition of the rituals so that 
“Actually it is religion that invented human culture”25. 
In choosing a victim for sacrifice a community is choosing a victim whose resemb-
lance to the original object of violence is sufficient to allow effective displacement 
while still retaining sufficient difference to exclude complete confusion. It is also im-
portant that the victim is one who can be struck down without the fear of revenge. 26 
There is no structural difference between human and animal sacrifice once the idea 
of sacrificial substitution is accepted. The modern tendency to differentiate between 
the two is purely arbitrary. In animal sacrifice, animals are chosen as sacrificial anim-
als because of their close association with human culture so that they can be ima-
gined as almost human.27 In human sacrifice, the physical resemblance between two 
human beings makes the substitution more readily acceptable. Those who are chosen 
as human sacrifices are so chosen because, despite their obvious humanity, they are 
in some way outside the community group. They are slaves, prisoners of war, young 
children, or other marginal individuals. They can also, however, include royalty. The 
king or queen is in exactly the same sort of position as a marginal individual, isolated 
and essentially casteless.28 Sacred kingship originates from the designation of the 
25 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 92.
26 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 13.
27 Ibid., 3 ff.
28 Ibid., 12.
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next sacrificial victim who is set apart as other and holy. If there is a delay between 
designation and sacrifice it is possible that the victim’s very sacredness proves an at-
traction; people become his or her followers, wishing not the sacrifice but the preser-
vation of the victim, at least for a while. In many early societies the monarch was of-
ten ritually slain, either on some regular basis or as the occasion seemed to demand.29 
Myth and religious rites will not guarantee the preservation of social order, espe-
cially over the longer term. Eventually events overtake the rites - drought or famine 
occurs, or, despite the sacrifices, internal conflict with or without the impetus of nat-
ural disaster breaks out. This precipitates what Girard calls the “Sacrificial Crisis”. A 
new cycle of mimetic violence develops threatening the very foundations of society,30 
culminating in a new scapegoat and the establishment of a new cult, or the re-instate-
ment of some old cult in renewed vigour. 
The Scapegoat Mechanism gives rise to humanity as “human” and to the possibility 
of any human society and its attendant linguistic and cultural forms. Mimesis occurs 
to some extent amongst animals. Animal societies are, however, marked by more or 
less instinctual “dominance patterns” or “dominance hierarchies” which limit con-
flicts and provide the template upon which social stability is based. Competition for 
“goods”, and even dominance itself, is therefore limited and does not develop into 
the kind of mob violence to which humanity is so prone. The capacity for imitation, 
however, tends to undermine instinctual mechanisms. As the capacity for mimesis in-
creases instinctual dominance patterns are weakened. At a certain point mimesis be-
29 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 92.
30 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 49.
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comes so powerful and instinct so weakened that animal society becomes impossible. 
Hominization occurs when, and only when, the mimetic conflicts within pre-human 
societies reach the point where they escalate into the scapegoat mechanism. 
The increasingly human primate was able to transform the increasing violence 
in the crucial phases of its biological and cultural evolution into a force for cul-
tural development. More and more elaborate cultural proto-institutions enabled 
the greater length of time needed for the immensely vulnerable and increas-
ingly prolonged period of human infancy, and thus for brain growth. Thus it 
can be shown that the confluence of mimesis and the victimage mechanism en-
ables Girard to account both for the continuing process of evolution and for the 
rupture between animal and human life.31
Thus from the very beginning humans find themselves in mimetic rivalry with oth-
ers. Human society, culture, language, communal and individual identity arise out of 
the scapegoat mechanism.
Human individuals come to be who they are, their personality is engendered and 
continues to be shaped by relationships which are to some greater or lesser extent 
rivalrous and at the least potentially conflictual. No matter how effective, how care-
fully a parent or guardian “suggests” the personality of a child into being, no matter 
how loving and peaceful the present human community to which we belong, the 
communities into which all of us are born are already shaped by the Single Victim 
Mechanism.32 
31 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 15.
32 Ibid., 17.
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2.2.6 Comments and Criticisms
2.2.6.1 Institutional Formation
There are a number of institutions which can be said to have clear links to the 
Single Victim Mechanism as described by Girard and therefore fit neatly into his 
framework. Whether this can be extended, however, to all human institutions and 
culture is a matter of some doubt. There is a deep sense of empathy and identification 
between humans33 which even the darkest of religious rites finds difficult to over-
come.  It  is  possible  to  maintain  that  those  institutions  which  have  developed as 
mechanisms of support and succour arise out of those beneficial impulses. It can be 
argued that the modern Health and Social Service institutions in many Western coun-
tries bear the considerable imprint of Christian values.34 
2.2.6.2 The Purpose of Myths
Walter Wink argues that not all myths mask the events of the Single Victim Mech-
anism. It is a central part of his view that myths tell the truth about the actual power  
relationships within a given society. His view, however, is not entirely inconsistent 
with Girard’s thesis.  Power and status  within a  society are  closely related to  the 
rituals of sacrifice. Thus myths which portray the foundation of any social order also 
serve as  portrayals,  and religious  justifications,  of  contemporary power  relations. 
Both the founding events and the contemporary hierarchical structures of a society 
are “misrecognised” and given a false transcendence by these myths.
33 Without which mimesis and rivalry probably could not develop.
34 Gill, Beyond Decline, 51.
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2.2.6.3 Large Scale Conflicts
Wink also suggests that the scapegoat motif is only a variation on the theme of viol-
ence, and argues that the combat myth of redemptive violence is more generic. 
Squaring off and slugging it out is the norm, and no third-party scapegoat is 
usually involved….Scapegoating occurs more often in intragroup rivalry rather 
than among nations with the result that the stronger combatant wins35.
The process in which smaller conflicts are absorbed into a larger conflict is not ab-
sent from international conflict. There is nothing like an external enemy to generate 
internal social  cohesion.36 In war,  as with any other conflict,  the evidence is that 
smaller scale internal rivalries are swallowed up in the greater rivalry of the war. The 
enemy effectively plays the role of the single victim to the society of either contest-
ant, and is often reduced to a single person, or referred to in singular terms.37 
International conflicts can and do spread rapidly, spilling across borders and draw-
ing in neighbours and allies to become regional, even global conflicts. As both World 
Wars developed, older rivalries were laid aside in a mimetic polarisation of many 
against one. Significantly these rivalries reappeared once the “victim” had been dis-
posed of.
35 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 153.
36 Most commentators on Britain in the Second World War note that there was a sense of “togeth-
erness” in the country during the war. Many commentators also note that the divisions and ten-
sions apparent in 1982 would have meant defeat for the Conservative government in Britain at 
the next election, until that is, the advent of the Falklands War. Similarly it is notable that the 
whole process by which the disputed presidential election in the U.S.A was to be examined has 
been dropped as a for the sake of “national unity” following September 11 2001.
37  “Our war is not against the people of … it is against….”(single individual or small group). The 
“hun” “Jerry”. Etc.
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There is little doubt that post-war mythologisation of conflict is developed by the 
victor and becomes an expression of the “new world order” which has arisen out of 
the conflict. The mythologies convey the new world order in terms which legitimate 
and conceal the human realities of this order behind a false transcendence. They also 
have a way of becoming an exercise in blaming the vanquished and so concealing the 
mimetic nature of the conflict.38 Entire nations cannot, however, be transmuted and 
divinised in the way in which the individual victims of the Scapegoat Mechanism 
are. There is instead, a tendency to transmute and divinise those who died either as 
combatants, or as civilians, in the conflict,  especially if they died in “our” cause, 
which is always, according to the mythology, a “just cause”.39 The result is that these 
myths of victory and conquest are less complete in Girard’s terms. Wink is, therefore, 
correct in concluding that “combat myths” express a form of redemptive violence in 
which the combat itself, rather than the divine victim, is seen as the generative source 
of new life and order. This does not, however, preclude a strong mimetic element in 
international conflict, nor that the achievement of subsequent peace and order will 
not  involve  some form of  “violent  exclusion”  recognisable  as  a  variation  of  the 
Single Victim Mechanism.
2.2.6.4 Legitimate Violence
Local, even individual, conflicts can also mimetically spiral into more widespread 
violence. Where such conflicts do not catch “mimetic fire”, it is often because they 
have been quelled by an exercise in legitimate violence. An exercise of legitimate vi-
olence limits vengeance to one single act of reprisal enacted with such authority that 
38 For example in the post WWI reparations, or in the Post WWII war crimes trials.
39 Consider some of the wording on War Memorials.
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there is no possibility of the mimetic spiral developing further. The institutions which 
exercise legitimate violence for maintaining peace and social order are attended by 
the same liturgical solemnity and imagery that attends religious ritual. This provides 
the same false transcendence disguising the actual nature of legitimate violence as an 
act of retributive justice which is not in any structural way different from the prin-
ciple of revenge.40 Capital punishment is an obvious example of the principle of le-
gitimated revenge in action. Even where the punishment is not capital a person con-
victed, or even simply accused of offences which touch deeply into the social ten-
sions of the day can become a convenient “hate” figure.41 The danger lies in recog-
nising the reality behind the mystification provided by ritual. Once this happens the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence becomes uncertain 
and a crisis occurs.42
2.2.6.5 The Emergence of the Human
Wink argues that Girard's understanding of the emergence of human societies is 
speculation, which cannot, in the light of present evidence be further tested. Alison in 
particular, also shows a tendency to step directly from modern primates to their an-
cestors. This involves the assumption that modern “higher” primates are similar in 
physical, mental and social organization to the more distant ancestors of homo sapi-
ens. This is by no means certain. All primates, including humans, may well be des-
cended from common ancestors, but modern apes may be as different from those 
common ancestors as modern humans are. Nevertheless, there is a widespread ac-
40 Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (New York: Crossroad, 1995), 85.
41 Why else do people bang on the prison van and shout at prisoners as they are moved between 
courthouse and prison?
42 Bailie, Violence Unveiled, 55-58.
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ceptance that human beings derive and maintain their sense of self from their cultural 
and familial environment in a way which inevitably involves mimesis of, and rivalry 
with, parental and peer models. It is also widely accepted that these conflicts are fre-
quently  dealt  with  by  “projection”  or  what  some  authorities  call  “paranoid 
behaviour” where the internal tensions, whether individual or communal, are projec-
ted onto others who then come to be at fault, the cause of all the problems.43 The ob-
jects of such projection are most often those who are in some way outside the social 
norms, whether from ethnic or religious difference, or because their life styles are 
seen as in some way reprehensible.44 Mimetic rivalry is a fundamental fact of histor-
ical human existence, all the more so in modern Western societies where competition 
in every aspect of life is turned into a virtue. It seems difficult to escape the conclu-
sion that, speculative as it is, Girard's account is an elegant and economical interpret-
ation of the available evidence.  It accounts for the rise of human culture and the 
formation of human identity at both communal and individual levels, and does so in a 
way which satisfies the rather difficult problem offered by seemingly contrary evid-
ence for continuity and discontinuity between human and animal societies. In Chris-
tian terms, he offers a vehicle for a more “process” orientated reflection, giving cre-
ation a more “autopoietic” status, consistent with a doctrine of God which is more 
kenotic, incarnational and relational in its model and consistent with current scientif-
ic cosmology. 
43 See Skinner & Cleese, “Families and How to Survive Them”.
44 For example, people with homosexual sexual orientation were “to blame” in the early stages of 
the AIDS epidemic in the West. 
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2.2.6.6 Innocence and Guilt
One of the more interesting modifications of Girard's theory comes from Miroslav 
Volf. Girard argues that accusations levelled against the victim are stereotypical and 
repetitive and have no basis in reality. His interpretation of Christianity is particularly 
dependent upon the innocence of Christ. Volf is less sure of the innocence of the vic-
tim. The focus on Christ as the innocent one has, he argues, distracted Girard from 
the fact that “[I]n a world so manifestly drenched with evil everybody is innocent in 
their own eyes.”45 Volf continues:
Yet all  know and all  agree that somebody must be guilty;  somebody's  eyes 
must be deceiving them badly. But whose eyes? The eyes of the perpetrators? 
Of the victims? Of both, I want to argue, and in addition declare a “third party” 
complicit in the generation of contrived innocence, that chimerical goodness of 
self that is but the flip side of the evil it projects onto others.46
Even if the scapegoats are innocent at the outset, “Will they stay innocent as they 
are drawn into a conflict and as the conflict gathers momentum?”47 Volf is clearly 
stating his questions in Girardian terms, and the answer to his questions would be a 
qualified “no”.48 The very humanity of both victim and perpetrator would tend to 
draw the scapegoat into the mimetic cycle, to become the “double” of the oppressive 
society, actively mirroring its disharmony, behaving in such a way as to fulfil the ste-
reotype and so attract, even encourage, exclusion. Further, the status of victim can al-
low an individual or community to seize the moral high ground, to justify its own vi-
45 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 79.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid 80.
48 Qualified in the sense that there are those who have deliberately sought to escape the mimetic 
cycle, like Martin Luther King or Desmond Tutu.
57
olent response in the conflictual spiral. Girard attends to the Psalms as often express-
ing the voice of the victim, but the sheer rage and vengeful blood lust of some of 
those same psalms should alert us to the fact that the victims have lost their inno-
cence as much as the persecutors.
In so far as the victim cannot escape the contagion of mimetic violence that lies at 
the root of all humanity, there is merit in Volf's argument. The question is whether 
this is entirely what Girard intends when he thinks of the victim as “innocent”. His 
argument that the victim must be one who cannot attract support or empathy, because 
this would only prolong rather than end the mimetic cycle, indicates that he is not  
suggesting that victims are free from the contagion which surrounds them. Indeed, it 
would be profoundly illogical for him to do so. The victims, with the exception of 
Christ, are all considered ordinary, if marginalised, human beings. Like every other 
human being they are formed by, and give rise, to the conflictual mimesis which 
eventually singles them out as victims. 
For Girard, the victim is innocent insofar as s/he is chosen arbitrarily; innocent of 
the stereotypical list of crimes of which s/he is accused and innocent of the underly-
ing accusation that s/he is the cause of whatever crisis has beset the community. This 
is a very specific innocence, and implies nothing about the victim's place in the mi-
metic cycle. The Jews of early modern Europe were not guilty of the practices re-
counted in the blood libel.49 That does not mean that they were any less prone to be-
ing caught up in more general cycles of mimesis and violence in the same way as the 
rest of the population. Volf seems to take a wider view over which victims may or 
49 R. Po-chia Hsia, The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 1-3.
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may not be considered innocent, a view that takes in the whole of their interactions 
with wider society. It may well be that it is he, not Girard, who has become distracted 
by the sinless nature of Christ. To the question of whether the victims avoid being 
caught up in the mimetic contagion in the wider range of their relationships with oth-
ers, the answer must be “no.” In the more specific sense the answer to an inquiry as 
to whether the victims are “innocent” of the crimes of which they are accused de-
pends upon the circumstances of each specific case.
In some circumstances it seems not unreasonable to suggest that Girard is correct, 
to say that the victim of any particular instance of the Single Victim Mechanism is 
“innocent”. It is not unknown, even in modern Western societies, for groups or com-
munities experiencing a sufficiently intense level of social disharmony to be suffi-
ciently blinded by the mimetic contagion that a coalition of all against one where the 
“one” is innocent emerges.50 In other circumstances it seems reasonable to suppose 
that the social unease of a community has indeed been caused by the person who 
stands accused. An example of this could be a criminal court establishing beyond 
reasonable doubt that the person in the dock is indeed a supplier of illegal drugs 
which have plagued the youth of a working-class estate. The complex nexus of inter-
relationships between social forces and individual responsibility for crime suggests 
that, whatever else is going on, this too is an instance of choosing and excluding a 
suitable victim upon whom wider social tensions can safely be projected. 
50 Many of the lynchings in the Southern states of the U.S.A. for example
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We would therefore suggest that in the narrower view of “innocence” of the victim 
to which Girard confines himself, the actual guilt or innocence of the victim is not 
relevant. Some individuals who appear in this work as the victims of the Scapegoat 
Mechanism are most probably guilty of the crimes of which they have been accused 
in the mimetic contagion, others are equally probably innocent. Whichever the case, 
we will argue that the Single Victim Mechanism has been at work.
2.2.6.7 The Effectiveness Of The Scapegoat Mechanism
Many would argue that the Scapegoat Mechanism is not, in the modern and post-
modern world, working effectively to control the contagious nature of violence. Ex-
posure of the workings of the mechanism undermines its effectiveness as it unveils 
the displacement and undermines the false  transcendence upon which it  depends. 
Girard argues that the Christian story has done exactly this, stripping away false tran-
scendence and exposing the workings of the mechanism at its most powerful as Jesus 
becomes the truly innocent victim in a disordered society. One outcome of this is 
that, in an increasingly global society with many organisations and groups imbued 
with Christian values, victims can always find advocates. Thus instead of ending the 
mimetic cycle the mechanism simply perpetuates it by drawing new participants into 
the conflict. 
A fuller discussion of Girard's account of Christianity will be carried out later in 
this work. In what follows it will be argued that the mechanism he identifies has 
functioned in the formation of Zambian national identity; that this functioning has 
been only partially effective in creating a genuinely secure and stable national iden-
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tity capable of encompassing a critical mass of Zambian society, and that Zambia is 
consequently trapped in a mythic cycle of conflict crisis and expulsion that has failed 
to stabilise society.
2.2.6.8 An All Embracing Systematisation?
Modern and post-modern thought has been almost ideologically wary of systemat-
isations which seem to be all embracing. It is a criticism of Girard's work that his the-
ory of mimetic rivalry is a revival of exactly the kind of all-synthesizing project 
which has been judged to have run its course and failed.51 Fleming, however points 
out that it is simply not enough to claim that Girard has produced an all-embracing 
“theory of everything” and to reject it out of hand on those grounds alone. Such a re-
jection involves one in a circularity: the espousal of the all-embracing theory that an 
all-embracing theory is to be rejected on the a priori grounds that it is an all-embra-
cing theory. It may well be the case that Girard is indeed reviving this “exhausted ad-
venture”, but it is difficult to know this without assessing his project in the light of 
both the evidence he himself brings to bear upon it and such relevant evidence that 
others can uncover.52
Fleming argues that a critique of Girard's theory would involve either examining 
and accounting more effectively for the phenomena for which Girard seeks to ac-
count, or critiquing the internal logic and coherence of Girard's arguments.53




In this work we are seeking to use Girard's thesis as a means of explaining the evid-
ence gathered either by others or by this writer in the course of living and working in 
Zambia. As a test of the effectiveness of Girard's thesis it is far from comprehensive, 
nevertheless, it is a real test carried out in particular circumstances. We must, there-
fore, seek to assess how far Girard's theory accounts for the facts of Zambian life. If 
there is nothing of the culture and life of Zambia today which can be explained ef-
fectively and economically by Girard's thesis, then serious questions may be raised 
about his entire project, for it has foundered upon the rock of a particular reality. If, 
on the other hand, Girard's thesis does provide some effective account for the phe-
nomena of life in Zambia, if it can be used not only as a method for accounting for 
the present but also, with albeit necessarily limited accuracy, as a tool for extrapolat-
ing present phenomena into the future - a method of reading the “signs of the times” 
and enabling the mission of prophetic challenge given to the church - then Girard's 
theory cannot be said to have been “proven”. It is simply that it has proved effective 
in this particular case. As part of the concluding material of this work we will seek to 
assess how effective Girard's theory has been in enabling this process, and how far it 
can contribute to the development of theological and missiological insight. 
Having now introduced our interpretative framework, the next three chapters will 
examine life in Zambia, making use of Girard's insights as a means of understanding 
what is happening and why it is happening. This in turn will allow us some insight 
into what life is like for Zambians and whether or not Zambia's current circumstances 
are good or bad for human beings. We begin with a brief outline of the history of 
Zambia's formation as a nation in the next chapter.
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3 Historical Background
The purpose of this present chapter is to describe, albeit briefly, the history of the 
formation of Zambia. The narrative intention of this chapter is consistent with the 
contextual methodology which we have adopted as the basis for this work. We en-
gage in a simple process of “telling the story” prior to carrying out any reflection 
upon the story.
The African history is a vast canvas. Hominid remains have been found in Zambia 
dating back 130,000 years,1 and the country is dotted with ancient rock art dated long 
before the coming of the first modern Bantu speaking Africans.2 Consequently there 
is no straightforward way of telling the story without some selection and therefore 
some bias. If we must be selective, then there must be some rationale to our selectiv-
ity. Our focus is on the Zambia's present and its conflicts with the aim of envisioning 
possible alternatives founded upon the Gospel. Our focus must therefore be on that 
part of history which has the most bearing upon the emergence of the nation called 
Zambia: the colonial and immediate post-Independence period, with only a little at-
tention paid to the pre-European period.
1 “Homo Heidelbergensis, Rhodesian or Broken Hill Man,” n.d., 
http://piclib.nhm.ac.uk/piclib/www/image.php?img=51523 (Accessed 11 August, 2009). Ac-
cessed 11 August 2009.9)
2 The writer has seen small samples of ancient rock art at Mutinondo, near Mpika.
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3.1 The African Past
The European powers imposed their colonial rule upon African territory which was 
certainly thinly populated, but not empty. The main cultures already present became 
known as the “Bantu”. Their history, their cultures and languages played, and contin-
ue to play, a very significant role in the shaping of the colonial and post-colonial en-
vironment. The “Bantu”3 cultures appear to have originated around the region now 
known as Cameroon and the neighbouring areas of Nigeria.4 Evidence, such as it is, 
suggests that they lived in loosely affiliated kin groups, without a significant and or-
ganised central structure, and their identity was shaped by their belonging to a specif-
ic kin group.5 Centralization into kingdoms appears to have emerged amongst the 
Bantu cultures in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo and the concept of 
the centralised state eventually migrated south into what is now Zambia.6 The emer-
ging nations were varied in terms of their centralization and organization but there 
was a good deal of political “borrowing” as powerful individuals competed with one 
another for control of resources and long distance trade.7 By the 15th century there 
were societies which exhibited many of the features of discrete and centralized states 
with a clear sense of a common linguistic and cultural identity as a “people”, capable 
of developing resources and regulating trade links across wide areas. These states 
came into contact with both European and Arab traders who were establishing them-
3 The name “Bantu” properly describes a groups of languages and is taken from the root ntu used 
in words throughout the range of modern Bantu cultures to denote a human being. Thus in 
Icibemba umuntu/abantu = Human/Humans or Person/Persons.
4 Curtin, Feireman, Thompson, and Vanisna, African History, 25.
5 Joseph Calder Miller, Kings and Kinsmen: Early Mbundu States in Angola (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976), 48.
6 Irving Kaplan, ed., Zambia, a Country Study, 3rd ed., Area handbook series (Washington: 




selves along the coasts. Inevitably as Bantu nations continued to vie with one another 
for access to trade, technology, territory and natural resources they made the best use 
they could of any advantages acquired through these contacts. 
In Southern Africa the Zulu, part of a wider Nguni ethnic group, emerged under 
their king, Shaka, as the most significant power in the region. Their sudden and viol-
ent expansion generated what is known as the “mfecane”,8 the ensuing instability 
leaving  a  legacy  in  inter-ethnic  relationships,  language,  and  culture  throughout 
Southern Africa. Villages grew larger and alliances were forged amongst loosely af-
filiated kin groups or between ethnic groups. Already well-defined groups central-
ised, smaller weaker groups were assimilated into more powerful neighbours, all in a 
search for security.
3.2 The Arrival of The Europeans
European colonisation of what is now Zambia began with Cecil Rhodes who had 
offered to establish a colony organised, administered and paid for by a Chartered 
Company, The British South Africa Company (hereafter the BSAC), which would be 
allowed to profit from land and mineral rights.9 The Charter gave the Company the 
authority to negotiate with local rulers for treaties or concessions, and, on the basis of 
these, to occupy and administer territory. Rhodes' representatives persuaded Loben-
gula, King of the Ndebele, to grant the Company rights to exploit the mineral re-
sources in his territory,  and to do anything necessary to that end.10 As Lobengula 
claimed sovereignty over most of what is now Zimbabwe the concession provided 
8 Zulu: “crushing” or “scattering”, also known as the “Difaqane” or “Lifaqane” in Sesotho. 
9 Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), 34-37.
10 Ibid., 47.
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Rhodes with a pretext upon which to claim British “effective occupation” of the ter-
ritory in the face of stiff European competition. Rhodes subsequently proceeded to 
piece together a network of further treaties and concessions securing British influ-
ence, at least in European eyes, over a territory whose northern boundaries eventu-
ally reached to the Congo Free State and German East Africa.11 The BSAC was al-
lowed to govern the entire territory, both north and south of the Zambezi, until 1924, 
when the northern part became a British Protectorate, and the southern a self-govern-
ing colony.12
3.3 Northern Rhodesia: Company and Colonial Rule 
The Company's original intention was to profit by expropriating land north of the 
Zambezi  and  offering  it  for  sale  to  Europeans.  This  was  not  entirely  successful 
simply because “the anticipated white-settler farmers failed to arrive”.13 The viability 
of the Company's project remained in some doubt until the discovery of large depos-
its of copper near to the border with the Congo Free State created a nascent industrial 
economy.14
3.3.1 Hut Tax
In order to be profitable the Company required cheap labour for its new industry 
and agriculture. Africans, understandably, had been reluctant to give up their familiar 
lifestyle for the mines, factories, farms and European homes throughout Southern 
11 Christina Lamb, The Africa House: The True Story of an English Gentleman and His African  
Dream (London: Viking, 1999).
12 Blake, A History of Rhodesia, 91-92.
13 Mwelwa C Musambachime, “Colonialism and the environment in Zambia,” in Guardians in 
Their Time: Experiences of Zambians Under Colonial Rule 1890-1964, ed. Samuel N Chipun-
gu (London: Macmillan, 1992), 8-29 The quote is from page 18.
14 Hortense Powdermaker, Copper Town: changing Africa. The human situation on the  
Rhodesian Copperbelt. (New York: Haper and Row, 1962), 58.
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Africa.15 The Company therefore introduced a tax which became payable in cash in 
order to compel African men to engage in wage labour.16 As the wages in industrial 
areas were higher than those paid by in the rural communities men tended to leave 
their villages, often for long periods. This disrupted the traditional social and eco-
nomic life of the rural communities.17 It also created an urban population reliant upon 
industrial employment for their livelihood. The Great Depression generated concerns 
that an urban population lacking employment would soon become sufficiently disaf-
fected to turn to crime and violence. Consequently a number of mechanisms were ad-
opted in order to encourage the urban workforce to remain in contact with their home 
communities and to compel those whose contracts had ended to return to their vil-
lages.  These mechanisms were made up in part  of restrictions on living in urban 
areas and in part embedded in the policy of Indirect Rule. 18 
3.3.2 Indirect Rule
The BSAC used local chiefs to aid its administration and the Protectorate Govern-
ment developed this into a programme of “Indirect Rule” which left as much as pos-
sible of the administration in the hands of the chiefs as the “Native Authorities”.19 
The Authorities were responsible for collection of taxes, a portion of which was re-
tained in the “tribal treasury” for payment of staff and investment in the development 
of roads, wells, schools and health facilities as well as the provision of small loans 
15 Chipasha Luchembe, “Ethnic stereotypes, violence and labour in early colonial Zambia,” in 
Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of Zambians Under Colonial Rule 1890-1964, ed. 
Samuel N Chipungu (London: MacMillan, 1992), 30-49.
16 Henry S Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism. A Prelude to the Politics of Independence in  
Northern Zambia, 1893-1939, Etc (Manchester: Published for the Institute for African Studies, 
University of Zambia by Manchester University Press., 1971), 87.
17 Ibid., 89.
18 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 48-49.
19 Davis Modern Industry and the African, 250-253.
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for local enterprise. These resources were ultimately allotted by the chiefs, who also 
retained their traditional control over the, ever vital, access to land. Traditional Afric-
an customs were retained, albeit in altered form, in as far as they were not “repugnant 
to 'natural justice' and morality”.20 Family matters, such as marriage and divorce, fell 
under the control of the Native Authorities and local chiefly courts. The Authorities 
were also responsible for a good deal that did not derive directly from African cus-
tomary law, such as the issue of a wide range of permits and the collection of levies  
and fees introduced by the Protectorate government.21 Indirect Rule thus gave chiefs 
considerable patronage and power.22 This was enhanced by a number of government 
measures to bolster the authority of the chiefs and centralise their control over their 
communities.23 
Nevertheless, Indirect Rule also generated some ambivalences. Daniel Posner notes 
that,  far from being built  up, traditional norms and institutions were often under-
mined.24 The status of chiefs often came not from their traditional roles within soci-
ety but from the power given to them as patrons and court magistrates under a system 
shaped for European administrative purposes. Even where the Government enhanced 
their authority within the African community it also placed strict limits on their real 
power. The Protectorate Administration was able to compel or revoke the binding or-
ders of the Native Authority,25 as well as placing limits on the matters over which the 
Authorities had jurisdiction and political  competence,  especially where Europeans 
were concerned. Moreover the British did not hesitate to interfere with African polit-
20 Ibid., 254.
21 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 34-35, 45.
22 Ibid., 33.
23 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 28; Lowe et. al. “Talking about "Tribe".
24 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 31.
25 Davies Modern Industry and the African, 254.
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ical relationships and structures. Chiefdoms were created where none previously ex-
isted. Hierarchies of chiefs, where one Authority became senior over others, were de-
veloped, even where there was no traditional acknowledgement of any relationship; 
several chiefdoms were amalgamated into one single Native Authority in the name of 
efficient  administration.  The  government  also  interfered  with  the  succession  of 
chiefs, picking those who were most “progressive” or “competent”.26
3.3.3 The Formation of Ethnic Identity
Posner argues that, taken together, the measures of Indirect Rule and the limitations 
on permanent urban residence had the effect of creating and strengthening allegi-
ances between individuals and the ethnic community to which they were allotted. In 
order to be sure of obtaining the social and economic goods which the chiefs and 
their  Native  Authority  administrations  had  within  their  gift  it  was  necessary  for 
people to cultivate and retain close relationships with the community, embracing and 
investing in their allegiance to ethnic groups.27 This was as much the case for urban 
as for rural communities. While residential “locations” or compounds were not se-
gregated, job allocation was usually made on the basis of a series of ethnic stereo-
types.28 Other  mechanisms to provide opportunities  for  building  ethnic affiliation 
were in place in the residential locations. Recreational activities and competitions, in-
cluding traditional dances and songs, were often organised along group lines. Chiefs 
26 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 253-255.
27 Ibid., 40.
28 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 46; Luchembe, “Ethnic stereotypes, violence 
and labour in early colonial Zambia.”
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and village headmen were regularly invited to visit the locations, enabling them to 
exact tribute and remind their subjects of the affiliation which the urban worker had 
every reason to maintain in order to be sure of a secure retirement.29 
Indirect Rule was informed by an ideology in which the imperial project was one of 
benevolent “trusteeship” exercised by the rulers on behalf of, and for the good of, the 
ruled, who were being slowly brought to the “light of civilization”.30 The institutions 
of Indirect Rule were to be an “instrument to meet the developing needs of Native 
society” and therefore of guiding them into “Modern Maturity”.31 Inevitably, Indirect 
Rule enhanced the identification of individuals with their tribe in as far as the tribe 
was to be a “self-determinate” or “semi-autonomous” entity in which the Chief exer-
cised a role in which he had considerable power and patronage.32 Posner provides 
compelling evidence to show that numbers claiming membership of those groups 
which had Native Authorities tended to increase as a percentage of the population, 
while those that did not tended to decline.33 The logic of Indirect Rule together with 
the constraints of life in the towns offered every incentive and opportunity for the mi-
grant worker to maintain his or her links with village and ethnic group, and to act-
ively invest in the well-being of their communities of origin. That these incentives 
and opportunities were seized without hesitation by many is more or less incontro-
vertible.34 
29 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 41-52.
30 Brian Stanley, The Bible and the Flag: Protestant Missions and British Imperialism in the  
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Leicester, England: Apollos, 1990), 36-37, 47.
31 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 41-52.
32 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 251-252.
33 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 36-40.
34 Ibid., 51.
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Posner, however, makes a little too much of the effect of company and government 
policies. There is little doubt that African culture was reshaped by those government 
policies pursued for the sake of administrative efficiency, and that as a consequence 
ethnic allegiances were reshaped. The Europeans, however, did not create identities 
ex nihilo. Ethnic identities already existed and were already in a process of change 
and  coalescence  as  a  result  of  events  which  predated  the  European  colonial 
enterprise, a process which government policy certainly encouraged and redirected.
3.3.4 Segregation
While Indirect Rule could be seen as something relatively benign, even beneficial, 
it could also be understood as encouraging segregation and a “soft” version of “sep-
arate  development”.  There  were  places  from which  Africans  were physically ex-
cluded except as servants. Africans were served separately in shops, often through 
windows or hatches. People lived in separate areas of the urban environments and 
had separate land tenure arrangements in the rural communities.35 The constraints 
and incentives for Africans to invest in their ethnic identity contributed to this by cre-
ating separate legal systems, the one designated as superior and the other to uphold 
the first and be reshaped in its service. Africans were also excluded from participa-
tion in political life by the various combinations of educational and wealth qualifica-
tions limiting the franchise. 
35 Lamb, The Africa House, 311; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 49; John V. 
Taylor, Christians of the Copperbelt; The Growth of the Church in Northern Rhodesia. (Lon-
don: SCM, 1961).
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However,  this  social  and  political  exclusion  lacked  the  theoretical  foundation 
provided for Apartheid by Calvinism in South Africa and was at least theoretically 
intended to allow Africans to “progress” at their own pace. Settlers could deny im-
putations of racism by pointing out that the qualifications for the franchise applied to 
everyone and made no mention of race or colour. Thus racism was concealed under a 
cloak of benevolent paternalism which implied that one day Africans would be equal 
partners in a multi-racial society.36 The sense of European superiority, the protections 
surrounding skilled employment and the restrictions on African social and economic 
advancement all determined that, as far as the European settlers were concerned, the 
“one day” would not be soon, “not in a thousand years”.37
3.4 The Federation
The question of the relationship between African and European Settler in the Pro-
tectorate was at its most intense during the years of the Federation, and Zambia today 
celebrates this formative period of its nationhood in a range of public symbols. Set-
tlers had long campaigned for “Responsible Government” which, it had been determ-
ined, would be best achieved as part of a federal entity to include Southern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland. The political circumstances for the creation of a federation were at 
36 Broomfield, G. W (General Secretary to UMCA) “Last Chance in the Federation of Rhodesia  
and Nyasaland”. UMCA, London 1960. Book marked MMSL AF-SN 1237 in Box MMSL AF-
SN 975-1410 SOAS Library Archives, University of London. He writes of the European set-
tlers bringing prosperity and security to “large numbers of Africans” and of building a civilisa-
tion out of the wilderness.
37 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Obituary: Ian Smith,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1136865.stm (Accessed 12 August, 2009).
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their most propitious following the Conservative Party victory in the British General 
Election in 1951. In March 1953, the House of Commons approved the creation of a 
federal entity, subject to a review after between seven and nine years.38
3.4.1 The Rise of African Nationalism
Africans were almost unanimously opposed to the Federation, fearing that their po-
sition would significantly worsen if they were deprived of their status under the Pro-
tectorate.39 African protests, however, went unheard, or were put down to ignorance, 
propaganda  and  manipulation.  As  the  1960  review approached  and  was  debated 
European commentators took up the concept of “partnership” and “common citizen-
ship”,  written  into  the  preamble  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  albeit  without  clear 
definition,40 as ideals and aspirations which were the only hope for the Federation.41 
The language of “partnership” was highly ambivalent. For some it expressed a genu-
ine desire for a multi-racial society in which all should be equal; for others it meant 
European domination. It was in response to many such mixed messages that African 
Nationalism emerged, beginning with the “Welfare Association” at Mwenzo Mission. 
The Mwenzo Welfare Association became a forum for expressing political griev-
ances and making representation to the local administration on a wide variety of mat-
ters of community interest. It became a model for vibrant campaigns against discrim-
38 Mulford, Zambia, 12-19.
39 Ibid., 9.
40 Greaves, Last Chance in the Federation. Notes that there are several ways of defining “Partner-
ship”, including to denote a form of Apartheid.
41 Both Greaves and Broomfield refer to these ideas. Greaves Last Chance in the Federation 
writes: “I know of no reasons to suppose that the desires of civilized African peoples are any 
different from those of any other democratic people” and thinks in terms of the franchise being 
extended as “increasing numbers [of Africans] qualify as responsible citizens”.
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ination and thus the cradle of Zambian nationalism.42 Migrant workers from Northern 
Province spread the model,  forming local Associations where they worked which 
gradually coalesced into a national political  entity,  the African National Congress 
(A.N.C.) with Harry Nkumbula as president.43 Over time,  support for the A.N.C. 
widened and it became more and more influential as a nationwide voice in opposition 
to the Federation.44
The first years of the Federation were relatively prosperous and the worst of Afric-
an fears were not immediately realised. The A.N.C. lost its political way and under-
went a deterioration characterised by inconsistent policies, bickering officials, and a 
widening breach with the trade unions. 
The Federal Government introduced two Bills, the combined effect of which was to 
reduce African representation as a proportion of the Federal legislature. The African 
Affairs Board had retained theoretical power to reserve such legislation for consider-
ation by the British Government. The Board declared the Bills “differentiating meas-
ures”, but was overruled on both. Any African confidence in the future dissolved into 
a bleak vision of permanent subjugation in a European-dominated state and an appet-
ite for militancy returned.45 The A.N.C. had, however, lost much of its internal coher-
ence and Kenneth Kaunda led a break-away faction to form the Zambian African Na-
tional Congress (Z.A.N.C.).
42 Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism. A Prelude to the Politics of Independence in Northern Zam-
bia, 1893-1939, Etc, 240-245.




3.4.1.1 Zambian African National Congress
The new party was considerably more militant than the A.N.C., boycotting the 1959 
elections in which a complex system of differentiated constituencies and a dual list 
franchise46 gave Africans an element of participation without the prospect of real 
power. Popular opinion drifted towards Z.A.N.C. and consequently voter registration 
for these elections remained low.47 
The election results clearly show how little influence the African vote had. Even in 
rural Special Constituencies, where the African vote, despite being discounted by the 
dual list system, was large enough to determine the outcome, European votes had 
disproportionate influence.48 As the incumbent United Federal Party (U.F.P.) returned 
to  untrammelled power Hastings Banda tartly expressed general  African opinion: 
“Partnership has turned out so much whitewash”.49
The Z.A.N.C. had been vindicated, and having been banned before the election, 
gained the addition of an aura of martyrdom. Opinion moved so far in a militant dir-
ection that even Nkumbula, the only A.N.C. victor, renounced moderation for a cam-
paign of civil  disobedience.50 The government responded with emergency powers 
which enabled it  to  harass  the  Z.A.N.C.  leadership.  Kaunda was imprisoned and 
many others joined him.51 Inevitably this situation could not last. Leaders jailed or 
“restricted” to rural areas had to be released, gaining the kudos of having suffered for 
the cause. The party remained intact and continued to grow. 
46 Lamb, The Africa House, 311.
47 Mulford, Zambia, 91.
48 Ibid., 99.
49 Cited by Greaves Last Chance in the Federation. 7
50 Mulford, Zambia, 111.
51 Lamb, The Africa House, 310-311.
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3.4.1.2 U.N.I.P.
Kaunda was released from prison to find the Z.A.N.C. metamorphosing into the 
United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.).52 Its main area of activity was along 
the “line of rail” to the north of Lusaka, the Copperbelt and in Bemba heartlands of  
Luapula and Northern Provinces from whence much of the Copperbelt labour force 
was drawn. In these areas the population was becoming steadily more militant. Ex-
treme civil disobedience, including refusal to pay taxes and destruction of identity 
papers, was being proposed and the party led a highly successful boycott of the Fed-
eral Review (Monckton) Commission.53 A variety of African civil organisations, in-
cluding the naturally conservative Chiefs' Council, began to follow the U.N.I.P. lead. 
The British Government began to accede to the pressure. Kaunda was invited to 
London for talks, and possibly for the Federal Review.54 Kaunda arrived in London 
on 4th December 1960 and the Federal Review opened the following day. Progress 
was infinitesimal, with the settler parties attempting to frustrate any change to the 
constitution, the White Liberal group suggesting a five-year transition period and the 
Nationalists demanding majority rule immediately.  Eventually the Federal Review 
was suspended in favour of seeking a resolution over the constitutional issue.
Negotiations continued throughout 1961 with a range of proposals offering various 
arrangements in an effort to create a balance of power between the Africans and the 
Settlers. The last of these, issued in June, effectively diminished the chances of the 
Nationalists winning upper roll support in the National constituencies and thus elim-
52 Ibid., 131.
53 Mulford, Zambia, 143-159.
54 Ibid., 175-179.
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inated the likelihood of an African majority in the Legislative Council. Kaunda was 
in a bitter and impatient mood and violence erupted in Zambia almost immediately 
and carried on throughout the (Zambian) winter.55 Almost 3,000 people were con-
victed of a variety of offences. In September the turbulence ceased almost as sud-
denly as it had begun.
3.4.2 The End of the Federation
There were further political manoeuvres during the closing months of 1961. The 
Government eased the restrictions imposed on U.N.I.P.  during the winter and the 
Governor  resumed constitutional  discussions,  and it  was  now the Settlers  turn to 
threaten chaos in the face of a steadily weakening position.56
A new constitution was published in March 1962 and the elections were set for Oc-
tober. Accepting this as a step towards independence both U.N.I.P. and the A.N.C. 
decided to contest the elections. The results show the depth of division between Set-
tler and Nationalist communities. Any “middle ground” between the Settler and Na-
tionalist aspirations had vanished. The small Liberal Party was effectively annihil-
ated and disbanded shortly after the election, bequeathing its constituency to U.N.I.P. 
Even “middle class” Africans, whom one would expect to be a more moderate con-
stituency, seemed to have supported the militant Nationalist agenda. 57
55 Lamb, The Africa House, 322.
56 Mulford, Zambia, 231.
57 Ibid., 265.
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3.4.2.1.1 Reaching out to the Europeans
Despite the divisions, U.N.I.P. had been attempting to build support amongst the 
Settlers. The efforts were disrupted in the violence of 1961, but resumed with vigour 
during  the  1962  Elections.  Although  Kaunda  dropped  none  of  his  objectives, 
Europeans were invited to join in the building of a new Northern Rhodesia. He atten-
ded nightly multi-racial meetings and always spoke in reconciliatory terms of a genu-
ine long term partnership in which the Settler community would always be welcome 
in Zambia because they were human beings with the same rights as Africans.58 
U.N.I.P.’s efforts began to bear fruit. The party began to attract European members 
and  a  “floating  vote”  developed  amongst  Europeans.59 In  the  elections  of  1964 
U.N.I.P. attracted 35.2% of the European vote and came within 120 votes of claiming 
the constituency of Ndola in the Copperbelt.60
3.4.2.1.2 Coalition Government
Following the 1962 elections the A.N.C. held the balance of power in the legis-
lature. To ensure nationalist victory the A.N.C. and the U.N.I.P. needed to enter into a 
coalition. Nkumbula arrived together with Kaunda at the A.N.C. conference, held as 
by-election results to fill “frustrated” National seats were released,61 and dramatically 




61 Special seats which could only be filled by a candidate gaining sufficient votes from both elect-
oral rolls counted separately. Often these could not be filled on the first attempt as a candidate 
failed to gain the quota from one roll while commanding a majority in the other.
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ernment now? How many are behind me?”62 The answers were predictable, and, fol-
lowing intensive negotiations, Northern Rhodesia’s first African Government came 
to power.
3.4.2.1.3 Constitutional Questions
Nkumbula was never deeply committed to the coalition, expressing the belief that it 
would not last. This meant that there was a real urgency about establishing a new 
constitution and holding yet  more elections.  A new constitution required that  the 
question of the Lozi-speaking Kingdom of Barotseland be addressed. The Kingdom's 
well established distinctive identity derived from its separate Protectorate treaty. The 
Lozi King had supported the Federation and sought a separation from any future in-
dependent state.63 His petitions were refused and the Kingdom became a reluctant, 
but integral part of Zambia. Prior to the elections of 1964 the Barotse government 
was reformed to make it more representative and elections were held to the Barotse 
National Council. The U.N.I.P. was popular with the younger and better educated 
Barotse, who saw the party as offering change in the face of a stifling traditionalist 
government dominated by old men and the U.N.I.P. won all the available seats.64
The constitution was more or less complete by September 1963 and the elections 
set for 20 and 21 January 1964. Under universal suffrage there was never any real 
doubt about the outcome. The main surprise was that the almost defunct A.N.C. actu-
ally  won  ten  seats.  The  U.N.I.P.,  however,  had  won  a  significant  majority  and 
62 Ibid.
63 Owen J. M. Kalinga, “Independence Negotiations in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.,” In-
ternational Negotiation 10, no. 2 (May 2005): 258.
64 Mulford, Zambia, 219, 228, 314.
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Kaunda became Prime Minister. Yet another constitution, this time establishing the 
Republic of Zambia, was published, and on 24th October 1964, at midnight, Kaunda 
became the first Republican President.
3.4.3 Independent Zambia
The constitution of the new nation created centralised institutions and a potentially 
authoritarian government in which the President was both Head of Government and 
Head of State. The President appointed the Cabinet, which was selected from, but not 
responsible to, the National Assembly. The centralised government set about building 
a “centralised command economy”,  increasing educational spending, nationalising 
industry and creating the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) to lead in-
dustrial diversification. While copper prices were high the nation might be able to 
sustain a carefully managed necessary expenditure. All too often, however, INDECO 
projects were ill conceived and designed for political and ethnic gains rather than 
economic sustainability.65 Kaunda's support for those opposing neighbouring white 
dominated regimes made further  demands upon the exchequer.  Military spending 
rose and traditional trade routes through Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa closed, requiring considerable investment in new infrastructure.66 
65 Edem Djokotoe and Pamela Chama, Show Me The Money (Lusaka: Transparancy International 
Zambia, 2006), 52.
66 Kaplan, Zambia, a Country Study, 42-43.
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3.4.3.1.1 Fragmentation
Limited resources exacerbated ethnic rivalries and the collapse of the precarious re-
lationship between Europeans and Africans which the U.N.I.P. had attempted to build 
prior  to  Independence was one of the first  signs  of  fragmentation.67 The alliance 
between the A.N.C. and the U.N.I.P. also did not last long. The A.N.C. became the 
opposition party in parliament, but the centralised nature of the state with its focus on 
the President in the dual roles of Head of State and Head of Government, gave rise to 
a confusion between state and government which made the concept of democratic 
opposition difficult to grasp. The A.N.C. were firmly tied to the Southern Province 
and the Tonga people. Few Tonga needed to join the migrant workforce in order to 
pay their taxes. Those who did migrate tended to travel to Southern Rhodesia and 
South Africa rather than to the Copperbelt.68 The Lozi were entirely dependent upon 
migration south for industrial employment. Both the Lozi and the Tonga were, there-
fore, disaffected groups within Zambia, who were “losing out” as a result of the Gov-
ernment's foreign policy. The 1968 elections saw the A.N.C., which differed signific-
antly in its approach to foreign policy, win a number of constituencies in the south 
and west, and come to articulate Tonga and Lozi disaffection in Parliament.69
Given these factors, it is easy to see how the A.N.C. became subject to accusations 
of tribalism and treason. The A.N.C. Leadership was arrested and its members were 
harassed, intimidated, and subjected to a range of restrictions. After 1968 the party 
67 Ibid., 50.
68 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 77; Jan Pettman, Zambia. Security and Con-
flict (Lewes: Julian Friedmann, 1974), 68.
69 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 66.
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lost  its  recognition as the official  opposition on the grounds that  it  did not have 
enough MPs.70 Essentially a clear ethnic cleavage was developing between Tonga 
and Lozi speakers and groups in the North and North-East.71 
3.4.3.1.2 The One Party State
The U.N.I.P. originated in the North and North-East of Zambia, amongst CiBemba 
speaking  peoples  Many  Bemba  migrated  to  the  Copperbelt  mines,  making  the 
Province a de facto Bemba speaking region.72 The U.N.I.P. found these urban Bemba 
speakers a ready force for agitation and strikes in pursuit of independence, and their 
continued support became essential for stability in copper dependent Zambia. As a 
consequence, the U.N.I.P. was often identified as a “Bemba” party. 
The Bemba speakers within the post-Independence party were, however, inclined to 
be dissatisfied with their share of the spoils of victory. Kaunda paid careful attention 
to the balance of his cabinets and the Bemba perceived themselves as under-repres-
ented at the centre of power. One time Vice-President, Simon Kapwepwe, defected in 
1970, citing “Bemba sufferings and victimisation”, to form his own United Progress-
ive (Party U.P.P.) which quickly gained support in the Bemba speaking provinces, 
which formed the U.N.I.P. heartland.73 The new party was eventually banned, and 
Kapwepwe was detained as “a tool of neo-colonialist forces” and an “agent of South-
ern African régimes” as well as even more unlikely accusations.74 
70 Ibid., 67.
71 Kaplan, Zambia, a Country Study, 38.
72 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 72-75.
73 Michael. Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over,” Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 (1992): 83.
74 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 62.
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There was extreme tension, both within the U.N.I.P. and nationally, following the 
banning of the U.P.P.. The U.N.I.P. sought to resolve the tension by creating a new 
constitution  establishing  Zambia  as  a  “one  party  participatory  democracy”.  The 
“Second Republic” came into being in 1973.
The one-party state, however, solved little in the way of either ethnic tension or 
economic problems. Oil prices rose dramatically after 1973 and income from copper 
fell.  Agricultural  production,  although left  largely in  private  hands,  had declined, 
leaving Zambia reliant upon food imports through the 60s and 70s.75 Like many other 
African countries, Zambia borrowed heavily, with devastating results. Soon the debt 
was beyond realistic repayment.76 
The IMF imposed a “Structural Adjustment”  in 1983 which  obliged the Govern-
ment to remove subsidies from food staples,  but this  was continually blocked by 
protests from students and the urban poor.77 Tensions within the nation rose steadily 
and Kaunda resorted to manipulation and repression.78
3.4.3.1.3 The M.M.D. and the return to a multi-party state
In July 1990 the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (M.M.D.) was formed out of 
a variety of disaffected business and trade-union groups to campaign for the restora-
tion of a multi-party democracy. Kaunda was eventually forced to concede to a mul-
ti-party election and to accept independent international electoral monitors. Elections 
75 Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: Free 
Press, 2006), 282.
76 Lishala C. Situmbeko and Jack Jones Zulu, “Zambia: Condemned to Debt,” PDF object, zam-
bia01042004.pdf, April 2004, 7, http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/debt/zambi-
a01042004.pdf (Accessed 21 January, 2009). Accessed 12 January 2009.
77 Ibid., 21.
78 Meredith, The State of Africa, 381.
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were held in October 1991, and the M.M.D., lead by Frederick Chiluba, duly won a 
massive victory both in the parliamentary and presidential  contests.  Kaunda, in a 
move almost unprecedented in Africa, conceded defeat.79
During the campaign to oust Kaunda both Chiluba and Kaunda appealed to Christi-
an sentiment. Kaunda presented himself as a “Christian Gentleman”.80 He had, how-
ever, flirted with what he called “Humanism” and “Indian spirituality”. Chiluba was 
perceived to be a committed member of the United Church of Zambia, he claimed to 
have had a conversion experience and to have received the gift of tongues. He gained 
a good deal of Christian support, especially from the “evangelical” groups. Once vic-
torious, Chiluba felt he had to make a “pay-off” to these supporters, and two months 
after the elections he declared Zambia to be a “Christian Nation”.81
The  declaration  was  enthusiastically  welcomed  by the  evangelical  groups.  The 
mainstream churches however, were a good deal more ambivalent, welcoming the 
idea  that  government  should  be  conducted  according  to  the  highest  of  Christian 
standards and principles, but wary of anything that might compromise the secular 
nature of the state.82
79 Ibid., 406.





The aura of Christianity did little to disguise the consequences of Chiluba's eco-
nomic policy, which was based on fulfilling IMF conditions and structural adjust-
ment  programmes.  Import  tax  regimes  were  liberalised  and  overall  government 
spending  reduced  with  disastrous  results.  Formal  employment  in  all  sectors  col-
lapsed.83
The Government's records on financial probity and transparency were no better. 
Many believed that the new Government  included a number of corrupt  ministers 
from the past.84 The irregularities, scandals and blatant corruption attending many of 
the Government's programmes, most especially the Presidential Housing Initiative, 
did nothing to dispel this view.85
The dangers of the “Christian Nation” soon became apparent.  It  became briefly 
fashionable for Chiluba to be presented as God's chosen President and, consequently, 
opposition to him was viewed as opposition to God.86 Chiluba invited North Americ-
an “tele-evangelists” to conduct highly dubious “miracle crusades” and revivals; by 
eliciting their support and approval, he gained a semblance of credibility and interna-
tional legitimation for his re-election campaign.87 Paranoia and intolerance of opposi-
tion soon became hallmarks of Chiluba's presidency in much the same way as they 
were of Kaunda's. Plots and coup attempts abounded. The Constitution was altered in 
83 Situmbeko and Zulu, “Zambia Condemned to Debt,” 31, 33.
84 Gifford "African Christianity", 182.
85 Djokotoe and Chama, Show Me The Money, xiv.
86 Gifford, African Christianity, 202.
87 Ibid., 203-204.
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order to exclude Kaunda as a candidate in advance of the 1996 elections and efforts 
were made to deport not only Kaunda, but also a number of other leading political 
opponents.88
In 1998 Chiluba was behind yet another campaign to alter the constitution, this time 
to allow him a “third term” as President. In April 2001 the Party Conference voted to 
nominate him as its presidential candidate. The party fragmented, and 43 M.M.D. 
Members of Parliament, including cabinet ministers, joined Opposition members in 
pledging to uphold the Constitution.89 By early May the opposition, both in Parlia-
ment and throughout the country, was so intense that Chiluba publicly abandoned the 
third-term bid in an exchange for a pivotal role in the nomination of his successor, 
Levy Patrick Mwanawasa. This led to further fragmentation and the abrupt and noisy 
departure of Chiluba's former “fixer”, Michael Sata, to establish his own Patriotic 
Front Party. 
Many believed Mwanawasa would be no more than Chiluba's puppet. This, how-
ever, appears not to be the case. Chiluba's immunity from prosecution as a former 
Head of State was removed at Mwanwasa's instigation and he (Chiluba) was prosec-
uted on several counts of corruption both in Zambia and in London.90
88 Whitaker, “Citizens and Foreigners.”
89 Post 3rd April 2001. Front Page
90 “World Briefing | Africa: Zambia: Ex-President Loses Immunity - New York Times,” July 17, 
2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9C0DE2DE1239F934A25754C0A9649C8B63&scp=1&sq=Africa:%20Zambia:%20Ex-
President%20Loses%20Immunity%20July%20&st=cse (Accessed 26 January, 2009); “World 
Briefing | Africa: Zambia: Ex-President Told To Repay Stolen Millions - New York Times,” 
Mqy 5, 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E2D6113E-
F936A35756C0A9619C8B63 (Accessed 26 January, 2009).
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3.4.4 Some Conclusions
A number of conclusions can be derived from the foregoing account of Zambia's 
formation. Firstly, we have seen that there were a number of ethnic identities already 
existing in the territory. Some of these were already becoming more clearly-defined 
before the Europeans arrived. They had also begun to attract the allegiance of other 
culturally similar groups who were seeking alliances to secure themselves in the face 
of significant external threats. The Company and British Administrations, through the 
mechanisms of Indirect Rule, created the circumstances in which this process contin-
ued and accelerated,  despite  increasing  urbanisation  and industrialisation  through 
which ethnic identity might be expected to weaken.
Secondly, we have seen that during the same period contact with and subjugation to 
the European colonial power also created the circumstances in which a new “nation-
al” identity could be formed, particularly in the midst of the conflict over the Federa-
tion. This identity appears to have been fragile, and it began to unravel as soon as In-
dependence had been gained, fragmenting into a number of rival factions defined, at 
least in the main part, by ethnic affiliation. In attempting to contain the tensions cre-
ated by this unravelling the ruling party instigated a one party state. 
Thirdly, we have observed that while the one-party state changed the parameters of 
the ethnic conflict to some extent, it failed to address any of the underlying causes of 
conflict, and the Party and its President were eventually removed from power, to be 
replaced by the M.M.D. The M.M.D. was created to achieve this end. While it was 
able to mobilise large numbers and, temporarily, to transcend ethnic identities, it too 
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has proved to be a fragile coalition, with a number of its leading members abruptly 
departing to join or to form opposition parties as the internal competition for power 
and its financial benefits intensified. We have not yet established whether the result-
ing competing factions have an ethnic basis; this matter will be investigated in a later 
chapter.
Finally we have seen that the M.M.D. has shown as little  understanding of the 
concept of “loyal opposition” as the U.N.I.P. It has repeated the U.N.I.P.'s authoritari-
anism, and has been just as profoundly incapable of dealing with even the most con-
structive criticism. Neither has it been able to address the underlying causes of ten-
sion and conflict. Zambia, therefore, remains in a deeply conflicted state.
The story has been told, and the scene set. We have yet to achieve any real insight 
into how competing ethnic identities coalesced into a single national identity.  We 
must now analyse the foregoing historical material to achieve an insight into how the 
conflicts of the past have shaped both ethnic and national identity. This will be car-
ried out over the next three chapters, drawing upon the insights of René Girard.
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4 The Identity of A Nation
In the last chapter we recounted something of the story of the creation of the nation 
of Zambia. From this story it is clear that the “national” identity of Zambia has been 
constructed relatively recently. Prior to the arrival of the British, the territory was oc-
cupied by disparate and scattered Bantu groups with their own agendas and relation-
ships. There was nothing which could be thought of as a political or historical pre-
cursor  to  Zambia  and no identity held  in  common to  which  the  various  African 
groups could subscribe. This raises the question to which this chapter is addressed, 
why is there a nation called Zambia, despite the clear evidence for ethnic divisions in 
the nation? The question becomes more vital when we consider two further facts. 
First the policies adopted by the Protectorate Government and the mining companies 
ensured that ethnic identity was driven along a specific path of clarification and co-
alescence. Second, neither the multi-party states nor the one-party state of post-inde-
pendence Zambia have successfully established a truly unified nation state. 
Clearly, the only heritage which the nation as an entity can claim is that of the Pro-
tectorate. If we are to understand why Zambia came into, and remains in, existence in 
spite of its divided self, then it is the colonial period which we must consider. The 
purpose of this chapter is therefore to explain the emergence of the nation of Zambia. 
drawing upon the theory of René Girard.
Girard's thesis is that identity, whether communal or individual, is formed out of de-
sire, which is never desire as such, but always desire which is mediated by a model. 
Identity emerges as desires coincide and the imitator and the model aspire to the 
89
same “object of desire” and engage in mimetic rivalry. The central focus of the con-
flict moves from the object to the rivals as each seeks “kudos”: the unanswerable 
power to finally displace and exclude the other with such effect that there is no pos-
sible response. As this phase, or “moment”, of the conflict progresses, distinctions 
between the rivals collapse, and the phenomenon of “mimetic doubling” occurs, in 
which the patterns and actions of one become replicated by the other so that each 
rival becomes a mirror image of the other. The doubled rivals do not occupy the same 
place in the pattern at the same time, but each takes the same position in succession. 
The quicker the rhythm of reprisals, the shorter the wait. The faster the blows 
rain down, the clearer it becomes that there is no difference between those who 
strike the blows and those who receive them. On both sides everything is equal; 
not only the desire, the violence, the strategy, but also the alternation of victory 
and defeat, of exaltation and despair.1
4.1 Internal and External Mediation
Girard argues that desire can be mediated in two main ways: externally and intern-
ally. In external mediation, the model is at sufficient “distance” that direct rivalry be-
comes impossible. The usual literary example is that of Don Quixote, who seeks to 
imitate Amadis of Gaul, the “perfect knight”. As Amadis is a fictional figure Quixote 
can imitate his chivalry without direct conflict arising, because he and Amadis can 
never become rivals for the same object. 
External mediation can also take place where the symbolic distance between the 
model and imitator is sufficient to prevent direct rivalry. Social distinctions, class, 
prestige, power, wealth: all are barriers to direct conflictual rivalry while permitting 
1 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 158.
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some level of mimesis.2 A small child, for example, is so entirely dependent upon its 
parents that any conflictual mimesis is soon suppressed. Social  institutions which 
maintain the distinctions between groups,  classes or individuals or maintain hier-
archy and social order create symbolic distances by making it seem impossible for 
the imitator to attain to the position of the model. This reduces the danger of mimesis 
sliding into direct confrontation.
Internal mediation occurs when the social or symbolic separation between the mod-
el and the imitator is reduced. The latter is more capable of attaining the object of de-
sire, permitting the two to become rivals. At the very core of this internal mediation 
is the “double bind” of “imitate me/do not imitate me”. As each seeks to resist the 
mimesis  of  the other  the struggle  for  mimetic  identification  grows more  intense, 
doubling occurs, and finally a collapse into a catharsis through which some form of 
harmonious identity is established as a result of the expulsion of the victim.
It  is  usual  for  forms of  mimesis  to  change as  the social  and symbolic  distance 
between the model  and the imitator  changes.  The symbolic  distance between the 
small child and its parents are too great for conflictual mimesis. As the child grows, 
however,  the  disparities  in  power  within  the  relationship  reduce  and  conflictual 
mimesis develops. All parents know the “negative phase” of early childhood and the 
fraught and conflicted relationships with teenage children, phases which form part of 
the pattern of identification and expulsion through which identity develops.3
2 Fleming, René Girard, 17-18.
3 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 30.
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In  our  effort  to  understand  the  emergence  of  Zambia  from the  Protectorate  of 
Northern Rhodesia we shall seek to examine the history, which we have already re-
counted, for evidence of these patterns of mimesis rivalry, doubling and catharsis. 
This will allow us both to test the effectiveness of our interpretative tool and, should 
our tool prove effective, to come to some conclusions concerning the origin of Zam-
bia as a nation and of its national identity. We will first examine the emerging identit-
ies of both the Settler and the African populations, seeking the points at which they 
interacted in conflict with one another and with the British Colonial Office, and seek 
to show that it is the relationships conflictual mimesis which caused these identities 
to emerge. 
4.2 Conflict and Identities in Northern Rhodesia
4.2.1 European Identity and Africans: Land Rights
The  historical  evidence  indicates  that  a  complex  multi-dimensional  pattern  of 
rivalry amongst Africans, between Arabs and Africans, amongst European powers, 
and between Arabs and Europeans and Africans and Europeans generated what is of-
ten known as the “Scramble For Africa” which led to a British colonial rule in South-
ern and Central Africa. This scramble to acquire and occupy African territory was 
born less out of a desire to have African colonies as such, than out of the rivalries 
between the European powers. British Governments became entrapped in a spiral of 
territorial seizures, which expanded the boundaries of their southern African acquisi-
tion ever northwards in a quest for “security” for what was intended to be little more 
than a re-provisioning station for shipping between the Far East and Britain.4 Each of 
4 Stanley, The Bible and the Flag, 42-43.
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the conflicting powers wanted what the other desired without either being sure of its 
“intrinsic value”.5 The Scramble can therefore be understood as a mimetic rivalry fo-
cused initially upon control of territory, so that others could be prevented from gain-
ing control of it. As the European powers were intent upon validating their control 
before both their own and other European eyes, the Scramble became a race to ac-
quire a network of dubious treaties and concessions from African leaders.6 There 
was, of course, only a passing semblance of legality to this. The treaties and conces-
sions were shadowy instruments designed to provide, often morally very dubious, 
European interests with sufficient pretext to establish or at least claim “effective oc-
cupation” and ensure territory fell into their specific “sphere of influence” rather than 
that of another nation. If the African leaders soon had doubts about the extent and 
meaning of what they had given to the representatives of the European commercial 
and government interests they found just as soon that they could not regain their con-
trol. The legal niceties of treaties and concessions were designed to displace African 
as well as other European powers from their claims to control of territory.
As European Settlers arrived in Northern Rhodesia they were quickly drawn into 
their own locally specific set of rivalries with the African population on the one hand, 
and the British Foreign and Colonial Office on the other. These were a mimetic rep-
resentation of the larger national rivalries. The Settlers had been lured into the colo-
nial project by the offer of land and/or business opportunities predicated upon the 
B.S.A.C.'s claim to control the land on the basis of the same dubious grants and treat-
ies which established “effective occupation”. The whole colonial project therefore in-
5 Ibid., 45.
6 Blake, A History of Rhodesia, 76.
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evitably entrapped the Settlers in a mimetic rivalry for a desired good: possession of 
the land. This rivalry was not so much between rival groups of Settlers, as between 
Settlers as a group and the African population who were perceived to be in posses-
sion of the land.
The nature of this as a purely mimetic rivalry becomes clear when we examine the 
population density of the Protectorate. The Davis Survey estimated the usable land 
area of the Northern Rhodesian Protectorate as 288,400 square miles with a total 
population in 1931 of 1,295,081 Africans and 13,846 Whites.7 Despite the uneven 
quality of the land and the disadvantages imposed by climate and environment this 
can hardly be a recipe for overcrowding. Colonisation was slow, “[T]he anticipated 
white-settler farmers failed to arrive and the vacated lands remained silent.”8 Those 
Settlers that did come to Northern Rhodesia bought the land at astonishingly low 
rates.9 Yet the historical records show an unrelenting thirst for land to be expropriated 
and allocated for European use. In order to legitimate their possession the Settlers ad-
opted stereotypes of African land use. They viewed the land as grossly under-utilised 
and crying out for proper development. African agricultural methods were regarded 
as inefficient and incapable of producing sufficient surplus for a modern industrial 
economy. They also adopted the racist stereotypes similar to those elsewhere in the 
region:
7 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 33 The area of Zambia is usually put at slightly over 
290,000 square miles. Davis deducts an amout for unusable land and lakes.
8 Musambachime, “Colonialism and The Environment,” 18.
9 Lamb, The Africa House, 64-65 Gore-Brown bought land at 1 shilling an acre.
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This attitude included some gratuitous assumptions,  to wit:  that the Natives 
were more prolific than Whites; that they were measurably immune from the 
diseases of the districts; that they were a menace to national security; that they 
were potential competitors who, if given the White man's advantages, might 
presently repossess the land, and that with a little skill and education they be-
come "cheeky" and difficult to control.10
Europeans clearly saw the Africans as a threat to their possession of what were (and 
still  are) vast tracts of nearly empty land and ultimately to “national security”, in 
crude terms a people seeking to out-breed and displace them.11 They projected onto 
their  African  rivals  the  identity of  rebellious  and “cheeky” “children”  seeking to 
usurp their parental authority. They were concerned to ensure that their displacement 
of the Africans was permanent, arguing that allocating more land for African usage, 
in effect returning some expropriated land, would be “wasteful and a challenge to 
White supremacy”.12
We can immediately recognize one of Girard's insights: conflictual mimesis arises 
out of the relationship between the rivals and not necessarily from any scarcity in the 
objects which are mutually desired, although scarcity may intensify or exacerbate the 
rivalry. It is the mediation itself that engenders conflictual mimesis, irrespective of 
the object.13 The Company had expropriated the most fertile land and moved the 
African population to considerably less desirable “reserves”, not because land was in 
short supply or of any great intrinsic value, but from desire rooted in the mimesis: the 
mediated desire for an object because others either possessed it or desired it or even 
seemed to possess or desire it.
10 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 100.
11 An ancient form of stereotyping: compare this with Exodus 1:9
12 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 100.
13 Fleming, René Girard, 19.
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4.2.2 European Identity and The Colonial Government
The British and colonial Governments were, despite the appeals of the Settler com-
munity, persuaded by 1934 that allocating more land to Africans was a necessity. 
Land was acquired from the North Charterland Concession Company as crown land 
and  in  1946  a  commission  insisted  that  no  further  land  should  be  allocated  for 
European settlement, at least until that which had already been allocated had been 
taken up. The commission also argued that Africans already resident upon crown 
land should not be forced to move.14 The unease of the Europeans generated by these 
two moves was exacerbated by the fact that Northern Rhodesia was not technically a 
colony, but rather a “Protectorate”, which meant that, while the Settlers could influ-
ence the Governor through representatives elected to a council, they could not form-
ally drive policy through an elected government, nor could Africans be forced into 
making further concessions without at least the passing semblance of negotiation.15 
The protections might well be more theoretical than real, but they were, in Settler 
minds, irksome restrictions on their “rights” and supremacy in the region. The con-
cerns of the settlers were further intensified in 1930 by the Passfield Memorandum. 
This declared African needs to be “paramount” in the Protectorate.16 Taken together 
the Passfield doctrine and the moratorium on land expropriation left the Settlers feel-
ing that the Government was paying little attention to their needs. 
14 Musambachime, “Colonialism and The Environment,” 20.
15 David Armine Howarth, The Shadow of the Dam. [On the Removal of the Tonga Tribesmen  
from the Site of the Kariba Dam.] (London,: Collins, 1961), 73-74.
16 Mulford, Zambia, 7.
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In response the Settlers sought for themselves what was designated as “desirable” 
and had been given to, or won by, both the British domestic population and European 
Settler  communities elsewhere:  representative democratic  self-government.  British 
and British Dominion societies in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada be-
came models for the Settlers who through a mimesis of these societies sought to 
build Western “democratic civilisation” in Africa, through which they would gain de-
terminative power over their own communal life. This would mean that the Governor 
would become a figurehead representing a distant and largely impotent Crown, and 
the local civil service would be directed by a local parliament filling the role of the 
Crown in British society and the governors of other Dominion states. The Settlers 
wished in effect to become not just “like” the model through what they saw as an ac-
countable form of government, but to “become” the model, become the governing 
power in a new state through “Responsible Government” which effectively displaced 
the Governor and Colonial Office, relegating the Governor to a ceremonial symbol.17 
The British Government, motivated by the ideology of high imperialism, was re-
luctant to grant the Settlers independence to the overt detriment of a sense of trustee-
ship.18 The Settlers were therefore blocked by their model. The Settlers, however, did 
not find it easy to enter into a direct confrontation with the Government. In order to 
assert their claims to the land, the Settlers needed to maintain a sense of cultural dif-
ference and superiority: to consider themselves as Europeans rather than as Africans. 
Without the ideological support which gave rise to Apartheid, the Settlers in North-
ern Rhodesia needed the legitimation provided by the British Government's claims 
17 Lamb, The Africa House, 252 Gore-Brown wrote to his aunt "I thought if we could get the 
place out of the hands of the colonial government, we could really make it tick".
18 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 11-12.
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upon the territory based upon the treaties and concessions. Without this their position 
in the Protectorate would have been a good deal more tenuous. The Settlers could not 
therefore, at that time, directly oppose either the British Government, upon whose 
policy they had very little direct influence, or the Governor and his council upon 
which Settler representatives sat by constitutional grant, without fundamentally un-
dermining the whole institutional structure which embodied their self-ascription. 
As the symbolic distances between the Governor and the British Government on the 
one hand and the Settlers on the other were too great for the Settlers to be able to  
enter into a direct conflictual mimesis the Settlers were left instead with the African 
population, whose status as British protected persons was a matter of some irritation, 
as a target for projection in this frustrated and frustrating conflict.19 As a tiny minor-
ity in an African territory the Settlers could not but perceive that anything which re-
duced the distinctions between themselves and the African community would sooner 
or later mean that the Settler community would be disadvantaged and eventually dis-
appear.20 “Responsible Government” therefore meant “for Europeans only” and any 
drive to self-government on behalf  of the Settlers was equally a drive to exclude 
Africans. The African was to be “a wage-earner - a labour force to be exploited. He is 
to be a serf dependent upon the goodwill of his employer. There should be no tech-
nical education, no contact with the world of new ideas, no modern methods deliber-
ately provided for him”.21 
19 Hsia, The Myth of Ritual Murder, 14-41 argues that a similar mechanism played a role in the 
presecution of the Jews in early modern Europe.
20 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 12.
21 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 105.
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The Settlers were therefore in conflict on two fronts over self-determination and 
land possession. This created and maintained a distinction between themselves and 
the Colonial Office as represented by the Governor on the one hand and the African 
community on the other hand. The conflict  with the Government being projected 
upon the African community and enhanced the impetus to maintain the distinctions 
between themselves and the African population. There was no sense of “common 
cause”  between  Settler  and African  population  against  the  Government.  Africans 
were opposed to  the  Federation  on the  grounds that  they feared that  Settler  rule 
would place them in a significantly worse position than their status as British protec-
ted persons had allowed them, and as we have argued, the drive for self-government 
on the part of the Settlers was a drive to exclude Africans. Only as the crisis out of 
which Zambia was created reached its climax did a temporary realignment become 
possible.
The creation of the Federation did nothing to alleviate the tensions either between 
the Settlers and the Government or between the Settlers and the African population. 
On the one hand, the territory remained a Protectorate and the Colonial Office re-
tained some rights of supervision over the Government which set irksome, if only 
symbolic and theoretical, limits upon local and Federal Government. On the other 
hand, the Settler communities in all the countries of the Federation were given more 
political power to determine the course of the new entity, and more leverage and in-
fluence over the British Government and less interference from the Governor and 
Colonial  Office.  This  reduced the  symbolic  distance  between themselves  and the 
Government, intensifying the conflict between them, driving the Settlers' campaign 
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for the transformation of the Federation into a self-governing Dominion similar to 
Canada or Australia. This in turn intensified the conflict with the African population. 
Both the British Government and the African population were to be effectively ex-
cluded in the proposed dominion.
The symbolic distances between the Setters and their rivals were reduced through 
the social and political changes which took place both in the Protectorate and else-
where.  The mediation of desire moved from “external” to “internal” in character. 
Tensions  and  rivalry  therefore  increased  through  the  entire  history  of  Northern 
Rhodesia until the mimetic crisis occurred, generating significant fluidity in identity 
and shifts in allegiances which allowed a coalition “of all against one” through which 
the nation came into being.
The Settlers took on an identity that could only have emerged as a result of these 
conflicted relationships. This was quite clearly a new communal identity whereby the 
European population identified itself, and was identified, as a distinctive community 
within Northern Rhodesia. It is true that Settlers were European, and were no more 
of a tabula rasa than the African communities they came to dominate. Nevertheless, 
the Settlers became, in the conflicted relationships of Northern Rhodesia, a new and 
quite distinctive community which was neither entirely European nor African. In ori-
gin the Settlers were almost as diverse in their ethnicity as the African communities, 
some were Irish, others Greek, Polish, Italian or Afrikaner, some distinctly “working 
class” others of more aristocratic background. This wide range of differing social and 
ethnic groups might otherwise have despised one another, but in Northern Rhodesia 
they became one “community” with a common identity to which all could subscribe. 
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The identity that bound, and continues to bind, such a disparate group together as one 
coherent  community was  formed as  an identity  “over  against”  both  the  Colonial 
power and the African population, in short by mimetic rivalry with, and exclusion of,  
both Africans and Government.
4.2.3 African Nationalist Identity
4.2.3.1 External Mediation in African-European Relations
In the earliest encounters between Africans and the encroaching European power 
there was a stage when Europeans were both physically and symbolically distant. 
The first Europeans to settle in the region were isolated missionaries, such as Moffat 
and Livingstone. They provided models for alternative life styles and world views, 
but were scattered, with limited influence, and, given their missionary intentions, less 
likely to immediately become obstacles to African mimesis. They thus posed little 
direct  cause  for  conflictual  mimesis.  Until  the  arrival  of  the  “Pioneer  Column”, 
European presence remained a very distant influence upon many of the peoples of 
the  region,  although  their  gradual  encroachment  upon  those  African  societies 
between the Limpopo and the Zambezi, where there had been more direct contact, 
elicited ambivalent responses.22 
22 Blake, A History of Rhodesia, 55-60.
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Even as the settlement began in earnest Northern Rhodesia's Europeans still  re-
mained at a distance to many Africans. 
By reason of the backwardness of his culture the Native had found it hard to 
compete with the White invader, and harder still to adopt the new culture or 
harmonise it with his own. This continuous disability has farther increased the 
social distance between him and the White man. Thus it became easy for him 
to accept the White man's definition of his inferior status and satisfactorily to 
rationalise his position. So that through the earlier stages of the contact, before 
the opening of the present century, the White man and his ways were measur-
ably sacrosanct. The changes in Native civilisation which took place were in-
cidental and mainly resulted from unconscious imitation.23
Davies and his team may well use complacent and paternalistic language, but they 
offer clear evidence of “external mediation” during the primary stages of European 
settlement. The Europeans were for the Africans at a “symbolic” distance because of 
the disparities in technical and military power. It was impossible to integrate the late 
19th and early 20 century invaders into African cultural paradigms in the way that had 
occurred with earlier European incursions or contact with Arab cultures, which had 
been met  on more equal  terms and had remained a somewhat  scattered and less 
pressing influence. The symbolic distance in the relationship both produced, and was 
the outcome of, an element of submissiveness on the part of the Africans and of pa-
ternalism on the part of the Europeans. Africans accepted, because they had been 
psychologically overwhelmed, the superiority of European culture, and although, by 
virtue  of  the technical  power wielded by Europeans,  European culture became a 
model, African culture had little ability to either assimilate or be assimilated by it. 
African mimesis of European culture was consequently sporadic and distant,  and 
could not therefore generate any immediate rivalry. 
23 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 88-89.
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4.2.3.2 Internal Mediation
As an industrial economy emerged Europeans became more numerous and Africans 
entered the domestic and industrial workforce. The encounter between African and 
European became more frequent, more constant and more intimate. Africans began to 
work in close proximity with their European pit bosses and mine captains, farm man-
agers and family members. The distance between African and Europeans closed and 
mimesis steadily became more immediate.24 Africans learnt, through mimesis, to ac-
quire more and more of those aspects of European culture designated as desirable by 
their model. In the process they also learnt to become impatient with their social and 
economic position. 
It was in this latter period that the Native discovered that the White man had 
feet of clay. Resentment, irks and grievances against White injustice, real or 
fancied, gradually replaced his blind admiration. Occasionally these complaints 
were overtly expressed. More frequently they were masked by a smiling face 
and an exaggeratedly polite demeanour, or were studiously repressed only to be 
aired among his own people in the kraal, township or location.25
The transition from external to internal mediation was not a sudden leap, but rather 
a slow slide through a spectrum. The emergence of conflictual mimesis took place 
gradually. While symbolic distance was still significant, expressions of open rivalry 





The African industrial labour force was most aware of the disparities between them-
selves and Europeans. Their contacts with Europeans were the most intense and pro-
longed.  They  were  also  amongst  those  most  likely  to  undergo  any  significant 
European training or education in preparation for their work in the mines and thus 
most likely to be influenced by new ideas. They were certainly aware of the disparit-
ies of rewards between themselves and their European bosses. Robert Rotberg, intro-
ducing the second edition of the Davis Survey, wrote:
They [Africans] believed themselves badly paid, particularly in comparison to 
the wages received by the whites with whom they worked .... Africans disliked 
the supposedly inferior houses to which they were assigned, and complained of 
primitive sanitary arrangements. In their eyes conditions of employment, par-
ticularly underground, were considerably less than ideal.26
While people living in rural communities might be thought to have been slower to 
close the social distance, being less likely to find themselves in direct contact with 
Europeans, those returning at the end of their contracts and those who had been edu-
cated in mission training schools soon brought a sense of disaffection with them. 
Through time,  the  symbolic  distances  reduced,  and rivalry between Africans  and 
Europeans became more intense and more openly expressed by Africans through the 
Welfare Associations and African Trades Unions, themselves products of the closing 




The core of mimetic rivalry, according to Girard's thesis, is the “double-bind”. 
Man cannot respond to that universal human injunction, “Imitate me!” without 
almost immediately encountering an inexplicable counterorder: “Don't imitate 
me!” (which really means, “do not appropriate  my object). This second com-
mand fills man with despair and turns him into the slave of an involuntary tyr-
ant. Man and his desirers thus perpetually transmit contradictory signals to one 
another.  Neither  model  nor  disciple  really  understands  why one  constantly 
thwarts the other because neither perceives that his desire has become the re-
flection of the other's.27
Far from being confined to the area of pathological psychology the double-bind is a 
very common element in human development, “so common that it might be said to 
form the basis of all human relationships”.28 The model issues the invitation to “Imit-
ate me!” and, because the model, in his or her power, appears to hold the secret of 
“true being”, this invitation is profoundly seductive. Yet at the same time there is a 
rebuff. The imitation is rejected and the acquisition of the “secret of true being” is 
forbidden. The closer the disciple comes to the model, the more powerful the forbid-
ding injunction and the more intense the conflict.29 
We should therefore expect that African-European relations were formed by a com-
plex nexus of interrelated double-binds,  in which the Europeans both encouraged 
Africans to take on elements of European culture and practice while at the same time 




posing obstacles in the way of African acquisition of desirable aspects of that same 
culture.30 While  this  double-bind mechanism can be  seen to  have affected  Afric-
an-European relationships throughout the whole range of social interactions, there 
are two very clear examples of its action: the questions of African education and 
African political rights.
4.3.1.1 Education and The Double Bind
Education was of considerable concern to the mission agencies, and forms a con-
stant thread through many of their minutes and reports. For the missionaries the most 
satisfactory education was carried out in residential institutions.31 Typical memorabil-
ia from such institutions suggest an atmosphere imitative of that of a British boarding 
school, with its school magazine, societies, houses and inter-house competitions.32 
Speaking African languages was discouraged, and the adoption of English as a medi-
um of communication, of Western values and of British culture was encouraged. The 
missions in particular offered both primary and more advanced education, so that 
Africans themselves could become teachers and evangelists; models for the next gen-
eration to imitate and equal participants in the mission of the church. The Govern-
ment too was, at least theoretically, committed to education, the aim of which was to 
enable Africans to become equal participants in an increasingly non-racial state.33 
Education grew both in terms of quantity and quality from the end of the 1930s, with 
30 Rural Africans were encouraged, for example to farm in a European manner, but forbidden to 
hunt with guns. Musambachime, “Colonialism and The Environment,” 14.
31 The UMCB, for example was regularly concerned with education, and often sought missionar-
ies who were educationalists. Mission Minutes record that 18 certified primary teachers were 
needed but could not be found in January 1937 box CBMS A\T\7.2|290 SOAS Library Univer-
sity of London
32 Memorabilia from Waddilove and Tegwani Schools, box MMSL AF-ZI 1045. SOAS
Library, University of London .
33 Greaves, Last Chance in the Federation 3.
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both Government and mining companies issuing newspapers and magazines intended 
for  a  literate  African  readership.34 Education,  even in  one of  the  local  languages 
chosen as the media for African education by the Government, had its rewards. It 
opened the door to civil service or administrative jobs which, even if less well paid 
than the more senior posts occupied by Europeans, offered a much higher standard of 
living than that offered by subsistence farming.35 Through the process of education 
Africans were enjoined to become “civilised”, at least according to European defini-
tions of “civilised”; invited by their European teachers to “be like me”. At the same 
time the “colour bar” imposed by Europeans ensured that Africans did not enjoy the 
full benefits of becoming urban, “civilised” and educated, something which urban 
Africans were well aware of and resented deeply.36
The narrower the difference between African and European, the more intense the 
rivalry and the more Europeans were determined to exclude the African from all the 
benefits promised by education. Africans felt in turn a sense of “disappointment”; a 
sense of promises broken and advancement blocked. This is expressed a number of 
times in the evidence given to Davis and his colleagues during their survey: 
My education has been a disappointment to me. Although I hold a certificate 
such as is possessed by a White man, yet I am not paid at the same rate, and 
further, a half-cast is paid better than myself or any of my group qualified in 
that way. The average White man in his dealings with my group is unable to 
understand that there are those of my race who are already his equals, and thus 
in his treatment of the Black man he becomes impatient, unfair and lacks an 
understanding of him.37
34 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 65-66.
35 Ibid., 82-83.
36 Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 88-89.
37 Ibid., 92.
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The respondent's evidence shows that stereotyping by Europeans prevented Afric-
ans, no matter how well educated, from ever being treated as equals, thus generating 
the “double bind”. No matter how well educated, what certificates and experience the 
African respondent held, he could not, under any circumstances, aspire to “be like” a 
European in economic reward or social status. The theme of disappointment recurs in 
other evidence:
I am disappointed with my education when I consider the energy and time and 
patience I spent to get it .... and yet after all these years of labour and hard 
work I am offered a salary which is anything but adequate. As an enlightened 
man I am supposed to live a clean, decent, hygienic life, eating a variety of 
foods suitable and wholesome, wearing neat, fairly attractive clothes and living 
in a furnished home....But the White man in this country,  including a great 
number of good missionaries, is out for White superiority. They know that the 
best way of keeping the African under subjection is by keeping him poor.38
Here the respondent sums up the whole African experience of the double bind, ex-
pressing what was clearly a widespread sense of frustration and anger. He has gained 
a European education and adopted, as far as he has been permitted, a European life-
style. Through mimesis he has learnt to desire to live in a European manner, with a 
European-style home, furnishings, meals, clothing and levels of personal hygiene. 
Yet, no matter how well-educated he has become, how Westernised his aspirations, in 
European eyes he remains “African” and therefore outside European circles of priv-
ilege and power. He has been encouraged to “be like me”, and yet, when he responds, 
is rebuffed by the “do not be like me”. 
38 Ibid., 96.
108
In this way Africans became aware of themselves as distinct from their models, ac-
quiring, identifying with and internalising, through mimesis, European culture; yet at 
the same time forbidden to become their models and instead assigned the identity of 
“African”. An identity designed to frustrate their “advance” towards European “civil-
isation”. The more they identify with the model, the more they are rebuffed; the more 
intense the identification becomes,  the more intense the rebuff;  and the more the 
boundaries harden and the clarity of identity sharpens as the conflict takes each turn 
in a spiral. 
4.3.1.2 Suffrage and the Double Bind
In the 1930s, when African Nationalist identity was barely beginning to emerge, the 
question of political advancement appeared on the agenda, but in a deeply ambival-
ent manner that kept it as a distant prospect without any real intention of making it  
truly available. In effect the political advancement - for which one must read “voting 
rights” - is another example of the double bind at work. There was to be no immedi-
ate political equality until the African met the criteria of European civilisation, even 
if there should be no impediment to this happening one day.39
The Federation experiment was, in British eyes, an effort to create some kind of 
“liberal democracy” in which the aspirations of a profoundly outnumbered Settler 
community were to be balanced with the principles of universal suffrage taken for 
granted in British parliamentary democracy. The Settlers, however, remained increas-
39 Ibid., 120.
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ingly resistant to African participation in public life. Many Settlers and British offi-
cials were convinced that the African populace had neither the education nor the ex-
perience to exercise the power of the ballot with due responsibility. 
As far as the franchise was concerned the existing qualifications for voters 
were based on literacy and property which excluded older and certainly re-
sponsible Africans. How to widen the electorate without letting in a flood of ig-
norant black people to swamp the minority of whites was the problem.40 
In addition to excluding “responsible Africans” who could not qualify, the “Special 
List” votes were heavily discounted, ensuring that the “Ordinary List” voters always 
had  more  representatives  in  the  Legislative  Council.  This  entailed  that  “political 
equality” was still as far off as ever, with doubts about the “maturity” of African in-
sight into democratic processes disguising a deeper sense that Africans would never 
be ready, and that Europeans would and should always take the lead in running the 
country. Thus Africans were encouraged to “be like me” and to think in terms of ac-
quiring democratic rights and responsibilities as highly desirable social and political 
goods. At the same time the African leaders in Northern Rhodesia found that their as-
pirations to a universal franchise were “obstacled” by the Settlers' refusal to accept 
that they were, or would ever be, capable of exercising democratic responsibility.
A frustrated African leadership expressed their sense of being caught in the double 
bind with incisive clarity: 
40 Monica Fisher, Nswana - The Heir: The life and Times of Charles Fisher as Surgeon in Central  
Africa (Ndola: Mission Press, 1991), 85.
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As regards partnership, the Government says the time is ready; … but when we 
bring up representation the Government says the time is not ready… How is it 
that for other things the time is ready, but for representation the time is not 
ready?41
Until the emergence of African Nationalism there was little sense of common Afric-
an identity. Ethnic groups encountered the Europeans piecemeal, and were disposed 
to make very different responses to their encroachment. Some offered resistance, oth-
ers willingly entered into treaty arrangements with the newcomers. As colonisation 
progressed and the Settlers became the dominant culture Africans found themselves 
confronted by a system which at one and the same time sought both to distinguish 
between them and to collapse these distinctions in order to treat them all as the same 
sort of essentially second-class citizens. On the one hand they were to be African 
“natives” whose culture was supposed to progress at an appropriately slow pace to-
wards “maturity”. On the other hand they were to be labouring poor with a static role 
within a stable political economy, with less rights, influence and opportunities than 
the Europeans because they were Africans. Both halves of this system were based on 
stereotypical misunderstandings; both intended to keep Africans within the orbit of 
“African”  culture  and  forbid  their  acquisition  of  the  rights  and  responsibilities 
Europeans were demanding for themselves. The common African identity was there-
fore generated “over against” the Settlers who sought to secure their position through 
their campaigns for “Responsible Government”, Federation and Dominion status by 
excluding Africans from all but the most menial participation in public life. As this 
conflict intensified a common African identity emerged and became more clearly de-
lineated. And so developed:
41 Mulford, Zambia, 34.
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...the political consciousness of being African, a Northern Rhodesian African. 
This marked the emergence of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and 
clearly represented a response to the white Settlers’ drive for power.42
Africans came to perceive themselves as an “oppressed majority”, an oppression 
based upon their being African rather than their belonging to a specific ethnic group. 
Thus, a sense of shared grievance developed across the African ethnic groups, partic-
ularly amongst educated and urban Africans, which engendered a sense of common 
identity as “victims”. The respondents in the Davis Survey were, in 1932, already 
seeing themselves not in terms of ethnic identities but as members of the wider “my 
group”, “my race”, “the Black man” and “African”. They could already express a le-
gitimate catalogue of grievances against Europeans from the point of view of their 
identity as “Africans” rather than as members of individual groups. Some years after 
the liberation struggle it was noted that:
Many older Africans,  too,  show an intense awareness of past racial  humili-
ations, and acknowledge an emotional identification of an 'African' grouping as 
opposed to a European one.43 
The appearance of a common African identity, the pre-cursor of a “national” iden-
tity, was promoted by a process of identification and expulsion. Africans sought to 
become like, and eventually to expel and displace, their European rulers. Smaller 
conflicts and expulsions between the ethnic groups were subsumed into the larger 
conflict as groups identified with each other and resolved the tensions generated by 
that identification by an “all against one” projection focused upon the Europeans. 
42 Ibid., 333.
43 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 65.
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This identity was at its most complete in the brief alliance between the largely Tonga 
A.N.C. and the U.N.I.P., which bridged, at least temporarily, a major fault-line in 
African society. The dramatic challenge recounted in the previous chapter, laid down 
by Nkumbula at the A.N.C. conference following the 1962 elections, indicates that 
“African  Government”  with  all  that  this  meant  in  terms  of  “kudos”,  was  “now” 
gained by allowing the smaller conflicts between the A.N.C. and the U.N.I.P. to be 
subsumed, at least for the time being, into a unity of “all against one”. 
4.4 Mimetic Doubling
One of  the features  of  Girard's  insights is  the appearance of mimetic  doubling, 
where the contestants in any conflict come to resemble one another. While the doub-
ling in the case of Zambia may not be exactly the classical vision of the “monstrous 
double” which Girard detects in Greek myth and tragedy, there are points where the 
contestants in the conflict come to resemble one another in their efforts to triumph 
over and displace one another. In fact through the conflicts which marked most of the 
lifetime of the protectorate, one can discern the rivals occupying much the same pos-
itions at different times. 
For example there were elements of doubling between the Settlers and the National-
ists. We have seen how Nationalist identity emerged in response to the Settler drive 
to power. This inevitably makes Nationalist identity a “double” of the Settler identity. 
And in the Nationalist campaign for universal suffrage and independence one can im-
mediately recognise a “double” of the Settler campaign for “Responsible Govern-
ment”. Both desired the same object; both desired it in such a way that the other 
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would inevitably be excluded from it. Both sought to use similar tactics at differing 
points in the struggle as “kudos”, representing power and influence over both the 
policies implemented by the Governor and his staff and over British Colonial policy 
devised in London, flowed back and forth between the two groups. 
The Settlers themselves were not always in as strong a position as it might at first 
appear. Even prior to World War II the Passfield Memorandum had weakened their 
position eliciting a wave of protests which included white politicians throughout East 
Africa. As the political climate changed following World War II and Britain divested 
itself of its empire, the Settler position became steadily weaker. By the 1960s even 
Conservative British Prime Ministers were speaking of the “winds of change”. The 
distinctions between the two groups were dissolving as the Settlers lost the sympathy 
of the Government and their political influence faded as a consequence. The Settlers 
began to take on some of the aspects of the Nationalists. As the London talks pro-
gressed the Nationalists began to win the argument and British policy steadily turned 
towards ending the Federation. Welensky's position became so tenuous that he resor-
ted to the Nationalist tactics of boycotting the talks. Towards the end of the process 
hard-line members of the United Federal Party began to threaten a mirror image of 
the Nationalist “cha-cha-cha rebellion”: strikes amongst the European mine workers, 
civil disobedience, even military force. 
Kaunda's  bitter  and  angry words  at  the  breakdown of  the  negotiations  in  1961 
clearly show the way in which each of the protagonists mirrored and were mirroring 
the actions of the other:
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I have repeatedly asked the people of Northern Rhodesia to be patient and non-
violent in thought, word and deed. But I have recently removed one of these 
noble words from my vocabulary. It is ‘patience’. Welensky refused to be pa-
tient and he got what he wanted. We who were patient have been neglected.44
Another example of doubling can be seen in the way in which the U.N.I.P. as a 
party took on aspects of the Protectorate's administration. The party was strongly 
centralised, with executive officials at all levels appointed centrally rather than elec-
ted, and expected to report regularly to headquarters. An emphasis was placed upon 
high standards of administration and financial accountability. The U.N.I.P., however 
unconsciously, began to resemble the centralised organisation of the state, with its 
Governor, appointed officials and centralised structure of accountability. 
The post-Independence constitution carries this “doubling” further. African presid-
entialism is termed "institutional-charismatic". It is a carry-over from the leader and 
the party that achieved independence. As a product of “Independence” it is intended 
to be a “radical break with the colonial past”. At the same time it reflects continuity 
with the colonial tradition, which was itself strongly authoritarian, resting in the last 
resort on force, “without any effective separation of powers.”45 The post-Independ-
ence constitutions show this clearly. The President's authority is final in the face of a 
relatively weak  Parliament,  to  which  he  is  ultimately  not  accountable.  This  is  a 
straight  forward mirror of the Governor and his final  authority over a legislative 
council with only limited power. In essence both the U.N.I.P. and the new nation be-
came a double of the administration which was eventually expelled. Once again we 
have two rival groups occupying the same position at two different stages in the con-
44 Mulford, Zambia, 178.
45 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 35.
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flict. In the case of the U.N.I.P. becoming the “double” of the Protectorate Govern-
ment,  this  had profound consequences  for  the political  life  of  post-Independence 
Zambia.
4.5 The Crisis and The Victim.
Towards the end of the Independence struggle sudden and very temporary re-align-
ments characteristic of the “sacrificial” or “mimetic” crisis took place. Kaunda and 
the U.N.I.P. leadership, like many African leaders, were informed by a mixture of 
both Western religious and political ideas and African spirituality, all of which car-
ried with them ideals of universal humanity. In conflicted relationships real distinc-
tions within one group tend to be collapsed in the ideologically-conditioned stereo-
types of their rivals. The ideals espoused by Kaunda and the rest of the U.N.I.P. lead-
ership  permitted  the  possibility of  de-constructing  the  less  helpful  stereotypes  of 
Europeans and allowing some of the tensions and distinctions between the Govern-
ment and the Settler community, as well as within the Settler community, to be per-
ceptible. Kaunda was therefore able to reach out and invite Europeans into what he 
promoted as a non-racial and truly equal partnership based upon universal suffrage. 
Inevitably these invitations grew more seductive as the relative power of the Settlers 
and Nationalists changed.
Europeans responding to Kaunda's invitation fell roughly into three categories. First 
the more conservative elements, representing the majority of European opinion, who 
sought to make the best of an impending disaster. Having had their worst suspicions 
realised when they proved unable to persuade the British Government to continue the 
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Federation in some form, they attempted to create a minimal winning coalition with 
those whom they viewed as  the  more moderate  and tractable  African  leadership. 
They hoped that this group, would do less to undermine the European dominance in 
the political economy. It was these more conservative Europeans who sought some 
kind of relationship between Tshombe's Katanga and Northern Rhodesia46 and who 
later made an electoral alliance with the more “moderate” A.N.C. The second group 
were the Liberal-minded European Settlers, like David Stirling and Dr. Charles Fish-
er. They had proposed a rather idealistic common front against extremism, national-
ism and racism and thought in terms of a controlled transfer of power over a set peri-
od.47 They too found the “moderate” A.N.C. preferable, but many were able to re-
spond more positively to Kaunda's invitation.48 The third group, a very small minor-
ity of Europeans, were more radical than the liberal group, and joined the U.N.I.P. 
The conservative and moderately liberal European groups found themselves “switch-
ing sides” to join the African Nationalists in a coalition of all against the one entity 
that all had perceived to be the “obstacle” to their desires: the Colonial Office, and 
the British Government it represented. Gore-Brown, a member of the U.N.I.P., had 
already presaged some form of alliance between European and Africans in order to 
remove the influence of the Colonial Office with a controversial speech in the Legis-
lative Council in 1948. At the time, the speech seemed to give support to the Federa-
tion. It is, however, likely that he had in mind something more like the alliance that 
Kaunda was ostensibly promoting.49 The possibility, therefore, of a radical realign-
46 Kalinga, “Independence Negotiations in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia..”
47 Lamb, The Africa House, 309.
48 Fisher, Nswana, 194-195.
49 Lamb, The Africa House, 251-252. Lamb argues that his intention was to advocate an African-
European alliance.
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ment of European opinion, at least existed. At the dissolution of the Federation an al-
ternative relationship between African and Settler developed and a new community 
of “one against all” based upon the expulsion of the colonial power emerged.
As a corollary to this, the social changes in Britain left even Conservative Govern-
ments less inclined to imperial entanglements and more ready to part company with 
the Settlers. Both McLeod and Maudling were considered “progressive” on colonial 
matters and by 1962 any incoherence in British policy towards Northern Rhodesia 
was resolved by passing the entire responsibility for Central Africa to the distinctly 
progressive R. A. Butler.50 In effect the Colonial Power solved the problem of its im-
perial  entanglement in the territory by colluding with the shift  of allegiances and 
willingly playing the role of the scapegoat. Its expulsion allowed the emergence of 
the new nation. 
4.6 Some Conclusions.
In the foregoing material we have seen how new identities have arisen as a result of 
the conflicts which mark the history of Northern Rhodesia. The emergence of two 
significant identities have been explored: that of the African community and that of 
the Settler community. Both these identities bound together sets of disparate ethnic 
communities  in alliances  founded upon the exclusion of a  group perceived to  be 
50 Ian Gilmour, “Oxford Oxford Dictionary of National Biography article: Butler, Richard Aus-
ten,” n.d., http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30886?docPos=2 (Accessed 3 March, 
2009); N. Piers Ludlow, “Oxford Oxford Dictionary of National Biography article: Sandys, 
(Edwin) Duncan,” n.d., http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/39858 (Accessed 3 March, 
2009); Robert Shepherd, “Oxford Dictionary of National Biography article: Maudling, Regin-
ald,” n.d., http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31428 (Accessed 3 March, 2009).
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“other”. These two groups temporarily resolved the conflicts between them by form-
ing an alliance of “all against one”, the “one” being the British-appointed Colonial 
Government. 
This answers the question with which we began this chapter: “why is there an entity 
called Zambia”? Zambia emerged out of the conflicts which marked the history of 
Northern Rhodesia. As a nation it was founded upon the exclusion of the British co-
lonial Government and this event was constitutive not only of its “nationhood” but of 
its national identity and whatever ethnic cohesion has existed in the nation. It is a mi-
metic representation or “double” of the British Protectorate Administration, based 
upon the Single Victim Mechanism.
This, however, requires us to pose a new question. As we noted in the introduction 
to this work, Girard's thesis suggests that the emergence of a stable identity may re-
quire many acts of expulsion of the sort we have described above. Periods of stability 
in between foundational acts of generative violence are maintained in the face of ten-
sions and conflicts by the mythologising of the foundational act or acts. The victim is 
often divinised, and the whole action disguised in a myth which is then recounted 
and repeated either regularly or as necessary in the form of sacrificial rituals. Girard 
argues that from time to time the rituals themselves fail to maintain stability and a 
new cycle of rivalry, crisis and catharsis begins. 
All of this suggests that stability and cohesion are difficult to attain, and even more 
difficult to maintain. In pursuit of a missiology which allows the church to contribute 
fruitfully and effectively to the building of “the politics of the pure in heart” in Zam-
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bia we must next explore how Zambia fared after her independence, whether the one 
expulsion we have described was sufficient to create a nation which was truly “one 
Zambia, one Nation” or whether fragmentation and instability soon followed. This is 
the purpose of the next chapter. 
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5 The Mythic Cycle
In the last chapter we examined the emergence of Zambian national identity and 
concluded that it emerged as a result of a complex set of conflictual relationships cul-
minating in a coalition of the “all against one” characteristic of the Single Victim 
Mechanism. This answered the question: “why is there a nation called Zambia with 
some sense of identity?” The identity of Zambia emerged out of conflict, through the 
processes of mimesis and rivalry. Before we can move towards a missiological en-
gagement with the Zambian context we need to ask some further questions. The first 
of these concerns how Zambia fared after Independence. Therefore the purpose of 
this chapter is to answer the question “how did the conflicts which attended the form-
ation of Zambia affect its post-Independence life?” 
Girard's thesis indicates that identities established by the Single Victim Mechanism 
are not particularly stable, and need “refreshing” on a regular basis. In the historical 
account we have offered in Chapter One it is clear that there was significant instabil-
ity in post-Independence Zambia. The alliances which had formed to expel the colo-
nial power quickly fragmented into mutually antagonistic groups. The historical ma-
terial indicates a struggle in which the identity of the nation was at stake. The axes of 
division in this struggle appear to follow the ethnic distinctions in Zambia, with a 
particular,  but  not  unique,  fault-line  appearing  between  the  Tonga  and  Barotse 
peoples on the one part, and the Eastern and Northern ethnic groups on the other. 
This in turn suggests that the “smaller” ethnic and language group rivalries subsumed 
in the conflict and catharsis through which Zambia was created soon re-emerged. 
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The instability in the national identity becomes clear when we examine the startling 
number of constitutions under which both Northern Rhodesia and Zambia have been 
governed. Stable societies have, in one form or another, a fairly static set of funda-
mental laws which define the nature of the nation. Britain is unusual in that these 
laws, while existing, are not gathered together and defined as a “constitution”. For 
many other nations, both Northern Rhodesia and Zambia included, these laws are ex-
pressed in a written constitution which effectively embodies the identity of the na-
tion.
The process of political transition is best seen as a struggle between incumbent 
and opposition political interests over both the rules of the political game and 
the resources with which it is played.1
A constitution states the “rules of the game”, and while constitutions are legitim-
ately modified from time to time Northern Rhodesia and Zambia have been governed 
under a bewildering array of constitutions from World War II onwards. If political 
transition represents a  struggle over  the “rules  of  the game”;  rapidly progressing 
through a series of constitutions would indicate considerable political struggle and 
instability, not simply at the level of the rough-and-tumble of parliamentary debate 
and of changing governing coalitions, but over the more fundamental “grammatical 
rules” which govern the nature and language of political discourse. The more intense 
and widespread the conflict, the more often the constitution was changed.
1 Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over,” 82.
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Since 1964 Zambia has been governed under three different constitutional arrange-
ments and at the time of the writing a fourth is currently in progress. This in itself is 
an indication of continuing instability within Zambia's body politic. These changes 
were not simple adjustments at the “fringes”, but, as switches from multi-party to 
one-party systems and back again,  were changes which affected the fundamental 
nature and identity of the nation. It is clear from this that “what little unification and 
mobilisation had been achieved in the independence struggle soon dissolved”.2 
Girard argues that the double-bind and the mimetic rivalry which accompanies it 
mark out a template for future behaviour. This is particularly so in the formation of 
the individual identity through childhood. The child will be deeply affected by the 
double-bind, and the rejection it carries. 
The future orientation of his desires - that is, the choice of his future models - 
will be significantly affected by the dichotomies of his childhood. In fact, these 
models will determine the shape of his personality.3
Given that Girard sees conflictual mimesis as the source of both community and in-
dividual identities it seems reasonable that this could be applied mutatis mutandis to 
the formation of a nation. In what follows we shall examine the political life of post-
independence Zambia, seeking evidence for a cyclical pattern of conflict, crisis and 
catharsis. Each turn of this cycle itself a mimesis of those first foundational events, 
one of a series of reiterations of the conflicts out of which the nation was formed.
2 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 34.
3 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 147-148.
123
5.1 The First Reiteration: The One Party State
5.1.1 Breaking the National Identity: The Europeans
Disappointment  and  disillusionment  soon  followed  the  successful  liberation 
struggle. The new dawn4 had broken, but the daylight exposed the fact that little or 
nothing could change in a hurry. The high expectations which motivate any liberation 
struggle can rarely be met, and Zambia was no exception. Most Zambians remained 
as poor and powerless on the 26th October 1964 as they had been in the months and 
years before. The first target for the inevitable disappointment and frustration were 
the European settlers. The Europeans were in a position of a minority anywhere: easy 
to isolate, without widespread support or sympathy within Zambia, and in the case of 
White settlers in Africa, with little in the way of sympathy elsewhere. Their position 
was made more  precarious  because they were easily identified  and distinguished 
from the general population. As there were few Zambians with the necessary skills 
and  no  third  level  education  whatsoever  in  the  country,  Zambia  needed  the 
Europeans, with their skills, education and experience to continue to run crucial ser-
vices such as education, health and security, the Government, administration and the 
economy. Nor was there a radical land reform. Kaunda, as much as he was influ-
enced by socialism, left the agricultural sector in private hands. There was, in any 
case, little to actually redistribute. The measures taken in 1934 and 1946 had averted 
a concentration of land into a few European hands of the sort that had taken place in 
Southern Rhodesia,  and by the mid 1950s only 6 percent  of  the land was either 
4 Kwacha, Kwacha (“dawn, dawn”) was a U.N.I.P. chant during the liberation struggle.
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Crown land or in private European hands.5 Europeans were therefore in the ambival-
ent position of being “necessary” in the political economy, but given the positions 
they occupied and their continuing relative wealth they were also an unwelcome re-
minder and continuation of past subjugation and humiliation. 
As Kaunda's entanglement in the politics throughout the region began to engender 
significant economic penalties, Europeans living in Zambia became an obvious target 
for the projection of the internal conflict. A widespread belief developed that the re-
maining settlers had sympathies with the white-dominated regimes to the south. Ten-
sions emerging in 1965 rose quickly, leading to riots in October 1966 in which one 
European woman was killed. Senior European police and army officers were dis-
missed and in 1967 five Europeans were tried for spying.6 
In  1969  there  was  a  clash  between  the  Government  and  judiciary  when  the 
European High Court judge, Justice Evans, gave two rulings, one on the apparent vi-
olation of Zambian territory by white Portuguese colonial military personnel from 
Mozambique,  which  went  against  the  Government.  The  Chief  Justice,  also  a 
European, defended the judgements and there was a violent reaction, with members 
of the Zambian Youth Service storming the High Court carrying placards, one of 
which read “White men cannot be Zambians”.7
5 Howarth, The Shadow of the Dam. [On the Removal of the Tonga Tribesmen from the Site of  
the Kariba Dam.], 74.
6 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 27-29.
7 Ibid., 50.
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It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work  to  establish  whether  the  trial  of  the  five 
Europeans for spying for the white dominated regimes in the region was conducted 
fairly on the basis of sound evidence, or was more of a “show trial” offering the pub-
lic a convenient scapegoat. Given that the innocence or guilt of the scapegoat is irrel-
evant it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that both were true. Plots and spies 
uncovered, feed paranoia and facilitate the projection of tensions and real plots and 
real spies will do as well as, if not better than, those manufactured by the Govern-
ment. What does appear to be the case is that not all of the remaining Europeans had 
sympathy with the Rhodesian or South African Governments, even if they may well 
have felt ill at ease in their new “African” country.8 
Any  differences  in  support  for  the  Rhodesian  Settler  Government  amongst 
Europeans,  became  invisible.  African  stereotypes  of  Europeans  portrayed  all 
Europeans as “a menace to national security”. Clearly this was a mimetic reversal of 
the European stereotypes of Africans in the past. There is credible evidence that the 
security forces visited violence indiscriminately upon members of the European pop-
ulation, particularly during the Second Republic.9 In essence, the Europeans were 
subject to brief and sporadic, but nevertheless real, persecutions, becoming scape-
goats for a Zambia ill at ease with itself even in its earliest and most hopeful and 
prosperous years.
8 Robert Wyatt, a long established settler farmer remarked in private conversation “They were 
accusing us of supporting the regime down south, but we weren't”. Wyatt was the founding 
chair of Mkushi Fellowship Trust which runs Chengelo school, one of Zambia's few truly in-
tegrated boarding schools.
9 Conversations with “Vickie” Falkenstein and Hugh Carruthers. Falkenstein is a nurse and Car-
ruthers a geologist born in Zambia. Falkenstein's home was invaded by paramilitary police who 
beat her, and Carruthers was arrested and beaten by security forces while on a legitimate pro-
specting mission for which he had appropriate documented permissions. Wyatt also remarked 
on the persecution and knew of other farmers had suffered.
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5.1.2 Breaking the Identity: African Ethnic Tensions
The heritage of being the Party which brought about independence together with 
the centralised nature of the state meant that the U.N.I.P. became identified as the 
“national” Party; the bearer of any residual sense of national unity and identity. This 
identification was made all the more intense given the failure of the A.N.C. to break 
out of what was essentially an ethnic ghetto and to establish itself on a nation-wide 
basis.10 The Party was, however, too disunited to provide the necessary “cohesive na-
tional ideology” with which to transcend the tensions within the nation. 
The power of the Presidency meant that the President would always be an alluring 
figure and the power and patronage of the Presidency an object of desire to which all  
Zambian politicians would aspire. Inevitably this generated rivalries within the Party. 
In part, these were rivalries to gain access to and close association with, the Presid-
ent, preferably through ministerial office, in order to gain from the patronage which 
only he could distribute. Equally there were rivalries with the President as political 
leaders sought to exclude him from office in order to seize it themselves. The ethnic 
and language group conflicts in the nation were played out within the U.N.I.P. as mi-
metic rivalries fragmented the party along clear regional and ethnic axes. Tensions 
were so great that in February 1968 Kaunda briefly resigned in protest against the 
ethnocentrism. 
10 Pettman. Zambia, Security and Conflict 51.
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The 1968 General Election exposed more tensions, with an accusation of murder 
made  against  unspecified  “Lozis”.11 With  the  end  of  the  arrangements  which 
provided some protected seats for Europeans, specifically European political parties 
disappeared in the 1968 elections, leaving only the U.N.I.P. and the A.N.C. in parlia-
ment. The A.N.C. became the primary target upon which the U.N.I.P. members could 
project the disunity within both their party and the country in order to generate some 
facsimile of unity.12
Like  the  Europeans,  both  the  A.N.C.  and  the  groups  breaking  away  from the 
U.N.I.P. were accused of being overly sympathetic towards the White-dominated re-
gimes in the region. These accusations of treason and betrayal took on unrealistic and 
paranoid aspects characteristic of mimetic rivalry. The action to detain the leadership 
of the opposition and breakaway groups, along with Kaunda's willingness to bow to 
the pressure to create a one-party state, were acts of projection and expulsion. They 
were an effort to both settle the conflicts in the nation and create a new, more stable, 
identity for the nation by using the opposition as the scapegoat.
The new constitution provided a yet more centralised State and gave even more au-
thority to the President, creating a deeper dependence upon Presidential patronage 
and making the office more alluring. Thus the “expulsion” of the opposition as the 




In this brief examination we see the first turn of the cycle. The identity created in 
the conflict through which Zambia was born fragmented almost as soon as the Scape-
goat was expelled.  As tensions increased the Europeans became the first  victims, 
briefly and sporadically vilified. As this failed to ease the internal tensions of the na-
tion the opposition A.N.C., together with groups breaking away from the U.N.I.P. be-
came the next victims, again vilified and finally excluded. Out of this expulsion the 
new one party state was born. Its novelty, however, was only apparent. In reality it 
was a mimetic representation of the old state.
5.2 The Second Reiteration: A New Multi-Party State.
Daniel Posner argues that amongst the identities available to Zambians are two not 
quite coterminous identities: ethnic and language group. This, he demonstrates, is 
due to migrations from rural urban environments in which the origin of the largest 
group migrating in a specific area is shaped by a variety of economic and political 
factors. Inevitably the language which acted as the lingua franca of a particular town 
or region was the language of the largest group. The extent and importance of a par-
ticular language was also strongly influenced by the languages chosen by both mis-
sionary organisations and Government for liturgical and Biblical translation and gen-
eral education.13 In the absence of other pressures the language which formed the loc-
al medium of education tended to become the main language of the area. During both 
the liberation struggle and the first years of Independence people tended to form alli-
ances based on their common linguistic heritage, even if, as was often the case, the 
people speaking the same language were in fact from different ethnic groups. 
13 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 56-83.
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Posner  argues  that  in  the Second Republic  a  change in  identities  took place as 
people opted for ethnic rather than language group identity as the basis for alliances 
that might produce a “minimal winning coalition” in any contest  for the benefits 
available through the one-party state. This was due to a change in the “focus” of 
political and economic contests: from the national to the regional and local.14 This in-
evitably  promoted  ethnocentrism with  old  alliances  contracting  to  identifications 
which were more “exclusive” as the field of the conflict narrowed.
Far from settling or at least suppressing ethnic conflict, therefore, the transition to a 
one  party state  created  circumstances  in  which  more,  rather  than  less,  instability 
would develop as old communal identities fragmented and new and more narrowly 
defined identities constituted by new and narrower conflicts emerged. The Party was 
neither able to suppress nor to contain these intensifying conflicts, despite banning 
internal debate. As the economy deteriorated and resources diminished conflict grew 
ever more intense. 
Legitimate political outlets through which dissension could be constructively ex-
pressed  were  stifled,  so  Zambians  turned  instead  to  a  variety  of  “civil  society” 
groups,  NGO's,  church  organisations,  unions  and business  interests.15 Many such 
groups had a prior ideology which made them transcendent, at least in theory, of eth-
nic identity. These disparate groups became focused less upon contesting for power 
between themselves and more upon expressing dissatisfaction with the régime. They 
began to grow into an unlikely coalition. The raison d'être of this coalition was the 
removal of the U.N.I.P. and Kaunda from power together with a return to a mul-
14 Ibid., 143-150.
15 Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over,” 86.
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ti-party constitution rather than the aims and objectives of any of the individual or-
ganisations involved in it.16 The “Third Republic” was therefore created out of a co-
alition of “all against Kaunda” who became the “scapegoat” whose expulsion created 
a very temporary peace within the nation and allowed the emergence of yet a new na-
tional identity.
A number of classical features of the Single Victim Mechanism are present in the 
campaign to depose Kaunda. First, Kaunda was becoming more and more unpopular, 
so much so that there was a short period of near-celebration when a group of soldiers 
announced that they had seized power in a coup. Kaunda was hurt and surprised by 
the reaction, warning that the coup leaders would have been much worse than him. 
He might well have been correct but public reaction shows how strong the projection 
was. Second, there was a rapidly growing trend of defection to the new movement 
amongst even senior members of the U.N.I.P. The National Interim Committee for 
Multi-party Democracy formed in July 1990 was chaired by former Finance Minister 
Arthur Wina and included many other former ministers and senior U.N.I.P. members. 
The Movement even attracted the support of one of Zambia's very few politically act-
ive Europeans, Guy Scott, who later became Minister for Agriculture. A third feature 
of the Single Victim Mechanism can be observed in the nature of the election cam-
paign:
16 “Movement for Multi-Party Democracy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” n.d., http://en-
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_for_Multi-Party_Democracy (Accessed 5 March, 2009). Ac-
cessed 05 March 2009.
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…. [T]he personalized and vituperative nature of the election campaign may 
have induced many voters to cast  their  ballots  against  Kaunda and U.N.I.P. 
rather than for elevated principles of multiparty competition, accountable gov-
ernment, and a regular rotation of leaders.17
What this clearly indicates is that Kaunda had become the scapegoat upon whom 
the tensions and conflicts wracking Zambian society were projected. He was duly ex-
pelled from office. 
The  fourth  feature  of  the  Single  Victim Mechanism lies  in  the  comprehensive 
nature of the victory won by M.M.D. In as far as it is possible it was “all” against 
“one”.
Kaunda fitted the role of scapegoat very well. All Zambians knew that his family 
was from Malawi, and he was careful throughout his Presidency to balance his cabin-
ets and at least appear to be unconnected with Zambian ethnic groups. He was there-
fore an obvious scapegoat, someone easily excluded with little risk of eliciting wide-
spread public empathy and few, if any, potential allies to offer support or exacerbate 
the conflict. 
The expected pattern can be observed once more in these events: a precarious unity 
is created in a national coalition whose identity is founded upon expulsion. Mimetic 
rivalry emerges and as conflict grows ever intense the coalition fragments. In the 
midst of the conflict  a new coalition emerges whose identity and integration rest 
solely upon the exclusion of a new scapegoat. In this reiteration of the pattern the 
17 Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over,” 93.
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M.M.D. plays the role of the U.N.I.P.,  struggling for “liberation” and a return to 
“democracy” and a meaningful franchise, while the U.N.I.P. takes on the role of the 
Protectorate Government, inviting and yet forbidding participation.
5.3 The Third Reiteration
The constitution of the Third Republic has many similarities to those of the First 
and Second Republics, creating a powerful Presidency with only weak mechanisms 
of accountability. Its new democratic institutions were fragile, and progress depended 
heavily on significant economic improvement,  without which the populace would 
soon start to seek a new victim.18 Tangible economic development and democratic 
progress simply did not occur. Instead the economy declined, with the I.M.F. Struc-
tural Adjustment Programmes no more popular or effective than in the past and the 
Government  proving  “as  inept,  corrupt  and  oppressive  as  the  previous  U.N.I.P. 
single-party dictatorship”.19 Chiluba managed to contain some of the potential con-
flict by using the opportunities presented by what appears to be a genuine plan to 
destabilise the country and seize power drawn up by some extremist members of the 
U.N.I.P. which was uncovered in 1993, and by a bungled coup attempt carried out by 
disaffected members of the military in 1997.20 As a result he was able to encourage 
the projection of the tensions onto the U.N.I.P. and its leadership.21 Following the 
18 Ibid., 82.
19 Denis Venter, “Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa,” Eastern Africa Social Science  
Research Review 19, no. 1 (2003): 6-7.
20 “History of Zambia - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” n.d., chrome://ietab/content/re-
loaded.html?url= (Accessed 5 March, 2009). Accessed 05 March 2009.
21 Whitaker, “Citizens and Foreigners,” 114.
133
1993 plot, the constitution was amended to prevent Kaunda from standing for the of-
fice of President, and in 1999 Kaunda was declared stateless in a High Court judge-
ment at Ndola.22 
Chiluba made further efforts to declare rivals as “aliens” and have them deported, 
indeed a tendency emerged within the M.M.D. “to treat all critics of Government ... 
as foreigners”.23 Some of those declared to be foreign nationals,  like Dipak Patel 
(who was not ultimately deported) and Majid Ticklay, were unlikely to elicit much 
empathy from African Zambians.24 Others, like Christon Tembo and John Chinula, 
presented a significant risk because they were, or could claim to be, connected with 
ethnic groups within Zambia and could therefore elicit  support from those ethnic 
groups.25
As is typical of many present-day African nations, some Zambian ethnic groups 
transcend what are now international boundaries, and over one million Zambians can 
claim to belong to such groups.26 Chiluba was engendering a sense of national iden-
tity by attempting to create a mythology in which the past is “mis-recognised” and 
national borders which did not exist in the past are created anachronistically in the 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 115.
24 They were of Asian origin. As in East Africa there is considerable ill feeling towards Asians, 
who are generally better educated, usually running small to medium sized businesses and gen-
erally considerably wealthier than most Africans. 
25 Amnesty International, “Zambia: Forcible Exile to Suppress Dissent,” November 13, 1997, 
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3973 (Accessed 9 March, 
2009). 
26 Whitaker, “Citizens and Foreigners,” 116.
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minds of the present-day community,  leaving ethnic groups whose members were 
targeted  for  deportation  with  a  deep  sense  of  exclusion.27 The  effort  failed,  and 
Chiluba himself became the next potential victim.
Chiluba's resort to oppression, his steady expulsion of powerful opponents and the 
mounting corruption of his regime all led to his growing unpopularity, exposing and 
isolating him as the next scapegoat. The same sort of alliance within civic society, 
churches, NGOs and unions which had facilitated the removal of Kaunda began to 
grow around a move to remove Chiluba. By the Party Conference of 2001 former 
ministers and other senior party members had joined the opposition in a coalition of 
“all against one” to ensure Chiluba's expulsion from power and his due exit from the 
Office of President. Even Chiluba's attempt to stamp some “behind the scenes” au-
thority upon the M.M.D. failed. Chiluba's successor, far from being a slow-witted 
compliant puppet, also joined the coalition against him, instigating the removal of his 
immunity and opening the way for his prosecution for corruption. Whitaker specu-
lates that Mwanawasa's revocation of the exile of Tembo and Ticklay was part of a 
constructive trend, halting the rising xenophobia of the Party and the country. While 
this may be true, the move was possible because Chiluba, having lost all support, had 
become an alternative and much less “risky” scapegoat. Mwanawasa could be por-
trayed as “the one who righted all wrongs”, an image he had already acquired during 
his time as a lawyer, while Chiluba became the scapegoat blamed for all the corrup-
tion and economic failure. Chiluba was a particularly useful scapegoat because the 
corruption case has been complex and long drawn out by legal manoeuvres on both 
sides and suspensions. This means that Chiluba could fill not only the role of found-
27 Ibid.
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ing victim but also of repetitive cult  victim. He could be brought before a court 
where more of the complex tapestry of corruption was recounted and Chiluba duly 
vilified in the public media as and when necessary. The case could then return to ob-
scurity until the next time it was needed. 
5.4 Repeating the Pattern
According to Girard, religion and its attendant culture develop in order that the 
mythologised and mis-recognised story of the expulsion may be re-enacted and thus 
social peace maintained. Even this resort breaks down eventually, occasioning the 
“sacrificial crisis” in which social tensions rise until a new act of victimisation takes 
place. Modern societies are less likely to institute overtly religious rites, but they, 
nevertheless, have “secular” memorials and rites by which the mythologised memor-
ies of the past are maintained and made available in pursuit of harmony. These cere-
monies range from the once-in-a-generation event, such as the crowning of a consti-
tutional monarch, or more frequent events, such as the State Opening of Parliament 
or the annual Act of Remembrance. These events assert the identity and unity of the 
nation, and often entail actions which recollect some divinised or partly divinised 
victim or victims. Zambia has few such well-established rites. Those who died as a 
result of the conflict which brought Zambia into being have not been transformed 
into mythic hero/victims in the way in which the dead of two World Wars have been 
in Europe. Many of the leaders of the liberation struggle are either still alive or have 
died over the ordinary course of time, rather than in the sort of circumstances which 
are the stuff of mythology. There was a tendency to elevate Kaunda to some divine or 
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semi-divine status,28 but Kaunda did not fill the role of victim/god at Independence 
required for the process to work effectively. The last Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, al-
though himself born in Southern Rhodesia, was a close friend of Kaunda, and was 
noted for his sympathy with African nationalist aspirations in general and for his 
sympathy and continuing interest in Zambia in particular.29 This made him also diffi-
cult to mythologise in the way required for the mechanism of generative violence. In 
more recent years, Kaunda has occupied a more ambivalent position, highly respec-
ted for his work on HIV/AIDS and occupying the position of “elder statesman” and 
“father of the nation” in the eyes of many, even accorded some honour for conceding 
defeat and departing office relatively peacefully, as well as still being reviled for his 
years of dictatorship. Perhaps a little of the ambivalence of the victim, therefore, 
hangs around him. He is, however, still alive, and it is hard to divinise a living person 
in this way without the panoply of sacred kingship. There are no rituals which attend 
him, no momentum to return him to office, and he attracts  little in the way of a  
deeply-committed  following.  His  position is  more  an  indication  that  the political 
world of Zambia has moved on from him, and the respect he gains is little more than 
the respect proper to any elderly man of elevated status in African society. Zambia 
celebrates its Independence Day, however, without the glamour or the widespread fa-
milial and communal importance of Independence Day in the USA or the solemnity 
of Remembrance Day in Europe. 
28 Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 41.
29 W. T. G Gates, “Sir Evelyn Hone, GCMG OBE,” African Affairs (London) 75, no. 298 (1976): 
99-100.
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Ritual, notes Eliade, is designed to bring the community to "the fabled time of the 
beginnings".30 Zambia has a deficit of ritual capable of retying the community to “the 
fabled time”, and therefore of actions which might repeatedly recreate national iden-
tity and unity. Instead, the community finds itself repeating the actual cycle of expul-
sion and crisis with little or no intervening stability:
Zambia was widely regarded as a major African success in democratization 
...Such  an  assessment,  however,  supremely exalts  form over  substance,  for 
neither the outgoing nor the incoming regime has had the ability to keep all the 
major groups included. In fact, the new regime has begun to repeat the very 
same process of exclusion that narrowed the base of its predecessor ... In little 
more than a year, the cycle began again. 31
Horowitz goes on to note the exclusionary basis for the M.M.D.'s identity as a co-
alition, an identity which was short-lived and soon fragmented into yet another inter-
ethnic contest:
Quite clearly, the breadth of the M.M.D.'s multiethnic support against Kaunda 
at the time of the 1991 election was a function of the transitory nature of the 
contest in which it was engaged, just as Kaunda's own initial support against 
the colonial regime did not long survive the departure of the British. In each 
case, victory marked the beginning of an ethnic struggle, in which group lead-
ers contended for the domination of the new regime and peeled away from the 
multiethnic party as they were defeated.32 
30 Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, World perspectives series,;no.21 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1964), 5.




5.4.1.1 From Event to Myth: Intensity and Transformation.
One is bound to ask whether the inability of Zambia to generate a mythology out of 
the events of history undermines Girard's theory, at least to some extent. The expect-
ation would be that founding events are “mythologised” and then recounted and re-
peated in their mythologised form as a means of sustaining community cohesion. 
However Girard recognises and accounts for varying degrees of mythologisation. He 
argues that in the story of Apollonius of Tyana the beggar whose stoning brings about 
the end of the plague in Ephesus is only partially transformed.33 Girard argues that a 
double transformation takes place in the most complete myths. In the first transform-
ation the victim is transformed into a demonic monster, and in the second stage into a 
positive and beneficent figure who brings healing. In the story of Apollonius the beg-
gar only undergoes the first transformation into the plague demon; the second trans-
formation does not take place.34 Instead, the story resorts to attributing the miracle of 
the end of the plague to the power of a pre-existing god, in this case Heracles.35
According to Girard the foundational events which are most completely disguised 
under the aspect of myth are those where there is the most fear in the first place and 
where the victim's death or expulsion bring the deepest relief. It is, therefore, the 
emotional intensity of the events which enables the full transfiguration of event into 
myth.36 The conflict need not be widespread nor even particularly prolonged, simply 
intense and profoundly traumatic. When it comes to considering Zambia's history it 
is clearly a good deal less traumatic than many of the transformations to political in-





dependence experienced by her near neighbours. Indeed Zambia has been, and re-
mains,  a  place  of  refuge  for  peoples  from  more  profoundly  disturbed  nations 
throughout South and Central Africa. Kaunda was strongly influenced by Gandhi, 
and while there was indeed violence and violent deaths the liberation struggle was 
largely conducted at level of civil disobedience and street protest. This is how the 
events are remembered today. The statues erected to commemorate the cha-cha-cha 
rebellion show figures in broken chains throwing stones not carrying firearms. The 
British authorities also remained relatively restrained. There were local tragedies, and 
people died as a result of police action. Such deaths are nothing less than appalling 
tragedies for all concerned. Clearly there was a cost paid by those involved in the 
struggle, people did die, either as a result of street violence or by legal sanction. The 
deaths  which occurred in  Zambia's  liberation  struggle,  however,  do not  have  the 
emotional resonance of Amritsar or Soweto. If the trauma attending the achievement 
of political Independence was relatively shallow, so was the relief brought by the fi-
nal expulsion. Zambian society changed only slowly and the euphoria of liberation, 
as we have already noted, did not last long. The structures of Government, again as 
we have already noted, remained very similar and were often represented at the local 
level by the same people who had acted on behalf of the British, at least for the first  
few years after Independence.
The events through which Zambia came into being did not have the cumulative ef-
fect necessary to bring about the double transformation which Girard finds in the 
most completely mythologised events. One could say much the same for the events 
surrounding the transformation from one-party to  multi-party states.  The M.M.D. 
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fought much the same sort of campaign as that fought by the liberation movements 
during the Protectorate. Civil disobedience and street protests were its characteristic 
methods. Indeed many of the partners would have had strong practical or ideological 
objections to espousing more violent or destructive forms of resistance. Kaunda him-
self, while being quite capable of exercising repression, was in the end willing to 
concede power and go with a certain amount of dignity. Despite the introduction of a 
multi-party system the  structures  of  Government  remained very similar,  and any 
changes in the political economy were often initially changes for the worse. 
One does not wish in any way to minimise either the courage or the suffering of in-
dividuals  during  these  times  of  transition,  or  to  claim that  Zambia's  history was 
without  elements  of  deep trauma and tragedy.  However,  when one compares  the 
story Zambia, with those of Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo or Zimb-
abwe or, for that matter, the experience of Europe during two world wars, the events 
of Zambia's history are less deeply traumatic and less intense. Under such circum-
stances the logical implications of Girard's account of the transformation from event 
to myth would indicate that a complete mythologisation of these specific events re-
mains unlikely.
5.5 Conclusions.
We are now able to answer the question with which we began this chapter: “how 
did the conflicts which attended the formation of Zambia affect its post-Independ-
ence life? We can see that Zambia's precarious national identity fragmented rapidly 
following the transition to Independence. Zambia has spent the years since 1964 en-
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trapped in a “mythic cycle” repeating a pattern of conflict, crisis and catharsis. Each 
turn of the cycle is somewhat different from the previous turn, but it nevertheless fol-
lows an identifiable pattern with its climax in an act of vilification and expulsion. 
Cyclical patterns of this sort may well eventually become mythologised through time 
and repetition, although this has not happened in the case of Zambia as yet. This, we 
have argued, is not entirely unexpected given the nature of Zambia's transformation 
and conflictual history.
A further conclusion which is beginning to emerge from the discussions in the past 
two chapters is the way in which the cyclical patterns we have discerned create an 
entrapment in what Wink terms the “Domination System”, an enslavement to the 
“Powers”. These patterns are without hope simply because they are cyclical, entrap-
ping all in a repetition in one form or another of the patterns of failure and crisis of  
the past. Individuals and communal entities “take roles” in a kaleidoscopic pattern, 
their identities emerging out of the pattern. They are not truly “individualised”, that 
is they have no identity of their own, but rather they appropriate desire and identity 
from that which is logically prior to themselves. This is something inherent in Gir-
ard’s theory. In exploring the Gospel insight into the mimetic cycle Girard asks why 
the Gospels have recourse to the figure of Satan rather than to an impersonal prin-
ciple. Girard argues that it is because humans have no insight into the reality of their 
entrapment in a circular process. He continues:
[T]he real manipulator of the process is  mimetic contagion itself. There is no 
real subject within this mimetic contagion, and that is finally the meaning of 
the title "prince of this world", if it is recognized that Satan is the absence of 
being.37
37 Ibid., 69. Italics original.
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Humans as individuals or as members of communities are entrapped in “an absence 
of being”, of non-identity; they are not, and cannot truly be themselves. For Volf, 
even the oppressed can claim no innocence, which involves a recognition of what 
Paul meant when he claimed that “All have sinned and fallen short”.38 Without the 
recognition that  all  are  in  need of  repentance,  without  a  “politics  of  the pure in 
heart”,39 any effort at liberation will fail, perpetuating rather than ending the mimetic 
cycle. This is precisely what has happened in Zambia, Efforts of liberation have all 
“fallen short” because they have all been shaped, or rather emptied, by mimetic con-
flict. The movements of liberation, either as the U.N.I.P. or the M.M.D., have appro-
priated identities which were logically prior to their own existence and exist only as a 
coalition of many against one. In themselves these movements have no “true” or 
unique identity of their own.
In Luke’s Gospel, Jesus tells the story of the “Prodigal Son”, the story of a repentant 
sinner.40 The son wishes to “displace” the father, taking that which is to be only prop-
erly his at the death of his father, and leaves the family home. In a “far country” he 
indulges in the mimesis of false and meaningless desires, frittering away his inherit-
ance in “dissolute living”. When his money is gone and famine hits that land he is 
still trapped in mimesis, hiring himself out to “one of the citizens of that country”, a  
faint echo of his true self, even wishing to have the rubbish fed to the pigs as food. 
The moment of realisation is described briefly in the story as the moment “when he 
came to himself.” He has been trapped, his life shaped by the “non-being” of mimet-
ic rivalry until “he comes to himself”. There is more to the story than this, but for our 




purposes it is enough to consider the moment in which “he came to himself”. At this 
moment he turns from the meaningless mimesis of rivalry and finds his true identity 
of “this my son” as a gift from the father. 
We have yet to account for how we, as human beings might “come to ourselves”, 
freed  from entrapment  in  the  “non-being”  of  the  mimetic  cycle.  The entrapment 
seems inevitable in Girard's theory,  as there is no “self” to come to which exists 
without mimesis, and thus every human is sucked into the mimetic cycle of rivalry, 
conflict and catharsis. In order to do so, we will have to carry out our theological re-
flection, which will include an examination of Girard's understanding of Christianity. 
There is yet one more intervening step to take before this can be done however, and 
that is to examine the state of Zambia at the time of writing, or at least as close to the 
time of writing as one can get. We do so in an effort to answer two questions. First,  
are there indications that the cyclical pattern we have discerned continues to be reit-
erated? Second, if so, what are the patterns within society which indicate this? Once 
we have achieved this task, we may move on to carry out our theological reflection.
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6 Zambia in the 21st Century -
The Politics of Predation
Through previous chapters we have argued that Zambia was established as a nation 
through mimetic conflict culminating in the expulsion of the colonial power as “vic-
tim” or scapegoat. The national identity thus created was, however, precarious and 
began to fragment. Subsequent post-Independence history shows the founding events 
to have become a template for a cyclical pattern of conflict, fragmentation and expul-
sion. In this pattern neither individuals or communities have an identity which is 
properly theirs. Instead they appropriate identity through the conflictual mimesis of 
others, taking on “roles” in the pattern. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the  
current state of Zambia, or as close to the current state as it is possible to get, given 
that the academic observer is always, of necessity, at least two steps behind events. In 
our examination we shall focus particularly on evidence which points to the recur-
rence of the mimetic cycle. If this evidence is available then it should be possible to 
form an educated opinion as to where in this cycle Zambia is today. We carry this out 
in order to understand the society with which the Church must engage in its mission 
to bear witness to the Good News of God in Jesus Christ. We begin with an examina-
tion of the role of the President in the mimetic cycle. 
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6.1 Institutional Charismatic Presidency and the Mythic 
Cycle
According to Girard the institution of sacred monarchy originated from the practice 
of designating the next cultic victim in advance. Girard suggests that this is a slow 
and cumulative process. The designated victim is kept until his sacrifice is necessary.  
His setting apart casts an aura of sacredness and divine power over him, which in 
turn makes him an alluring figure. Little by little this comes to be forged into politic-
al power as commanding potential victims gather supporters and divert the projection 
of communal rivalries from themselves onto alternative scapegoats.1 Yet the potential 
victim remains a potential victim. In times of crisis support may be withdrawn, diver-
sion fail and the sacrifice takes place.2 
The strongly centralized Zambian state and the "institutional charismatic" nature of 
the presidency leaves the President in much the same position as an ancient sacred 
king. He is an isolated figure, set apart by the office and its trappings from the vast 
majority of Zambians. Living in a grand Versailles in the midst of a park complete 
with antelope and other small game, escorted and cosseted everywhere, his face smil-
ing benignly down in every public building, the President is the “Father” of the na-
tion, Head of State and Head of Government. He is the designated model/rival/scape-
goat for every aspiring Zambian. The Presidential election is simply an ostensibly 
democratic means of designating the next victim upon whom the failures and ten-
sions of Zambian society will be projected. 
1 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 92.
2 Fleming, René Girard, 60.
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The prestige and power, the adulation and pleasures of comfort and wealth which 
accompany the office, are all vestiges of the “good times” granted to the sacrificial 
victim prior to his or her immolation.3 They also make the President an alluring mod-
el, whose very possession of the office casts a cloak of fascination over it, making it 
desirable and setting the conditions for rivalry. So Presidents go about the business of 
gathering supporters and diverting attention onto alternative victims in order to gain 
and maintain their hold upon the office. At the same time the Single Victim Mechan-
ism ensures that their rule eventually comes to an end in some form of sacrificial 
crisis. Support for the President leaches away and gathers to another, who takes his 
role, and thus the cycle begins again.
Insecurity  heightens  short-term  and  conflictual  approaches  as  individuals  and 
groups seek to secure themselves against the threat of up-and-coming rivals. Identity 
becomes more narrowly and exclusively defined, empathy is withdrawn, resorting to 
the single victim becomes more prevalent, and cycles of conflict are perpetuated and 
intensified.  The  mythic  cycle  has  thus  entrapped  successive  Presidents  in  what 
Robert  Bates  calls  “predatory behaviour”.4 Presidents  have  walked the  high  wire 
between power and expulsion, and have been irresistibly tempted to the immediate 
short-term pay-offs of predation in the face of the precarious nature of their tenure.5 
As each new contestant for the Presidential office is drawn into a conflict to supplant  
3 Ibid., 59.
4 Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa, Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Pbk. edn.), 2008), 
10-15.
5 Jan Kees van Donge, “The plundering of Zambian resources by Frederick Chiluba and his 
friends: A case study of the interaction between national politics and the international drive to-
wards good governance,” African Affairs (London) 108, no. 430 (January 1, 2009): 69.
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the model, he becomes the mimetic double of the rival/model. As the mimetic image 
of the predecessor each new president fills the role in much the same way as the pre-
decessor, repeating the patterns of the past. 
Each incumbent to a greater or lesser extent has misused, even straightforwardly 
stolen, public wealth and abused power and patronage with contemptuous freedom in 
order to secure the well-being of himself and a few select allies, relatives and co-con-
spirators. Each has sought to acquire and cling to power for as long as possible in or-
der to retain the fruits of office and avoid retribution from potential successors. All 
have attempted to maintain their position by diverting attention away from them-
selves onto a variety of alternative scapegoats, usually associated with opposing or 
disaffected ethnic groups. This in turn has tended to harden ethnic identities as indi-
viduals and groups perceive themselves as excluded from the benefits of the political 
economy on the basis of their ethnicity. 
It is the mimetic mechanism which drives this cycle. Presidents, as powerful as they 
may seem, as alluring and attractive as their office may be, are as much prisoners of 
their role, of the non-being at the heart of the mimetic cycle, as anyone else in Zam-
bia. Thus the mimetic cycle implants instability and rivalry into the very core and fo-
cus of the national identity. To see further indications of Zambia's entrapment in the 
mimetic cycle we must now turn to an examination of the State of Zambia in the 
early years of the 21st century.
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6.2 The State of Zambia In The Early 21st Century
6.2.1 A Brief Political Background
After the elections of 2001 Zambia experienced a period of economic growth as a 
result of increasing copper prices. Until the “credit crunch” of 2008 it was thought 
that this growth would continue unabated for a considerable period.6 This meant that 
towards the end of Mwanawasa's first term there was a sense of optimism, particu-
larly amongst those with urban business interests, with newspapers reporting increas-
ing investment in the mines and offering hopeful editorials.7 
The optimism was enhanced when Zambia completed the conditions for the Heav-
ily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (H.I.P.C.) for debt relief,8 reducing Zambia's 
international debt from $6.7 billion to $502 million.9 Early in 2006 the Kwacha ap-
preciated against the main international trading currencies, largely on the back of in-
ward investment and the freeing-up of funds consequent upon the successful comple-
tion of the HIPC programme.10
Not everyone, however, felt that they had benefited from this improvement in eco-
nomic well-being. Copperbelt miners were frustrated by poor pay, deteriorating em-
ployment conditions and declining safety standards driven by the demand for profits 
6 Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zam-
bia's 2006 election,” African Affairs (London) 106, no. 425 (October 1, 2007): 618.
7 Business Post October 25th 2005 “$1BN pumped into mines” and the editorial on the same date.
8 “Economic Policy and Debt - (HIPC) The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiat-
ive,” n.d., http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,con-
tentMDK:20260411~menuPK:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:4690
43,00.html (Accessed 11 September, 2009).




from the major multinational mining companies.11 The strengthening of the currency 
also caused an increase in costs which threatened a diverse range of “non-traditional 
export” sectors, including agricultural and flora-culture exporters and the tourism in-
dustry, all of which traditionally struggled in competition with more lower-cost en-
vironments in South Africa and Kenya. 
Despite  the  ambivalent  atmosphere,  Mwanwasa  won the  2006  elections,  which 
were widely accepted as fair and free.12 The United Party for National Development 
(U.P.N.D.) had formed a coalition with a number of other opposition parties under 
the title United Democratic Alliance (U.D.A.). The Alliance was politically wounded 
by the death of the U.P.N.D. leader Anderson Mazoka and the emergence of the little-
known Hakainde Hichelema, the new U.P.N.D. president, as its Presidential candid-
ate. The U.P.N.D. had declared that only a Tonga should be Party President13 which 
tied the party ever  more firmly to the Southern Province and ethnic Tonga vote. 
Overall the U.D.A. was only effective in the south and west. The baton of main op-
position was therefore passed to the Patriotic Front party founded and lead by Mi-
chael Sata. Sata took an early lead in the Presidential elections but eventually lost as  
rural votes were counted.14 Sata's defeat sparked a short spell of violence in both Lu-
saka and the Copperbelt as both he and his supporters claimed electoral fraud.15
11 Ibid., 618.
12 Ibid., 620.
13  Nomusa Michelo “Hichelema Speaks out on U.P.N.D. Presidency” Post Wednesday June 14th 
2006,
14 Larmer and Fraser "Of Cabbages and King Cobra", 623.
15 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Violence as Zambia awaits results,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5398252.stm (Accessed 14 April, 2009). Accessed 14 
April 2009.
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Over the next two years Zambia continued to experience economic growth, largely 
as a result of the Chinese economy's voracious appetite for raw materials. Mwana-
wasa was widely admired for the record of his Government on both the economy and 
on governance. As the economy grew, however, so did frustration with the inequity 
of distribution of its benefits. The multinational mining companies might be making 
new investments and posting record profits,16 but in their own perception Zambians 
were neither earning record wages nor profiting from the investment in new equip-
ment brought from outside the country, and there was an ongoing rumble of discon-
tent in the industrial workforce.
Zambia's mineral taxation régime has been one of the lowest in Africa, giving the 
mining companies breaks in company tax, import duties and a very low mineral roy-
alty. The régimes were negotiated with the mining companies during the processes of 
privatization, and are covered by a series of “Development Agreements” negotiated 
under a great deal of pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(often referred to collectively as the Bretton Woods Institutions).17 In April 2008 the 
Government imposed a new régime which it predicted would bring in revenues of 
$415 million.18 Mining companies, however, were reluctant to pay the new taxes, 
16 “First Quantum Minerals Ltd. - Financial Highlights - Mon Apr 20, 2009,” n.d., 
http://www.first-quantum.com/s/FinancialHighlights.asp (Accessed 20 April, 2009). Accessed 
20 April 2009.
17 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, “For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and Losers in the Privat-
isation of Zambia's Copper Mines” (minewatchzambia.com, n.d.), 11, http://www.mine-
watchzambia.com/reports/report.pdf (Accessed 9 April, 2009). Accessed 09 April 2009.
18 “Zambia president axes copper mine tax breaks - Forbes.com,” n.d., 
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/01/11/afx4520855.html (Accessed 9 April, 2009); 
“Zambia still on course for $415 million mine tax target | LusakaTimes.com,” n.d., 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/?p=2860 (Accessed 9 April, 2009).
“Zambia president axes copper mine tax breaks - Forbes.com”; “Zambia still on course for 
$415 million mine tax target | LusakaTimes.com.” (Accessed 9 April 2009)
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claiming that the “Development Agreements” locked the Government into the origin-
al terms for 15 or 20 years. Given the profits involved, there was little sympathy for 
their case, particularly within Zambia, and the new tax regime was implemented.19
Just prior to the African Union Summit at Sharm-al-Sheikh in Egypt in June 2008 
President Mwanawasa suffered a stroke. He died the following August at the Mercy 
Military Hospital in Paris.20 This precipitated a Presidential By-Election in November 
2008.  The internal  M.M.D. Party contest  was won by the  sitting  Vice  President,  
Ruphia Banda, who duly went on to win the national presidential by-election. This 
was essentially a two-horse race between Banda and Michael Sata. Hichelema had 
still failed to escape both his relative political inexperience and his party's perceived 
ethnocentrism. The U.N.I.P. fielded no candidate and the Heritage Party's Godfrey 
Miyanda hardly registered at the polls. As with the 2006 elections the urban vote put 
Sata far ahead and Banda could only claim to have been victorious after a consider-
able wait for the declaration of results from the remote rural constituencies. Again 
there was some short-lived post-election violence, this time largely confined to the 
Copperbelt city of Kitwe. 
19 Fraser and Lungu, “For whom the Windfalls?,” 2. Accessed 09 April 2009; Abi Dymond, Kato 
Lambrechts, and Simon Chase, “Undermining Development?” (Action for Southern Africa, 
n.d.), 7, http://www.actsa.org/Pictures/UpImages/pdf/Undermining%20development%20re-
port.pdf (Accessed 9 April, 2009). Accessed 09 April 2009.
20 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Zambia president 'suffers stroke',” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7480559.stm (Accessed 13 April, 2009). Accessed 13 
April 2009; “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Zambia's president dies in France,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7570285.stm (Accessed 13 April, 2009). Accessed 13 
April 2009.“BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Zambia president 'suffers stroke'.” Accessed 13 
April 2009; “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Zambia's president dies in France.” Accessed 13 
April 2009.
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As the “credit crunch” deepened into global recession, the price of copper on the 
London  Metal  Exchange  declined,  driving  the  Zambian  economy into  economic 
gloom. Employment in the mining industry declined drastically,  with some mines 
threatened with complete closure and the Government going so far as to consider re-
nationalisation and re-sale of mines which had been closed.21 
6.2.2 Resorting to the Scapegoat: Small Stones in a Large Landslide
Despite its economic hardships Zambia gives the appearance of relative stability. It 
suffers, like any other society, from crime and corruption, but the crime rates are not 
as high as in South Africa, the corruption not as obviously all pervasive as in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the political instability and oppression not as critical 
as in Zimbabwe. Beneath the surface, however, there are signs of profound tension 
and conflict which issue in many localised resorts to the Single Victim Mechanism.
Zambia suffers from a wide range of diseases. Malaria and tuberculosis are endemic 
and there are regular cholera epidemics during the rainy season. 2008/9 was an espe-
cially bad season, and there are indications that there is a link between the extent of 
the outbreaks and climate change.22 Zambia also still suffers from a high level of HIV 
21 “BBC NEWS | Business | Zambian miners hit by copper slump,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7920945.stm (Accessed 6 March, 2009). Accessed 06 
March 2009; “BBC NEWS | Business | Zambian mine lays off 1,300 staff,” n.d., http://news.b-
bc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7992500.stm (Accessed 11 April, 2009). Accessed 06 March 2009; 
“Zambia to nationalise ailing foreign-owned mines - Mail & Guardian Online: The smart news 
source,” n.d., http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-01-07-zambia-to-nationalise-ailing-for-
eignowned-mines (Accessed 3 April, 2009). Accessed 06 March 2009; Mukula Mukula, 
“KCM, Non-Ferrous frontrunners in LCM Purchase,” April 14, 2009, http://www.daily-
mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?category=3&id=1239691499 (Accessed 14 April, 
2009). Accessed 06 March 2009.
22 “afrol News - Climate change increases Zambia cholera numbers,” n.d., 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/33119 (Accessed 15 May, 2009). Accessed 15 May 2009; “MSF 
Responds to Serious Cholera Outbreak in Zambia (1/22/09) | Doctors Without Borders,” n.d., 
http://doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=3392&cat=field-news (Accessed 15 May, 
2009). Accessed 15 May 2009; “Zambia's cholera death toll hits 28 - Mail & Guardian Online: 
The smart news source,” n.d., http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-01-13-zambias-chol-
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infection, which leaves people more vulnerable to disease. There are a series of ge-
netic scourges, such as sickle cell disease, and “life-style” diseases, like blood pres-
sure and diabetes, caused by a combination of genetics and inappropriate nutrition. 
These factors contribute to an overall lowering of life expectancy. At the time of 
writing the average life expectancy at birth in Zambia was 38 years, with only 2.3% 
of the population over sixty-five.23 
Girard notes that for many societies physical disease and the contagion of mimetic 
rivalry are difficult to distinguish.24 This is entirely consistent with Zambian society. 
As with most Bantu cultures Zambians are prone to interpreting any misfortune as 
being due to the malevolent actions of some spiritual being or due to witchcraft prac-
tised against them. Zambians are able to integrate this view with modern understand-
ings  of  causation  and  see  little  inconsistency  in  turning  to  both  the  traditional 
ng'anga and Western medicine for healing in times of illness.
That the population often turns to traditional African forms of healing and witch-
craft detection is evidenced by the large number of advertisements, both on the road-
sides and in the classified columns of all the daily national newspapers, for a variety 
of “doctors” offering traditional remedies for a range of ailments and problems or 
promising to ensure all kinds of achievement and success. At the same time Western-
isation is having its effect and the same population crowds into the public clinics and 
hospitals or queues in the pharmacy to obtain Western treatment and medicine. The 
fact that the clinics and hospitals are often without medicine, vital equipment and 
era-death-toll-hits-28 (Accessed 15 May, 2009). Accessed 15 May 2009.
23 “CIA - The World Factbook -- Zambia.” Accessed 15 April 2009.
24 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 8, 32; Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 52.
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trained staff means that often the treatments are poorly implemented, inappropriate or 
simply not available.  Torn between traditional and Western medicine, the average 
Zambian finds little hope or healing from either. 
Lusaka is neither Johannesburg nor Nairobi, but crime is a major problem for many 
Zambians.25 In most stable societies the criminal becomes an object of the “legitim-
ate violence” of the State in the form of the legal system. The criminal is designated 
by accepted mechanisms of accusation, trial and judgement, and punished in ways 
which are in accordance with a system of standards and precedence which wider so-
ciety believes to deliver some measure of “justice”, however ill-defined that may be. 
The whole process, especially that part which occurs before the courts, is invested 
with considerable “majesty” and authority. Retribution is therefore meted out in such 
a way that tension is discharged while the possibility of response from the criminal's 
allies or relatives is reduced, lessening the possibility of further conflict.26
Much, inevitably, depends upon how deeply society as a whole has invested in and 
affirmed its legal mechanisms, which in turn depends upon the stability of the wider 
social identity. A well-supported and respected legal system in which accusations are 
carefully investigated, judgements credible and the punishment seen to be appropri-
ate can be an effective instrument in maintaining social peace. A legal system held in 
disrepute will encourage the populace to deal with crime in other ways. In Zambia 
25 “NationMaster - South African Crime statistics,” n.d., http://www.nationmaster.com/red/coun-
try/sf-south-africa/cri-crime&all=1 (Accessed 29 August, 2009). Accessed 29 August 2009; 
“NationMaster - Zambian Crime statistics,” n.d., http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/za-
zambia/cri-crime&all=1 (Accessed 29 August, 2009). Accessed 29 August 2009.
26 Bailie, Violence Unveiled, 55-58, 85.
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the legal system is slow, cumbersome, arbitrary and widely believed to be corrupt. 
Any kind of adequate legal advice or representation is far beyond the means of most 
ordinary Zambians.
Patterns of family life are also unstable, with marital failure, infidelity and domestic 
violence  all  too  common.  As  with  medicine,  Zambians  often  turn  to  traditional 
sources of family support such as older women who give instructions on wifely du-
ties, and parents and in-laws who act to mediate or advise couples struggling with 
their relationship in challenging circumstances and the changing expectations of their 
generation. As with medicine, Government provision of support for family life is al-
most non-existent. The Zambian Police Force has a Victim Support Unit to deal with 
domestic violence, but it is relatively young, operates under hazy and poorly upheld 
legal provisions,27 and, like the rest of the Police Force, is chronically underfunded, 
often susceptible to bribes and “gate keeping” fees. Social service provision is even 
weaker, with most social service support being left to NGOs. 
The average urban Zambian knows well that the shambolic nature of health and so-
cial services, together with the unreliable system of justice, both civil and criminal, 
are parts of a pattern of State failure. Their collapse is seen as a direct result of preda-
tion, mismanagement and business friendly policies adopted by the Government un-
der external pressure. Justice, health and social services are perceived as having be-
come desirable goods to which access is determined by corruption and ethnic favour-
27 Darlene Rude, “Reasonable Men and Provocative Women: An Analysis of Gendered Domestic 
Homicide in Zambia,” Journal of Southern African Studies 25, no. 1 (March 1999): 7-27.
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itism. In such circumstances the only mechanism for alleviating the consequent so-
cial tensions is the Single Victim Mechanism. People turn to accusations of witch-
craft and unregulated mob justice as a means of discharging social dis-ease.
Accusations of witchcraft  are particularly noted as expressions of deep tensions 
within a community. Often they arise out of social and economic changes and the 
tensions and rivalries which accompany them.28 In African cultures almost anyone 
can be a witch – anyone with whom you have dealings of any kind, “especially those 
you envy because of their success, or fear because of your good fortune”.29 The witch 
is the scapegoat for mimetic rivalries breaking out in the community.  Older people, 
as representatives and reminders of an old order, are ready candidates for the role of 
witch/scapegoat in times of particular social change and upheaval. This is exacer-
bated in Africa by generational rivalries whereby older male relatives usually control 
kin group wealth and therefore the accession of younger men to social adulthood 
through the payment of the bride-price necessary for marriage.30 Bantu cultures also 
hold the belief that people can extend their lives by “stealing” the life of others:
The minds of people are constructed around this myth and old people have of-
ten found themselves victims of mobs that deduce wrongly that all the elderly 
practice witchcraft.31
Blaming an elderly parent or next-door neighbour is a much easier option than act-
ively dealing with the wide range of disease, both social and medical, which afflicts 
Zambian society, from the level of the failing state to the level of the failing family,  
28 Lewis, Social Anthropology in Perspective, 77-79.
29 Ibid., 81.
30 Curtin, Feireman, Thompson, and Vanisna, African History, 160.
31 Times of Zambia Editorial 24th October 2006
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and which contributes to premature death. Those who have grown old simply be-
cause their lives have been largely lived before the emergence of the HIV pandemic, 
or who have drawn a winning ticket from the genetic lottery, can become a target for 
projection when unexplained deaths devastate the younger generation in the family. 
The slow, wasting course of HIV/AIDS which occurs disproportionately amongst the 
15-24 age group32 leaves it especially prone to being understood as an affliction res-
ulting from witchcraft. The seemingly magical immunity and prolonged survival of 
an elderly grandparent compared with the burden of grief and fear resulting from a 
relentless struggle with a poorly understood disease insidiously leaching away life in 
a younger family member easily leads to a violent conclusion: 
Western Province Commanding officer Vaels Muzwenga confirmed in an inter-
view yesterday that Mackson Simulilo was allegedly axed by family members 
on suspicion that he was practising witchcraft…“There were a series of deaths 
in the family and family members allegedly organised themselves to eliminate 
the old man” Muzwenga said.33
Killings of this sort are widespread, and even carried out by hired gangs of “grand-
parent” killers known as Karavina.34
The townships are squalid and neglected environments where people of varying 
cultural and linguistic backgrounds compete for employment and limited state re-
sources. They are regularly racked by epidemics of Cholera. Malaria, TB and AIDS 
are all endemic. In such circumstances the widespread perception that the legal sys-
32 “UNAIDS Report 2008 ExecutiveSummary_en.pdf (application/pdf Object),” n.d., 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2008/JC1511_GR08_ExecutiveSummary_en.pdf (Ac-
cessed 20 April, 2009). Accessed 20 April 2009.
33 Post Friday November 11th 2005.
34 Times of Zambia Wednesday January 14, 2003. “Karavina gang leader arrested”, also Times 
Wednesday October 30 2002, “Violence: The chilling revelations”, Times Thursday February 
07, 2002. “Indiscriminate killings irk Chief Justice Ngulube”.
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tem is tainted means that the deeper problems and rivalries engendered become pro-
jected in an arbitrary fashion onto those accused of criminal activity. The result is 
“mob justice”, both instant and lethal:
A suspected criminal was yesterday beaten to death and chopped to pieces with 
pangas and iron bars by an instant justice mob in Kitwe’s Chimwemwe town-
ship … the suspect was one of the criminals behind a spate of recent robberies 
in the area and was on the wanted list of house breakers…And residents of 
Chimwemwe township have vowed that they will eliminate anyone caught red 
handed in a criminal activity because they were tired of suspected criminal ele-
ments being set free after being apprehended. … They said they were tired of 
criminals robbing them of their valuables and would resort to mob justice as a 
way of teaching the offenders a lesson.35
The ready resort to projecting tensions onto these “obvious” victims indicates the 
uneasy nature of Zambian society. Mimetic contagion rules as tensions and rivalries 
ebb and flow within the community generating short term and highly fluid “mob” 
identities in which the normal human empathies with the victim, even where the vic-
tim is a family member, are withdrawn while a temporary group identity engendered 
by the Single Victim Mechanism emerges. People lose themselves in the mimetic 
fury and “know not what they do”.36 This feeds into the ongoing political instability. 
There are very few steps between the fearful and conflicted mob chasing someone 
accused of petty theft down the laterite streets of the township to the same mob at the 
gates of State House or Parliament, or between the murder of an elderly parent and 
the murder of the President as the nation's “Father”, especially when the discourse of 
“good governance” can easily be turned to credible accusations of Presidential preda-
tion and Governmental misrule. The very fluidity of the identities generated in mi-
35 Times of Zambia Wednesday, March 19, 2003.
36 Luke 23:34
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metic contagion make it easy for the smaller rivalries and projects to be subsumed 
and simplified into ever larger conflicts until the whole nation is swallowed up in the 
contagion and the point of national catharsis approaches.
6.2.3 Ethnic Tensions
On the surface that plague of human society, ethnic tension, seems to be less acute 
in Zambia than in most of her neighbours, or, for that matter, than in some European 
countries. Surveys suggest that most Zambians put “being a Zambian” above being a 
member of a particular ethnic or language group. The data suggest that there is a rel-
atively high rate of inter-ethnic marriage. The public atmosphere condemns “tribal-
ism”, and all forms of public discourse are regularly filled with warnings about, and 
condemnations of, ethnocentrism in all its manifestations.37 
We have already seen that the “peace” of Zambia is only a matter of appearance. It 
seems not unlikely that the surface data conceal wider ethnic rivalries ready to sub-
sume the smaller scale tensions. The very fact of widespread and repeated condem-
nations suggests that there is something to condemn; that ethnocentrism exists or is 
perceived to exist. These are public condemnations which express an uneasy sense 
that any ethnic stability which pertains in Zambia is tenuous and that ethnocentrism 




Poser argues that “Preference Falsification” occurs when Zambians are asked about 
ethnocentrism.38 Given the strong public condemnation of ethnocentrism, it is very 
likely that Zambians will conceal any tendency to ethnic bias from the relatively cas-
ual inquiry of the sociological survey carried out by a stranger. Posner’s use of “fo-
cus groups” revealed that most Zambians perceive that ethnic identity is of import-
ance through a wide range of social, political and commercial spheres. It is widely 
held that “From the President to the lowest ranking civil servant, public officeholders 
are assumed to use their power to assist members of their own ethnic group”.39 This 
can run from finding well-paid positions in Government organizations for one's relat-
ives and directing resources to certain regions or even local areas, to differentiation 
in the speed at which Government services are delivered. In such matters the percep-
tion is the reality. Whatever actually happens “[t]he widely held perception that the 
President's part of the country must be benefiting from his rule is much more power-
ful than the facts on the ground”.40 Equally, Zambians perceive that access to em-
ployment at all levels is dependent upon ethnic identity.41 In one class discussion stu-
dents at the Anglican Seminary stated that access to short-term or casual employment 
in the urban areas is controlled by gangs of “day labourers” all of whom have either a 
single ethnic or language group identity or belong to allied ethnic groups.42 
A high value for ethnic identification is unsurprising for two reasons. First our ex-
amination of Zambian history has shown that ethnic identification, which pre-existed 





42 Class discussion with students.
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pendence Zambia the Nationalist coalition fragmented along ethnic axes. It would be 
somewhat strange if ethnic identities which have existed for so long and were so act-
ively promoted have now faded away without some good reason, and we can see that 
in the new state mimesis has continued to simplify and promote ethnic identification. 
Second there is a culturally-engendered moral imperative to support less fortunate 
members of one's kin group with whatever means are available. To Zambians invest-
ment in one's kin or ethnic group welfare is little different from the idea expressed 
proverbially amongst British people that “charity begins at home”. Traditional oblig-
ations frequently manifested in the urban setting include joining with other members 
of one's kin group to pay the school or hospital bills of struggling family members, or 
sending remittances “back home” to secure the well-being of family members in the 
village.43 Yet what is at one level a perfectly innocuous, even morally admirable, 
activity locks Zambians into patterns of potentially destructive behaviour which ex-
hibits all the characteristics of mimetic doubling.
Faced with the logic of a prisoner's dilemma, most decide that ... supporting 
members of their own group is preferable to not doing so and being dominated 
by people from other groups that do. 'It is bad to support a [person] simply be-
cause he comes from your tribe', a teacher in Mongu explained, 'but we have a 
situation in Zambia where if you don't support your own man, who else is go-
ing to support him?'... 'Bembas are supporting Bembas, so even Lozis should 




Posner's respondents are caught up in what Peter Berger called “bad faith” where 
social roles take on an inexorable character and actions appear as inevitable with the 
consequent suppression of moral and emotional inhibitions.45 Posner's respondents 
use language which has strong echoes of Paul's insight into the enslaving power of 
sin. “I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the  
very thing I  hate”.46 They clearly know that  ethnocentrism is  “bad”,  but  because 
everyone else acts in this way they are impelled to do the same. They are caught in 
the mimetic contagion where each group mirrors the other in an effort to secure their 
own position and exclude the other. The one becomes the double of the other, and the 
whole pattern of ethnic conflict becomes entrenched and cyclical.
6.2.3.1 Ethnic Favouritism in Elections
One indicator of ethnic relationships in any poly-ethnic environment is to examine 
voting patterns to determine if ethnic or linguistic belonging has any bearing on how 
people vote. One has to be somewhat wary of the results published by the Electoral 
Commission of Zambia. The EU Election Observation Mission for the 2001 elections 
concluded that “In view of the serious flaws in the counting and tabulation proced-
ures we are not confident that the declared results represent the wishes of the Zambi-
an electors on polling day”.47 The results of the 2006 elections, however, are widely 
held to be considerably more reliable.48 Full conclusions concerning the 2008 elec-
45 Peter L. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, Penguin University Books (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1973), 89-101.
46 Romans 7:15.
47 “Zambian Elections 2001 - Final Statement of EU Election Observation Mission,” n.d., 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/zambia/in-
dex2001.htm (Accessed 30 March, 2009). Accessed 26 January 2009.
48 “European Union Election Observer Mission Zambia 2006,” 2006, http://www.eueomzambi-
a.org/ (Accessed 30 March, 2009). Accessed 26 January 2009.
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tions were not available at the time of writing. The S.A.D.C. observers, however, de-
clared that they were free and fair.49 These elections were, however, organized as a 
result of the death of the President, and there was insufficient time for a new registra-
tion.50
General elections in Zambia are held every five years and are “tripartite”; that is 
Presidential,  Parliamentary and Local Government elections are held on the same 
day. By-elections are held as a seat falls vacant, or, following the death or successful 
impeachment of the President. The most reliable set of results, those for the 2006 Tri-
partite Elections show clearly that voting was strongly influenced by ethnic affili-
ation. Patterns of ethnically-determined voting can also be seen in the 2001 elections, 
and in 2008 Presidential By-Election. Given this consistency we may conclude that 
this pattern broadly reflects public opinion.
In the 2001 Parliamentary elections the M.M.D. won convincingly in the CiBemba-
speaking heartlands of Luapula and Northern Provinces and in the CiBemba speak-
ing Copperbelt  Province,  and lost  in very few constituencies throughout all  three 
provinces, showing a marked preference amongst CiBemba speakers for the M.M.D. 
The main opposition of that year, the U.P.N.D. led by Anderson Mazoka, a Tonga, 
won in the Lozi and Tonga Western and Southern Provinces.51 The Presidential elec-
49 “European Union Election Observer Mission Zambia 2006.” Accessed 26 January 2009; “Zam-
bian Presidential Election,” April 11, 2008, http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?
sid=9&aid=12&dir=2008/November/Tuesday4 (Accessed 8 May, 2009). Accessed 26 January 
2009; “Zambian elections deemed free and fair as opposition leads returns : Africa World,” 
January 11, 2008, http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/239616,zambian-elec-
tions-deemed-free-and-fair-as-opposition-leads-returns.html (Accessed 8 May, 2009). Accessed 
26 January 2009.
50 The constitution requires that elections be held within 90 days of the death of the President.
51 “The Electoral Commission of Zambia - Downloads | Elections Results Index,” October 29, 
2008, http://www.elections.org.zm/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=31&Itemid=78 (Accessed 26 January, 2009). Ac-
cessed 30 March 2009..
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tions followed a similar pattern, with each party's respective candidates victorious in 
the areas where their party was similarly victorious.52 These elections followed upon 
the “Third Term” crisis and while the M.M.D. was still seen as a “Bemba”-domin-
ated Party: Chiluba having been a Bemba, and his immediate successor still assumed 
to be supportive of Bemba interests, despite being from a different ethnic group. The 
U.P.N.D. clearly won the support of Southern and Western Provinces, indicating that 
the country was split along the same ethnic fault line as it had been in 1968.
The 2006 elections saw the Bemba heartlands beginning to show disaffection with 
Mwanawasa, a Lenje. The Patriotic Front led by Michael Sata, a CiBemba-speaker, 
won all of the Parliamentary seats in urban Copperbelt, with only three rural, and 
therefore  not  CiBemba speaking,  districts  going  to  the  M.M.D.,  two of  these  in 
Mwanawsa's own Lenje territory, including Masaiti where he had a farm. The P.F. 
won all but three seats in Luapula. Results were more mixed in Northern Province, 
with  the  P.F.  doing better  in  the  districts  associated  with Sata's  own Bisa  ethnic 
group. The voting patterns for the Presidential contest were again similar to the Par-
liamentary elections, with Sata doing well in Luapula and Copperbelt, and a mixture 
of  results  in  Northern  Province.  With  the  U.P.N.D.  firmly tied  to  the  Tonga the 
U.D.A. lost ground in Western Province.53 The 2008 Presidential By-Election sug-
gests at first sight that the changes in political allegiances had proceeded further in an 
ethnocentric direction. Sata won convincingly in Luapula and Copperbelt, and also a 
52 “The Electoral Commission of Zambia - Downloads | Elections Results Index,” n.d., 
http://www.elections.org.zm/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=31&Itemid=78 (Accessed 26 January, 2009). Ac-
cessed 30 March 2009.
53 “Results 2006 http://www.elections.org.zm/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=31&Itemid=78,” 2006 Presidential Results. Ac-
cessed 30 March 2009.
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good deal of Northern Province. Hichilema won most of Southern Province, apart 
from  Livingstone.  He  also  gained  one  constituency  in  Western  Province.  The 
M.M.D. won most  of  Banda's  Eastern  province  as  well  as  most  of  Western  and 
North-Western Provinces.54
This ethnocentric pattern of voting provoked much angst amongst many in Zambia. 
Former President Kaunda expressed his concern:
Various newspapers gave us a clear picture of who got how many votes in the 
Northern Province, how many votes one got in the Southern Province ... but it 
is a clear picture of disunity getting into Zambia ...  People scored on tribal 
lines, but that is a dangerous development.”55
The Roman Catholic Episcopal Conference Secretary, Bishop George Lungu, was 
reported as having delivered a Pastoral Statement which noted with alarm:
We have closely observed that the pattern of voting during the past few elec-
tions has been along very partisan, regional and tribal lines. We now appear 
more divided and polarised as a nation than we were before multi-partism was 
re-introduced  in  1991.  This  state  of  affairs  should  not  be  allowed  to 
continue...The just-ended presidential  election has left  this  country more di-
vided than ever before. How can we be a nation if we are not united?56
54 “Results 2006 http://www.elections.org.zm/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=31&Itemid=78.” Accessed 30 March 2009.
55 Katwishi Bwalya, “KK Deplores The Tribalism of Oct 30 Presidential Election,” Post, Zambia 
(Lusaka, November 18, 2008), sec. Front Page.
56 Mwala Kalaluke, “Eelectoral Malpractices Worry Catholic Bishops,” Post, Zambia (Lusaka, 
November 10, 2008), sec. Front Page.
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Sata is  particularly noted as having campaigned strongly on an ethnic/linguistic 
platform from 2001, emphasizing his Bemba heritage by addressing people in CiBe-
mba, even in the large CiNyanja-speaking compounds around Lusaka.57 The urban 
Copperbelt, where Sata had considerable appeal, is widely perceived as having an 
historically strong preference for CiBemba-speaking candidates, irrespective of their 
policy or party affiliation.58 
These voting patterns, however, do not entirely conform to a simple explanation. 
On the one hand we can see clear evidence of ethnocentrism being manifested in vot-
ing preferences. On the other hand Sata won support and constituencies, not only in 
his traditional CiBemba-speaking heartlands, but also in the CiNyanja-speaking com-
pounds of Lusaka. Ethnocentrism seems to have been more manifest in some of the 
earlier elections, but a small and puzzling re-alignment appears to have taken place 
in the 2008 Presidential By-Election. It is therefore necessary to explore the divisions 
which are apparent in Zambia further in order to understand these rather complex and 
seemingly contrary patterns.
6.3 Another Turn of the Cycle
We have argued that the foundational mimetic conflict, crisis and catharsis which 
established Zambia has become a recurrent cycle. Within this cycle identities are flu-
id, with alliances emerging, consolidating and fragmenting as cycle moves through 
its various phases. We would therefore expect to find evidence of changing identities 
57 Austin Mbozi, “Should Bemba /Nyanja be the only ‘National’ Languages? A Critique Against 
the Post Newspaper Editorial,” in University of Zambia Linguistics Association (Zambia On 
Line, 2007), 11, www.zambia.co.zm (Accessed 30 March, 2009). Accessed 30 March 2009.
58 Ibid., 9.
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and relationships indicating where Zambia is in this cycle at any particular time. In 
what follows we will argue that the 2008 Presidential By-Election results offer such 
evidence. We begin with a reflection upon what seems to be a widespread concept 
amongst Zambians, that of ethnic (or in Zambian terms “tribal”) cousins.
6.3.1 Ethnic Cousins?
Zambians express a view that certain ethnic groups are “cousins” to one another. 
This is explained in terms of some, usually pre-colonial, inter-ethnic conflict which 
ended in a bloody stalemate. In such wars it was not unusual for women and children 
to be taken captive, the women and girls married off to their captors or their families, 
the male children enslaved as part of a village household and eventually absorbed 
into the community. As part of the peace settlement the leading families of two con-
flicting groups inter-married, and approved or encouraged others in making similar 
marriages, thus regularising familial relationships which had emerged during the war 
and cementing the peace. The Bemba and the Ngoni are said to be “cousins” to one 
another as a result of the settlement of the wars between them in the 19th century, as  
are the Tonga and the Lozi. There is an elasticity in “cousinage” and often it is exten-
ded to include not only those groups who are viewed as first instigating the relation-
ship, but also neighbouring or allied groups. Thus CiBemba-speaking groups are said 
to be cousins not only to the Ngoni, but also to other Eastern groups. The use of the 
word “cousin”  to  describe  the  relationship  is  in  itself  important.  In  the Zambian 
Bantu languages “cousin” describes a more indirect family relationship. A “cousin” 
is one who is a potential friend and ally or an acceptable marriage partner, but who is 
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not sufficiently close to be reckoned as a full member of the immediate family. A 
“cousin” is therefore neither a direct rival for kin-group resources nor an entirely reli-
able ally in confrontations within the family.59 
How well grounded in historical fact “ethnic cousinage” relationships are is a ques-
tion beyond our present purposes. There is nothing intrinsically unlikely in the Be-
mba and Ngoni, for example, cementing any settlement of their wars, which certainly 
took  place,  with  an  interchange  of  marriages  between  the  chiefly  families.  It  is 
enough to recognize that this is part of how urban Zambians today frame aspects of 
inter-ethnic relationships. 
The “elasticity” in the way the relationships between ethnic groups reckoned as 
“cousins” are construed, suggests that this is a mythologized projection onto history 
of inter-ethnic alliances, which while fluid and not entirely reliable, are preferred to 
other allegiances. The concept also makes sense of a significant and persistent fault 
line in Zambian inter-ethnic relationships, in which SiLozi and CiTonga speakers, for 
differing reasons, have a sense of being rather less well integrated into the shaky na-
tional identity and more affiliated to one another than to the CiBemba or CiNyanja 
speaking groups. 
The way in which Zambians speak of these relationships suggests that the two main 
sets of alliances are liable to draw into themselves those groups who have sufficient 
similarity of situation and interests with the main partners. Thus the Tonga-Lozi affil-
59 This information comes from a series of conversations with students at the Anglican Seminary 
in Kitwe with John Mumba who taught CiBemba to the expatriate missionaries at Mindolo 
Ecumenical Foundation and my former colleague, Francis Mwansa, a CiBemba speaker, who 
kindly reviewed the material.
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iation attracts support from ethnic groups in North-Western Province, another remote 
rural region inhabited by groups not readily drawn to urban life. The other affiliation, 
subsumes a wide range of disaffected CiBemba and CiNyanja-speaking urban resid-
ents of varying ethnic origin. The vagueness of the identities and the incoherence in 
the alliances suggest that a conflict between two blocks has not as yet taken any 
strong hold, being somewhat intermittent, with both groups oscillating between strict 
ethnic alliances at one pole and identification with a wider multi-ethnic alliance at  
the other.
The next questions to be asked are, therefore, “Is there, apart from the articulation 
of the notion of ‘cousinage’, evidence indicating that there is a developing set of alli-
ances across ethnic boundaries? Or if this not the case, do the conditions for the 
formation of such alliances exist?” We begin to answer this question by examining 
the two main ethnic groups in each of the larger inter-ethnic blocks.
6.3.1.1 The Barotse and The Tonga
6.3.1.1.1 The Barotse
At Independence, the Barotse King had resisted incorporation into Zambia, and the 
price of a functioning state was considerable autonomy for Barotse Province,  ex-
pressed in the Barotseland Agreement (BLA). This agreement gave the Barotse kings 
autonomous  control  over  crucial  resources,  including  access  to  public  land,  the 
Barotse Native Treasury.60 
60 Pierre Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and 
Casamance,” Afrika Spectrum 39, no. 1 (2005): 10.
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There remained a continued rumbling of dissatisfaction in the Barotse Province, 
which had low levels of economic development and poor access to markets.  The 
Province's economic prospects were worsened when the U.N.I.P. Government can-
celled the agreements which allowed South African mining companies to recruit la-
bour from Barotseland, thus closing a traditional route to industrial employment for 
the  population.  Economic  development  has  not  progressed  far  in  the  intervening 
years and the Province remains subject to food insecurity and reliant upon external 
aid.61
The BLA was rescinded at the creation of the one-party state and in 1991 Western 
Province  supported  the  M.M.D.,  hoping  that  the  Party  would  restore  Barotse 
autonomy. In the event, the M.M.D. was not so sympathetic. In 1995 the Government 
passed a land reform act which stripped the king of his long-held right to allocate 
public lands.62
The land reform of 1995 was, however, never fully implemented on the ground and 
the BRE has succeeded in retaining considerable de facto control of the allocation of 
vital resources.63 It has thus avoided demands for outright secession, instead seeking 
a full restoration of the BLA.64 There remains, however, an ongoing sense of dissatis-






for chronic underdevelopment.65 There remain a variety of fringe secessionist groups, 
often supported by rival claimants to the Barotse throne, the most radical of which 
has even threatened violence.66
The Barotse therefore perceive themselves to be on the margins of a State which is 
dominated by the CiBemba-speaking communities and their urban allies, both on the 
Copperbelt and in Lusaka.67 This has intensified as CiBemba has spread of as a lin-
gua franca as far west as Mongu,68 a fact which has caused some considerable debate 
in recent times.69
The Barotse are in a mimetic rivalry with those they perceive to be the dominant 
ethnic groups. They desire the higher standards of living and economic security and 
political influence which they perceive their urban rivals to have and to be withhold-
ing from them.
6.3.1.1.2 The Tonga
The Tonga live along the Zambezi and Kaufe rivers. A differentiation is sometimes 
made amongst Zambians between the “Valley” Tonga living either side of the Zam-
bezi and the “Plateau” Tonga on the veldt above the Zambezi Valley. By tradition 
they are cattle keepers and practise transhumance, the younger men herding the cattle 
onto the Kafue floodplains during the dry season and returning as the rains begin.70 
65 Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance,” 7; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 
103.
66 Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance,” 13.
67 Ibid., 8.
68 The Western Province and Barotse capital.
69 “The Bemba Language Debate,” Post, January 18, 2007, sec. Editorial; Mbozi, “National Lan-
guages.”
70 Conversation with Jane Mwanakasale.
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They also cultivate a variety of crops, the Tonga living along the Zambezi Valley re-
lying upon the river, especially during the dry season, for both water and areas of 
fresh silt for their winter gardens as well as fishing. 
Few Tonga, either on the plateau or in the valley migrated as they had alternative 
sources  of income from which to  pay their  taxes.  When they did migrate  it  was 
mainly to South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. As with the Barotse, therefore, they 
were adversely affected by the political decisions to close the migration routes south, 
although rather less so. The Plateau Tonga in particular were favoured by their stra-
tegic  position  close  to  the  communications  infrastructure  along the  “line  of  rail” 
which gave them access to urban markets. Southern Province therefore became an 
important agricultural region with high levels of “cash crop” production.71 In order to 
encourage crop diversification the Government held the price of maize at artificially 
low levels through the 1960s, and also restricted the use of the Kafue floodplains for 
grazing during the dry seasons. 
The above measures were not the only ones that put the peasants at odds with 
the ruling party. The rich peasants in particular had general distrust and misgiv-
ings  about  U.N.I.P.'s  overall  development  strategy  and  its  ideological  pos-
ition.72
The Tonga's suspicion of and resistance to Government policy was expressed in 
their support for the ANC. 
71 Jotham C. Momba, “The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in 




The Valley Tonga suffered one of the more traumatic acts of land expropriation in 
Zambian history through the building of the Kariba Dam. The dam was built, starting 
in 1955, in order to meet the growing demands for electrical power. As an inevitable 
outcome of the project the Gwembe Valley was to be flooded and the Valley Tonga 
living there were to be displaced.73 Quite apart from the outburst of violence which 
took place during the Government's efforts to re-locate the population, the result was 
an unmitigated disaster. The Valley Tonga were a relatively isolated community and 
had little desire for any of the industrial benefits which the dam was supposed to 
bring. They did have a great deal of investment in their culture and lifestyle, in which 
the river played a potent spiritual as well as physical part. The river formed a link 
rather than a barrier to interchange between villages on either side, and Tonga often 
crossed the river to maintain family ties or to acquire suitable marriage partners.74 As 
the flood affected both sides of the river the Valley Tonga on either side were re-
located to different places, to the considerable disruption of social interchange and 
family life and to the enormous disadvantage of the communities.75
Historically, the Kariba Dam, which was built in the Middle Zambezi Valley in 
the late 1950s, has had the worst impact on local people...Fifty-five thousand 
African villagers ... were forced to leave their homes. Today, most are still "de-
velopment refugees." Many live in less-productive, problem-prone areas, some 
of which have been so seriously degraded within the last generation that they 
resemble lands on the edge of the Sahara Desert.76
73 Howarth, The Shadow of the Dam. [On the Removal of the Tonga Tribesmen from the Site of  
the Kariba Dam.], passim.
74 Ibid., 49.
75 Ibid., 50.
76 Thayer Scudder, “Pipe Dreams: Can the Zambezi River supply the region's water needs?,” Cul-
tural Survival Quarterly 17, no. 2 (Summer 1993), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublica-
tions/csq/article/pipe-dreams-can-zambezi-river-supply-regions-water-needs (Accessed 6 May, 
2009).
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The children and grandchildren of fifty-five thousand dislocated people still living 
as “development refugees” make a significant disaffected group in a population of 
about twelve million.  Today Tonga leaders still  express considerable disaffection, 
claiming  that  little  benefit  has  ever  reached  the  displaced  Valley  Tonga.  Chief 
Chipepo particularly notes that there was little progress at all during the Kaunda ré-
gime.77
During the First Republic the Tonga remained a group whose integration and in-
vestment in the coalition built by the U.N.I.P. were weak and half hearted. It was this 
marginal position that left their leadership exposed to the workings of the mechan-
isms of regenerative violence at  the transition to the second republic.  During the 
1991 elections Southern Province voted overwhelmingly for Chiluba. By 2001, how-
ever, the Tonga were again dissenting from the governing party and the national iden-
tity, expressed through support for Mazoka and the U.P.N.D. The following two elec-
tions have left Southern Province as a U.P.N.D. stronghold, much as it was an ANC 
stronghold during the First Republic, with no other party making any impact or gain-
ing any long-term support.
Like the Barotse the Tonga have seen themselves as “different” and have only half-
heartedly subscribed to the national identity. They too see themselves in conflict with 
a  state  largely dominated  by the  Bemba  speakers  and their  allies  which  has  not 
served their interests, and in the case of the Valley Tonga, has offered them no benefit 
in recognition of the sacrifice of their land and lifestyle for the sake of an interest  
said to be “national” but clearly focused on industrial urban needs. 
77 Miriam Zimba, “Most People have not benefitted from Kariba Dam",” Post, October 16, 2008.
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6.3.1.2 Barotse and Tonga as “Cousins”
Both Lozi speakers and the Tonga have fewer historical links with the urban areas 
of the Copperbelt and Lusaka, and thus both have participated rather less in the core 
experiences of urban life. Both have developed a sense of distinction, grievance and 
exclusion from the wider nation. Both groups are sometimes described as “minority 
tribes”,78 and both groups inhabit regions which are perceived as “underdeveloped” 
and largely rural, with a sense that their economic situation is linked with the domin-
ance of the CiBemba and CiNyanja-speaking groups who occupy the more powerful 
positions in Government.79 
There has long been a propensity for the Tonga and the Barotse to form political al-
liances with one another. Both had an interest in maintaining a more “moderate” pos-
ition,  particularly towards  relationships  with  the  White-dominated  régimes  to  the 
south,  and both tended to support  the ANC. In the aftermath of its  banning,  the 
United Party simply disappeared into the ANC, which delivered not only the tradi-
tional support base of Southern Province but also Western Province to the ANC. In 
2001 both supported Mazoka, and a close examination of the 2006 and 2008 Presid-
ential results show that in Western Province, while the M.M.D. were still winning 
most constituencies, there was considerable support for Hichelema, who almost al-
ways came second ahead of Sata.80
78 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 99.
79 Ibid.
80 “Results 2006 http://www.elections.org.zm/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=31&Itemid=78,” Presidential Results by Constitu-
ency 2008 (Accessed 26 January 2009).
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It therefore seems that both Tonga and Lozi are less likely to subscribe to the na-
tional identity. Therefore there is a certain amount of common interests, or rather, 
common grievance and disaffection between these two groups, which makes mutual 
mimesis more probable. This can, and does, create localized rivalries between the 
two, but is also a contributory condition for those smaller conflicts to become ab-
sorbed into a temporary alliance. These alliances are loose, fluid and tentative, but 
they nevertheless constitute a basis for the emergence of a larger block in pursuit of 
common interests “over against” what might be termed a “Bemba hegemony”.
6.3.1.3 Urban Discontent and The Bemba Hegemony
There is a widespread sense of discontent amongst the urban workforce, particu-
larly on the Copperbelt, which has been deeply affected by the volatility in copper 
prices. There are clear signs that urban Zambians are presently deeply discontented 
with  their  economic  circumstances.  This  discontent  is  focused  heavily  upon  the 
growing nexus of Chinese Government interests in the country. Indeed the Chinese 
presence is highly ambivalent. On the one hand the Chinese offer welcome invest-
ment, practical improvements in infrastructure and employment, often where there 
was little hope of investment or employment. The pragmatist might well agree with 
Brendan O'Neill's “Thought Leader”:
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Last week, BBC TV’s Newsnight revealed that the Chinese have a signed a 
trade deal with the DRC worth a whopping $9 billion. As part of this package, 
the Chinese will help to build 2,400 miles of road, 2,000 miles of railway, 32 
hospitals, 145 health centres and two universities in the DRC…Now, if you 
were (or are) a poor African struggling to make ends meet, who would you 
prefer to see treading a path to your village? A worthy, well-spoken NGO vo-
lunteer from Islington in London ...? Or a Chinese guy in a suit wielding plans 
to build roads and factories and schools and in the process create thousands of 
new jobs?... I thought so. Bring on the Chinese.81
The Government certainly welcomes the investment in mines and infrastructure, as 
do the directors and engineers of the semi-privatized water companies seeking sup-
port for new pipes, pumps and tanks. On the other hand, there is more to the Chinese 
presence than much-needed road building and employment in once-defunct mines or 
even a water supply to the informal townships. Watching Chinese-supported projects 
from the laying of new fibre-optic cable to major civil engineering projects, it seems 
that much of the work is carried out by Chinese companies, using Chinese equip-
ment,  employing Chinese management and skilled artisans. Only unskilled labour 
and small contracts are left for Zambians. Much of O'Neill's $9 billion will simply go 
back to China in profits to contracting companies, equipment manufacturers and the 
salaries of Chinese employees. This has led to an increasing anti-Chinese xenopho-
bia. Kamwala market in Lusaka has been under Chinese management since before 
Independence,82 yet growing resentment towards the Chinese immigrants has led to a 
perception  that  Chinese  traders,83 benefiting  from  an  overly  close  relationship 
between  the  Chinese  and  Zambian  Governments,  have  been  displacing  Zambian 
81 “Thought Leader » Brendan O'Neill » Bring on the Chinese,” n.d., http://www.thoughtleader-
.co.za/brendanoneill/2008/04/24/bring-on-the-chinese/ (Accessed 13 April, 2009).
82 Larmer and Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 elec-
tion,” 628.
83 Fraser and Lungu "For whom the Windfalls?", 51.
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traders.  On  the  Copperbelt,  Chinese  companies  are  widely  thought  to  have  the 
poorest  health  and safety record,84 a  view corroborated  when 52 Zambians  were 
killed in an explosion at the Chinese Government owned explosives manufacturer, 
BGRIMM. A major cause of this accident was poor safety standards.85 Frustration 
and  xenophobia  erupted  into  violence  at  the  site  of  the  construction  of  a  new 
Chinese-owned smelter at Chambishi.86 
The Chinese are not the only investors finding disaffection. There is a perception 
that many foreign companies are offering less than fair conditions to the Zambian 
workforce. They are perceived to be ignoring the minimal legal protections given to 
Zambian workers. They avoid the provision of a range of benefits and pay less than 
the national minimum wage through the exploitation of legal loopholes and the wide-
spread use of casual labour, sub-contractors and short-term contracts.87 As copper 
prices rise so do mining company profits. In 2005 workers at Koncola Copper Mine 
went on unofficial strike for a 100% pay rise linked to the company's burgeoning 
profits.88
Underlying the industrial agitation is a dissatisfaction with the Government and its 
programme of liberalization,89 projected on to foreign investors, particularly in the 
mining sector which is dominated by large multi-national corporations.90 Accusations 
84 Ibid., 48.
85 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Dozens killed in Zambia explosion,” n.d., http://news.b-
bc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4466321.stm (Accessed 9 April, 2009); “BBC NEWS | World | 
Africa | Zambia miners 'see little reward',” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6267754.stm (Accessed 9 April, 2009).
86 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Chinese beaten up in Zambia mines,” n.d., http://news.b-
bc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7277006.stm (Accessed 9 April, 2009) (Accessed 9 April 2009).
87 Fraser and Lungu, “For whom the Windfalls?,” 20-22.





of raw corruption are not uncommon, but more insidious and frustrating to Zambians 
is the way in which the Government is driven by its relationships with both the mul-
tinational companies and the Bretton Woods Institutions to provide an economic en-
vironment  which  is  overly  “business-friendly”.  The  agreements  under  which  the 
companies took over admittedly failing assets after the return to multi-party demo-
cracy are  shrouded in  secrecy,  many never  having  been  revealed,  even  to  those 
charged with monitoring their implementation.91 Brendan O'Neill may well be cor-
rect concerning the welcome given to Chinese, or indeed any inward investment by 
African Governments.  The question as to  whether  Chinese or  other  investors are 
quite so welcome to make free with the assets of the country by the people who are  
said to have elected those same Governments is another matter. 
The potential for tension between the Government and urban workforce is exacer-
bated by the power which the Government has to intervene in strikes. Even if a strike 
becomes “official” - backed by the union with the necessary majority at an official 
ballot - there is a period of up to ten days during which the Government may go to 
court and declare that the strike is not in the national interest.92 This makes it more 
likely that the workforce will resort to illegal strikes, or else attempt to disguise their 
actions by calling them “protests” rather than strikes.93 An inter-ethnic “urban” iden-
tity is therefore emerging, arising out of an industrial conflict between the workforce 
and the employer fueled by a sense of common exclusion and exploitation.
91 Fraser and Lungu, “For whom the Windfalls?,” 17.
92 Ibid., 25.
93 The industrial workforce at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation, for example resorted to a number 
of “protests” which were de facto one day strikes in response to being thwarted over unionisa-
tion.
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6.3.1.3.1 An Urban Rural Division?
Urban disaffection and protest is not new in Zambia. The U.N.I.P. was, despite its 
beginnings in Luapula, an essentially urban party, finding its main support amongst 
the  CiBemba  speaking  miners  in  Copperbelt  and  their  relatives  in  Luapula  and 
Northern Provinces.94 It was urban protest, especially amongst students at U.N.Z.A., 
which resisted the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes under Kaunda. 
Chiluba was a mine union leader, and it was largely urban discontent amongst the 
urban workforce which made the formation of the M.M.D. and the re-emergence of a 
multi-party system possible. 
What some commentators perceive to be new, is the growing separation between 
urban and rural interests. In the past, urban and rural interests were tightly integrated 
because of the mechanisms implemented by the colonial régime, which encouraged 
Africans to maintain an investment in their rural home communities. Posner argues 
that there still  remains an incentive for people to maintain contact with their  kin 
group and village because there is still a tendency to retire to the village rather than 
remain in the urban environment. Urban-rural rivalries therefore play only a minimal 
role in Zambia's conflicts.95
Larmer and Fraser largely agree with this as an analysis of the past.96 They argue, 
however, that the urban-rural link is breaking down.97 Urban Zambians are certainly 
showing signs of having lost, or of losing, touch with rural relatives. One Zambian 
94 Momba, “The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in Zambia: The 
case of Southern Province,” 347.
95 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 84-85.




when asked “Where is your home village?” responded, with a certain amount of iron-
ic humour, “Luanshya”.98 There are many second or even third generation urban res-
idents with little contact with their rural origins. They are aware of their home vil-
lage, even of having relatives there, but have never been to the village. They may 
speak the language of their ethnic community only to a few elderly relatives who 
may come for a visit from the village,99 but primarily communicate in an urban lin-
gua franca or in English.100 Others have little knowledge of the place their families 
once came from, and know of no relatives left there.101 
Further, people may be thinking in terms of a rural retirement, but where they are 
taking up subsistence farming, it is often close to the cities where they had formal 
employment. They either move in as squatters on vacant land or as purchasers of 
land released by the Government. This is the case for a number of the retirees around 
Chambishi, in Copperbelt Province. Some still retain a foot in the urban world, rent-
ing out their township houses while living “on the farm”. Others have settled in small 
groups which have no core ethnic identity, being formed by groups of workers on 
specific projects who have settled, or been settled, together. The community of Tan-
zam in the immediate rural hinterland of Kitwe originated from a group of construc-
tion workers on the Tanzanian Zambian (Tanzam) oil pipeline.
98 Conversation with Fr. Sam Zulu, Dean of Central Zambia. Luyansha is a Copperbelt mining 
town.
99 Conversation, with Erica Chewe,
100 Conversation, with Gift Kabubi.
101 Class discussion, contribution by George Njovu, a CiNsenga speaker born and brought up in 
the Copperbelt city of Chingola.
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Squatting or purchasing land on the urban fringes like this is a far cry from return-
ing to a home village. These farmers have not gone “home” to retire amongst their 
rural kin, they are not subject to any chief, and live amongst others of differing ethnic 
backgrounds just as they did in the compound. Not being resident on “tribal trust” 
land, the disputes and difficulties in these “farm blocks” are resolved by appeal to 
local committees, co-operative enterprises or the local Government rather than to a 
chief. While they may live a rural lifestyle “on the farm”, their retirement to the urb-
an fringe is indicative of a breach between the urban resident and the rural kin group 
and ethnic community from which they might be supposed to originate.
Incentives for investing in the urban areas for an urban retirement are increasing, 
while incentives to think in terms of “repatriation” to the village are reducing. Privat-
ization and the consequent changes in the way people perceive employment have 
meant that the employer no longer provides the “fringe benefits” of free housing, 
subsidized transport “home” and free medical care for all the family. Many are em-
ployed on short term contracts with a percentage of total salary paid as a lump-sum at 
the end of the contract instead of a pension. This, together with the fall in the real 
value of urban wages has led to the urban workforce being less able to visit or sup-
port family in the village.102 Houses once provided as temporary tied accommodation 
for the urban workforce have been sold to the sitting occupants at very favourable 
prices, so that many now own the house they lived in as employees. Consequently 
many urban workers prefer to invest their “terminal benefits” in those things which 
will maintain or enhance their urban lifestyles at the end of their working lives. They 
may think in terms of improvements to their own homes, or the purchase of a nearby 
102 Fraser and Lungu, “For whom the Windfalls?,” 32.
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“plot” and the slow process of building a house for possible rent or a vehicle to hire 
out as a taxi or minibus. Urban dwellers are thus becoming more distant and discon-
nected from their rural relatives. 
Larmer and Fraser argue that clear urban and rural identities are emerging in con-
flict with one another. They agree that in the 2001 elections Michale Sata widely 
campaigned on the basis of tried and trusted ethnic grievance.103 In 2006, and again 
in 2008, however, Sata also won heavily in the poor urban areas of Lusaka, which, 
despite the migration of Copperbelt CiBemba-speakers, are still largely inhabited by 
CiNyanja-speakers. Many of his supporters are the most marginalized urban resid-
ents: taxi and minibus drivers, casual labourers, street and market traders; the first to 
suffer from economic shocks and the last to benefit from recovery. Sata touches the 
frustration and disaffection of the urban proletariat “discontent with the perceived 
imbalance of power and wealth”.104 His promises “to chase non-Zambians from the 
markets”, to regulate foreign investors, especially the much-resented Chinese, to en-
sure that they address concerns over their working conditions and thus respect for 
their needs, voice their concerns and winning their approval.
Matters are somewhat different in the rural constituencies. Liberalization of food 
prices is supposed to benefit farmers through higher prices at the market. Farmers, 
however, are unlikely to attribute any improvement in their farm incomes to Govern-
ment policy. Aware of this the M.M.D. has reversed its original policy to liberalize 
the agricultural sector in favour of subsidies and price support regimes.105





6.3.1.4 The Bemba Hegemony
In part, the 2008 election results support the thesis that there is an urban/rural divi-
sion. This, however, is not the whole picture. The urban Copperbelt and the rural 
Luapula and Northern Provinces voted together in both 2006 and 2008, as has tradi-
tionally been the case. This voting pattern would clearly not be expected if Sata was 
appealing to a simple urban/rural axis of division. Neither can the pattern be readily 
explained by a straightforward appeal to ethnic or linguistic identification. In such a 
case  one  would  expect  the  urban  Copperbelt  and  the  rural  CiBemba-speaking 
Provinces to support Sata, but not, as was the case CiNyanja-speaking Lusaka. It ap-
pears that neither thesis is entirely correct.106 We must seek a more satisfactory ex-
planation of the evidence than either a straight-forward ethnic division or a straight 
forward urban/rural split.
The motive power for political change has been historically found in the CiBem-
ba-speaking heartland of Northern and Luapula provinces and the largely CiBem-
ba-speaking industrial urban workforce, which has, ultimately, the power to paralyse 
the economy and to bring down the Government. Urban protest and industrial agita-
tion have brought down Governments in the past. Sata's electoral rallies “resembled, 
more than anything since, the M.M.D.’s 1991 rallies, when Chiluba, Mwanawasa, 
and Sata spoke together at rallies of 100,000 or more”.107 The destruction of cabbages 
106 Nic Cheesman and Marja Hinfelaar, “Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zam-
bian Presidential Election of 2008,” African Affairs (Lond) 109, no. 434 (January 2010): 51-76. 
The article was published after this work had been first submitted in September 2009. Nothing 
in the African Affairs article, however, entails any alteration in our opinion of the voting pat-
terns in the 2008 elections.
107 Larmer and Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 elec-
tion,” 629.
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at his 2006 rallies as a symbolic destruction of Mwanawasa, matches Sata's reputa-
tion as someone who is thuggish, brutal and rude.108 The rudeness and the crude sym-
bolism all suggest an attempt to designate Mwanawasa as the next Scapegoat. 
The electoral evidence therefore supports the thesis that there is an emerging coali-
tion of the sort which formed the core of the inter-ethnic alliance which undermined 
the British, the Kaunda régime and Chiluba. This is an alliance between CiNyan-
ja-speakers, and the CiBemba-speakers. It is built in part upon social or “class” iden-
tification across ethnic boundaries amongst marginalized urban residents and in part 
upon language group identification between CiBemba speakers. It involves the emer-
gence of an identity in conflict with the élites of the Government, together with their 
backers in the multinational companies and the Bretton Woods Institutions. By its 
nature it is an alliance dominated numerically by the CiBemba-speaking groups, but 
the sense of common identity extends to the inclusion of the CiNyanja speaking urb-
an population.
This alliance seeks, like that of the Lozi and the Tonga, a measure of autonomy, in 
this case in the face of a globalized economy whose controlling interests see local in-
terests as secondary to those of shareholders far away. In this context the story of 
“ethnic cousinage” roots a largely urban alliance in a mythologized traditional, ideal-
ized and simple past, which stands as a contrast to the complexities of colonial herit-
age and the semblance of democracy. It is an African past, with an African solution in 
108 Mwanawasa suffered a serious head injury as a result of a car accident and was, as a con-
sequence, slow and ponderous in his speech. As a result he earned the nick-name “Cabbage”.
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contrast  to a global economy with its  foreign interests, multinational corporations 
and international financial institutions all “interfering”, through their influence over 
the Government, in Zambian life.
Sata is now over 70, and the P.F., becoming impatient with his leadership, is afflic-
ted by division and already thinking in terms of his successor.109 The Banda régime, 
however, continues to be “business-friendly” in the midst of the economic storm, 
having repealed much of the windfall tax regime almost before it was applied.110 The 
alliance which Sata's rhetoric has engendered is, therefore, likely to outlast him. Even 
as this thesis was reaching its final form workers employed by the South African su-
permarket chain Shoprite were protesting, amongst other things, about the differen-
tials  between local  Zambian pay and that  offered to the South African expatriate 
management, while retrenched mineworkers were making their frustrations known 
elsewhere.111 This “Bemba hegemony” may well be fragile, and beset by internal eth-
nic and other rivalries. It is, nevertheless, based upon a set of common grievances. 
These are sufficient to provide the conditions both for smaller inter-ethnic rivalries 
over scarce urban employment, and deployment of resources in rural areas. They are 
also sufficient for those smaller rivalries to become subsumed into a wider, nation-
al-scale conflict, in which the object is to gain an autonomy in which the interests of 
the wider group are served. 
109 “C'belt cadres want convention,” Times, May 4, 2009, 
http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=4&id=1241414195 (Accessed 4 May, 
2009).
110 “Zambian parliament to abolish mining windfall tax | IBT Commodities & Futures,” n.d., 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20090328/zambian-parliament-to-abolish-mining-wind-
fall-tax.htm (Accessed 5 May, 2009). ”Zambia will now be perceived as a friendly country in 
terms of tax regime and it will attract more investments." 
111 “The Post - Shoprite workers stage another countrywide protest,” n.d., http://www.postzambia.-
com/content/view/12275/69/ (Accessed 29 August, 2009); “8 ex miners nabbed for planned 
demo at Barclays Bank,” August 29, 2009, http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?cat-
egory=4&id=1251528768 (Accessed 29 August, 2009)..
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6.3.1.4.1 The Repeating Pattern
The entire evidence above indicates that two wider-scale groups are emerging. They 
extend beyond the boundaries of an ethnic or language group into a wider alliance. 
They repeat the pattern of conflict for control over the state and its resources in an 
environment  in  which national  identity is  fragile,  which has  persisted throughout 
Zambia's history. The evidence of the 2008 elections is one clear sign of this coales-
cence of identities, indicating the emergence of an inter-ethnic alliance of the sort 
which, in the past, has been the core of any coalition which has expelled the incum-
bent Government.
In Girard's thesis the subsuming of many localized conflicts into one larger conflict 
is an indication of the intensification rather than the settling of a mimetic crisis. Our 
evidence  shows the  emergence  of  two larger,  even if  for  the  moment  somewhat 
vague,  common  identities.  Each  will  slowly  become  more  defined  as  conflict 
between them progresses. Each will tend to perceive the other as blocking access to 
the desired goods of economic development and social well-being and security. As 
the conflict progresses, each grouping will tend to become more settled and more at-
tractive, drawing in more and more allies. The checks and balances of a multiplicity 
of contestants in which no one group is able to gain the advantage over several others 
are lost and a straightforward rivalry between two essentially “doubled” groups com-
mences and grows more and more intense until the rivals cohere around a new single 
victim and the cycle repeats itself. 
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6.4 The Missing Beat
The mimetic cycle might be thought to have “missed a beat” with the untimely 
death of President Mwanawasa. The missing beat, however, does not mean that the 
tensions have abated or that the new regime has not resorted to tried and tested meth-
ods of distraction by providing an alternative to the President as scapegoat. The be-
ginning of President Ruphia Banda’s term of office more or less coincided with a ma-
jor global economic crisis over which Zambia had little influence. The consequent 
job losses and economic hardship played well to Sata's rhetoric of exclusion and the 
P.F. took to street politics, further heightening the atmosphere of rebellion.112 In order 
for the Government to avoid total collapse under the weight of blame for the circum-
stances an alternative scapegoat had to be found.
6.4.1.1 Distracting Attention: An Alternative Scapegoat
The M.M.D. coalition,  always  fragile,  was destabilized  by Mwanawasa's  death. 
Mwanawasa's health had been ailing for some time, but he had not made any clear 
indication of his preference for a successor. Consequently,  there was considerable 
rivalry for the post within the M.M.D. coalition.113 Initially, there were some sixteen 
candidates; eventually this coalesced into two major factions. One was based around 
Mwanawasa's  Finance  Minister,  Peter  Ng'andu Magande,  a  Tonga,  and the  other 
around the Vice-President, Ruphia Banda, popular in his ethnic homeland of Eastern 
Province. Both had held senior positions in the Government. Magande was particu-
112 “PF Gets rally permit....vows to demonstrate,” May 1, 2009, 
http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=4&id=1241160328 (Accessed 1 May, 
2009).
113 “Zambia's ruling party divided after death of president - The Irish Times - Mon, Sep 01, 2008,” 
n.d., http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2008/0901/1220180159010.html (Accessed 
30 April, 2009).
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larly well established as a potential heir to Mwanawasa. He had been Finance Minis-
ter during both Mwanawasa's terms, and was widely credited with creating Zambia's 
improved economic circumstances. Magande also had the backing of Mwanawasa's 
widow, Maureen.114
Banda's victory suggests that a faction has taken control of the Party which, in other 
circumstances, might have found it congenial to make Mwanawasa the scapegoat. 
Mwanawasa, however, died while the country's economy was buoyant and copper 
prices still high. In addition, his stance on Zimbabwe drew admiration from Western 
observers as well as some support from within Zambia.115 Mwanawasa was therefore 
not available as the scapegoat, his sudden death leaving a somewhat mythologised 
legacy of good governance, economic competence and moral integrity which had eli-
cited a degree of respect both at home and abroad.
114 “Mwanawasa wanted Magande (Finance Minister) as Zambia president: widow,” September 1, 
2008, http://zambianchronicle.com/2008/09/01/mwanawasa-wanted-magande-finance-min-
ister-as-zambia-president-widow/ (Accessed 26 March, 2009); “Zambia's two-horse race - Mail 
& Guardian Online: The smart news source,” n.d., http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-09-07-
zambias-twohorse-race (Accessed 26 March, 2009)..
115 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Obituary: Zambia's Levy Mwanawasa,” n.d., http://news.b-
bc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7488623.stm (Accessed 30 April, 2009); “BBC NEWS | World | 
Africa | Zimbabwe's crisis 'like Titanic',” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6475851.stm (Accessed 30 April, 2009); “News - 
Africa: Levy Mwanawasa: He dared to criticise,” n.d., http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?
set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=nw20080819150545866C174491 (Accessed 30 April, 2009); 




we&st=cse (Accessed 30 April, 2009); “Zimbabwe Opposition Faces Crucial Court Rulings - 
New York Times,” n.d., http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/world/africa/14zimbabwe.html?
_r=1&scp=3&sq=Mwanawasa,%20Zimbabwe&st=cse (Accessed 30 April, 2009).
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Banda seems to have promised to keep Magande as Finance Minister, perhaps in an 
effort to heal the rifts within the Party and to assure foreign investors of a stable ré-
gime continuing to pursue business-friendly policies.116 The signals were contradict-
ory to Banda's subsequent actions. The election was held on October 30th, and by 
November  14th Magande  was  replaced  as  Finance  Minister  by  Dr.  Situmbeko 
Musokotwane, a respected academic economist and also a Tonga.117 The appointment 
of a respected academic as Finance Minister allowed the themes of competence and 
integrity to be sustained while permitting Magande's removal. Magande was about to 
become the alternative scapegoat.
On 12th January 2009 the locally owned Zambian Airways suspended all its opera-
tions with debts variously reported as amounting to US $30 million, at least $12 mil-
lion of which was owed to various statutory bodies or Government-owned compan-
ies. Accusations of fraud, mismanagement and breaches of international airline regu-
lations soon followed.118 The company was owned by Mutembo Nchito, a Lusaka 
lawyer,  and the directors  included Fred Mmembe, editor  of  The Post,  Gaudensio 
Rossi, a hotelier, and the chairman of the board, Passmore Hamukoma, a Zambian by 
birth who holds South African citizenship.
116 “Zambia's Banda says would keep finance minister,” September 19, 2008, http://www.-
polity.org.za/article/zambias-banda-says-would-keep-finance-minister-2008-09-19 (Accessed 
26 March, 2009); “Zambia Watchdog | IMF advises RB on Magande,” n.d., http://www.zambi-
anwatchdog.com/?p=457 (Accessed 30 April, 2009).
117 “The Zambian Airways Saga,” n.d., 
http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Business_1/The_Zambian_Airways_Saga.shtml (Ac-
cessed 30 April, 2009).
118 Kasuba Mulenga, “Suspension of Zambian Ariways Operations Analysed,” n.d., 
http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?category=8&id=1231752256 (Ac-
cessed 30 April, 2009); “The Zambian Airways Saga.”
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Nchito is a partner in MNB Partners and Associates. He acted as prosecutor in the 
corruption cases against Chiluba and his colleagues, and together with his brother, 
Nchima, has been involved in actions against Chiluba since taking up the defence of 
Dipak Patel and Edith Nawakwi who had been sued for libel for calling Chiluba a 
thief.119 The Post was instrumental in the case against Chiluba, and has been hostile, 
to say the least, towards Banda.
Magande is accused of having used his position as Finance Minister to attempt to 
have the airline's debts to the state deferred and to persuade the state insurance com-
pany to offer the airline a loan. All of which had the potential to cost the State many 
millions  of  U.S.  Dollars.  Civil  and  criminal  proceedings  were  instituted  against 
Nchito, along with a number of others, including the Director of the Bank of Zambia, 
Caleb Fundanga. 
There have been demands for Magande to be suspended from Parliament,120 for him 
to appear before a tribunal charged with breach of the Parliamentary and Ministerial 
Codes of Conduct or to be prosecuted. These demands have the air of orchestration, 
coming as they do, from within the Party, some made by senior officers in various 
Party organizations and local branches. He is being investigated by the Anti-Corrup-
tion Commission, and may yet face the relevant tribunal or prosecution.121 Behind 
this is an attempt to obliquely scapegoat the late President who relied upon Magande 
for over seven years as finance minister. Hints of this are in the prolonged account of 
119 van Donge, “The plundering of Zambian resources by Frederick Chiluba,” 75.
120 “Zambia: 'Suspend Magande',” March 10, 2009, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200903100393.html (Accessed 26 March, 2009).
121 “CJ Awaits Magande Probe,” n.d., http://www.zamnet.zm/newsys/news/viewnews.cgi?cat-
egory=3&id=1240987357 (Accessed 30 April, 2009); “Magande should be prosecuted, says 
Lifwekelo,” n.d., http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=4&id=1238044660 
(Accessed 26 March, 2009)..
192
the affair put forward by The Times of Zambia. The point is introduced when readers 
are  reminded  that  Nchito  was  “handpicked  by  the  late  President,  Levy  Patrick 
Mwanawasa” and reinforced clearly when the report states:
Trouble  seemed  to  have  started  when  President  Levy  Mwanawasa  died. 
Mwanawasa on the one hand and Fred Mmembe, Mutembo Nchito and Mark 
Chona  were  close  allies  in  an  “unholy  alliance”  in  “the  fight  against 
corruption”. This relationship seems to have cost Zambia a huge loss of USD 
29 million.122
The accusations against the supposed conspirators to defraud became more bizarre. 
Nchito and Mmembe, were accused of plotting to have President Banda impeached. 
The plan, it was claimed was to represent all Government contracts as “corruption 
scandals”, which  The Post  would then publicise the scandals thus encouraging op-
position MP's together with disaffected members of the M.M.D. to combine in order 
to move a motion of impeachment.123 This accusation has distinct overtones of those 
paranoid years of “the emergency” during Chiluba's régime, with all its plots and 
coup attempts. 
It is impossible, and unnecessary, at the time of writing, to determine if any of the 
accusations against Magande or the Directors of Zambia Airways have any real sub-
stance.  Innocent or guilty,  Magande is an obvious substitute for Mwanawasa, the 
more so if it can be hinted that he and his fellow conspirators were once cloaked by 
the power and patronage of the President. No more need be said about Mwanawasa, 
122 “The Zambian Airways Saga.”
123 Ibid.
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who can now vanish behind the scapegoat, his reputation for integrity and good gov-
ernance untarnished, or at least unexamined while he remains a powerful emotive 
memory in people's minds.
The  paranoid  nature  of  the  accusations,  the  orchestrated  campaign  against 
Magande, the way in which the web of deceit and theft mirrors the complex political 
and business “predatory behaviour” of which Chiluba was accused,124 all have the air 
of the Single Victim Mechanism. Here is a process by which the tensions in the Party 
manifest  at  the  election  of  Banda  can  be  projected  onto  Magande,  Nchito  and 
Mmembe as allies and “clients” (however unlikely this  may seem in the case of 
Mmembe), of the late President. Like Zambia Airways, the old régime had all the ap-
pearance of success and growth while containing within itself the seeds of its own 
failure. It can now be blamed for Zambia's dis-ease. Banda is thus left with a clear 
space in which to establish himself as President without having to follow the more 
dangerous path of directly undermining the myth of “Good President Levy” which 
has quickly grown up around Mwanawasa's memory. 
6.5 Some Conclusions
The foregoing account allows us some insight into the state of Zambia today. It is  
clear that beneath an ostensibly placid surface Zambia is a highly conflicted society 
exhibiting signs of considerable instability. The population, both urban and rural, re-
sort readily to the Single Victim Mechanism as a means of temporarily discharging 
tensions. The widespread and recurring accounts of lynch mobs and murders of eld-
erly family members suggest that these measures are only partially effective, allow-
124 van Donge, “The plundering of Zambian resources by Frederick Chiluba,” passim.
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ing some discharge of tension, but not addressing the deeper unease to which they 
point. These sudden outbursts of mob violence also indicate unstable and short-lived 
identities in which individual actors are suddenly caught up in a temporary “mob” 
identity which just as suddenly dissipates once the catharsis is complete. This fluidity 
of identity allows the conflicts between the actors to be easily subsumed into wider 
identities, so that the smaller conflicts and tensions become small rocks in a larger 
mimetic landslide potentially overwhelming the whole fragile social edifice. 
Evidence of social instability widens when we consider ethnic tensions. It is clear 
from both Posner's work and the historical evidence which we have examined that 
ethnic identities are implicated in the conflicts in Zambia. Their role, however, is 
complex and there is considerable fluidity in the way in which ethnic identities are 
constituted  in  the  rivalries  of  Zambia.  Posner's  work suggests  that  the  coalitions 
which constitute “ethnic” identity have changed depending upon the circumstances 
and the arena in which the conflicts are played out. The notion of “ethnic cousins” to 
which we have referred suggests that these identities continue to ebb and flow, cur-
rently  coalescing  towards  two  major  “blocks”  of  identities,  one  representing  the 
Southern and Western peoples, and the other the Northern and urban communities, 
dominated by the large CiBemba-speaking group but drawing support from a wider 
disaffected urban population. This second block has in the past wielded considerable 
economic power within Zambia, being capable of paralysing that part of the eco-
nomy which generates the largest portion of Zambia's national income with strikes 
and protests. This or some similar coalition has always been implicated in the up-
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heavals which have driven the mythic cycle in Zambia, and its emergence on the 
present stage is a significant indication that it is possible, indeed quite probable, that 
the cycle is taking yet another turn.
The newly-incumbent government may be given some grace, especially if the value 
of Zambia's raw metal exports increases once more and the economy recovers its 
buoyancy. The Governments efforts to distract attention and to project tensions upon 
Magande is, at best, a high risk strategy. The whole affair, with its lurid allegations of 
plots and attempted coups, has many of the characteristics of earlier attempts at dis-
traction carried out by Kaunda and by Chiluba. In the past, similar tactics only served 
to add another turn to the spiral of mimetic conflict. It represents simply more of the 
conflictual mimesis which is at the very heart of Zambia's problems. What is needed 
is not more of the same, but new and creative thinking which enables Zambia to 
“come to itself”. Human beings living in Zambia need to be enabled to acquire stable 
identities  which  offer  both  integration  and  flexibility  in  order  that  people  may 
achieve a measure of security and stability within which to live satisfying lives. Be-
hind  the  sociological  enterprise  to  construct  such  an  environment  lie  theological 
questions and it is to these that we now turn.
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7 Towards a Theological 
Understanding of Person
Our contextual approach has so far developed an insight into some of the chal-
lenges and difficulties which face Zambia, and within which the Zambian Church is 
called to mission. The purpose of the next few chapters is to establish and explore 
theological resources which can shape the witness of the Church in the specific con-
text of Zambia. It is not to offer political, economic, sociological or even theological 
“solutions” to the problems which beset Zambia. At best the only people who are 
qualified to discuss “solutions” are students of chemistry. The mission of the Church 
is not to provide “solutions” but to proclaim the good news, as St. Francis is reputed 
to have put it, using words if necessary. “Solutions” imply an end point, a finality; 
societies are dynamic and addressing their problems is an ever-changing activity. If 
we have from time to time forgotten this, in the process abandoning ideas of the 
“fall” in exchange for utopian programs of human perfectibility, the sinister connota-
tions of the phrase “final solution” should act as a reminder of where such programs 
can lead us. Theology should never be “final”; instead it should always and only 
stand as a contribution towards proclaiming the “word of God for today” in a specific 
context.
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7.1 Democracy and Theology
Zambia is not a “failed state” and its problems are not by any means as severe as 
those of some of its neighbours, but the measures used to indicate state failure place 
Zambia  on  the  “endangered”  list,  ranked  63  in  a  list  of  177.1 According  to  the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance Zambia improved its overall governance score 
between 2005 and 2006, but slipped in ranking to 21st out of a list of 48 because oth-
er African countries made more gains according to the measures used.2 With no im-
provement in the rule of law, transparency, corruption or safety and security, and only 
small gains in the economy, which are vulnerable to the global recession,3 the imme-
diate prospects in Zambia are not good. 
As a consequence of her entrapment in the mythic cycle Zambia has been liable to 
bouts of instability. To counter this, governments resort to the Single Victim Mechan-
ism, projecting tensions onto former régimes and/or attempting to isolate and then 
victimize political opponents.4 National identity remains weak and the State contin-
1 “The Fund for Peace - Failed States Index Scores 2008,” n.d., 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=452 (Accessed 25 March, 2009).
2 “Ibrahim Index of African Governance | 2008,” n.d., http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/in-
dex-2008/ (Accessed 18 June, 2009).
3 “Just When Africa’s Luck Was Changing - NYTimes.com,” n.d., 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/business/02africa.html?_r=1&ref=africa (Accessed 7 Au-
gust, 2009).
4 Sylvia Mweetwa, “Zambian Airways probe widened,” Times, June 17, 2009, http://www.zam-
net.zm/newsys/news/viewnews.cgi?category=30&id=1245226436 (Accessed 18 June, 2009); 
“Zambian Airways: DEC warns, cautions Magande,” Zambia Daily Mail, June 18, 2009, 
http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?category=3&id=1245305968 (Ac-
cessed 18 June, 2009); “Corruption probe should extend to Levy era,” Times, June 18, 2009, 
http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=4&id=1245303937 (Accessed 18 June, 
2009); “Opinion,” Times, June 18, 2009, sec. Editorial, 
http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=3&id=1245304013 (Accessed 18 June, 
2009).
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ues to suffer from what Ghani and Lockhart term a “sovereignty gap”; its constitu-
tion and legal processes attract only limited legitimacy while the levels of services, 
security and empowerment characteristic of an effective state lacking.5
Evidence suggests that a certain element of weakness and instability is inevitable 
for those states which attained or returned to a form of democracy in the “Third 
Wave” of democratisation.6 Nations which have recently democratised, and/or which 
are characterised,  like Zambia,  as “disciplined”7 or  “semi-democracies”,  are most 
likely to be unstable.8 Further, there is a clear connection between national wealth 
and democracy; most of the countries which underwent transformation in the mid-
1970s were generating a GDP of between $1,000 and $3,000 when the transforma-
tion occurred. In the case of Zambia the Gross National Income (hereafter GNI: the 
new term for GDP)9 under the Purchasing Power Parity method was $820 and under 
the Atlas method $430 when it transformed to a multi-party system in 1990.10 This 
would indicate that by either measure Zambia is very clearly on the poorer end of the 
economic range for democratic transition, therefore diminishing its chances of a suc-
cessful full and permanent transition to democracy. 
5 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Frac-
tured World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17-22.
6 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, The Ju-
lian J. Rothbaum distinguished lecture series vol. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991); Bates, When Things Fell Apart, 11.
7 Larmer and Fraser, “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 elec-
tion,” 613.
8 Håvard Hegre Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch., “Toward a Democratic 
Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” The American Political  
Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 42-44.
9 “World Bank: Data - Change in Terminology.”
10 “WDI08_section1_intro.pdf,” n.d., http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Re-
sources/WDI08_section1_intro.pdf (Accessed 15 August, 2010) Explains the differing methods 
of measuring GNI ; “DDP Quick Query,” n.d., http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/re-
port.do?method=showReport (Accessed 27 May, 2009).
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One might therefore be tempted to conclude that the simple answer to Zambia's 
problems is for the Church, in alliance with a variety of other interested groups, to 
engage in activities which model, advocate and secure Zambia's precarious demo-
cracy and to promote the creation, and just distribution of wealth. Such a program is 
an attractive and appropriate part of any way forward. A Democratic civil peace is 
both more durable and more just than the alternatives.11 A democratic system deals 
with the tensions and rivalries of society by allowing them to be expressed in debates 
which tend towards compromises within the political economy. Even if the debates 
are “robust” and accompanied by a good deal of projection, this is infinitely more 
constructive than the suppression and oppression of Kaunda's failed one-party state.
The idea that Christian Churches can and should influence the establishment and 
consolidation of democracy and general well-being is widely held. Modern demo-
cracy emerged amongst Western Christian cultures.12 Democracy has followed where 
Christianity expanded in the 1960s, while significant changes in Roman Catholicism 
instituted by the Second Vatican Council are held to have contributed to democratiza-
tion both in Latin America and in the Iberian peninsula.13 Atheist Matthew Parris ar-
gues that Christianity must play a significant role if Africa is to “walk tall amidst 21 st 
Century global competition” and journey towards a democratic future.14
11 Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Polit-
ical Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” 44.
12 Huntington, The Third Wave, 73.
13 Ibid., 77-78.
14 Matthew Parris, “As an atheist, I truly believe Africa needs God,” As an atheist, I truly believe  
Africa needs God | Matthew Parris - Times Online, October 27, 2008, http://www.timeson-
line.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/matthew_parris/article5400568.ece (Accessed 28 January, 
2009).
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In Zambia Christians and Christianity have played key roles in the establishment, 
restoration  and the  preservation  of  democracy.  The insidious  undermining of  the 
European racist practices and attitudes by missionaries in the Protectorate, particu-
larly the witness of Colin Morris, and the work of the United Mission to the Copper-
belt (hereafter UMCB), whose missionaries George Fraser and Mike Moore played 
key roles in the establishment of the Welfare Societies,15 the Christian challenge to 
Kaunda in the late 1980s, and the role of the Church in the resistance to Chiluba's ef-
forts to revert to a more authoritarian system: all demonstrate that the Church as a 
whole has worked, and continues to work, diligently and effectively for a democratic 
state in Zambia.
The Church has also played a key role in education, health, and wealth creation, 
both in the Protectorate and in the years which followed. The missions often estab-
lished schools, and many missionaries were recruited on the basis of their qualifica-
tions as teachers. The Brethren Church founded and still maintains important medical 
missions in Western and North Western Provinces, the Anglican St. Francis Hospital, 
Katate, plays a key role in health provision and the training of medical personnel in 
Eastern Province, while the Roman Catholic Church has played a leading role in care 
for those suffering from HIV/AIDS and the establishment of ARVT programmes. All 
the mainstream Churches run home-based care programmes for those suffering from 
HIV/AIDS and distribute basic medicines, food and mosquito nets throughout the 
country. The Church also runs a wide range of small-scale development projects pro-
moting livelihood and food security in both rural and urban environments.
15 Taylor, Christians of the Copperbelt; The Growth of the Church in Northern Rhodesia., 42-43.
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While  these  efforts  are  highly significant,  increased  democracy,  social  security, 
health and wealth cannot provide a total response to the needs of Zambian society. 
Development and the creation and distribution of economic wealth are all necessities, 
but, as even Parris seems to agree, people do not live by bread alone.16 Scarcity may 
well become a focal point of conflict but, wealthy as any nation might be, it is the re-
lationship of mimetic rivalry and not scarcity in itself which triggers conflict. Grow-
ing wealth will  in itself  resolve nothing unless the mechanisms exist  to  deal  ad-
equately with the rivalries over goods designated as desirable.
It might well be thought that the creation of robust democratic institutions would 
inevitably ameliorate the tensions and conflicts within a society. Democracy, how-
ever,  has its own inherent ambivalences in respect to addressing the problems of 
rivalry.  Canadian  sociologists  Paul  Laurent  and Gilles  Paquet,  following de  Toc-
queville, argue that democracy, and the yearning for equality upon which it is based, 
actually intensify the envy and rivalry within a multi-ethnic society, which in turn 
promotes further balkanization. They link this thought with the work of René Girard. 
For Girard, mimetic conflict creates, and is intensified by, a collapse of distinctions, 
“which becomes exacerbated the more equality of conditions prevail”.17 As inequal-
ity breeds envy, so equality fuels an equal passion for distinction, which further pro-
motes rivalry.  Democracy, like any other cultural  product,  is  essentially a system 
built upon mimesis and rivalry: 
16 Parris, “Africa Needs God.”
17 Paul Laurent and Gilles Paquet, “Intercultural Relations: A Myrdal-Tocqueville-Girard Inter-
pretative Scheme,” International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science  
politique 12, no. 3 (July 1991): 175.
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The most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, 
and periodic  elections  in  which  candidates  freely compete for  votes  and in 
which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.18
The whole system is legitimated and reaffirmed by those procedures whereby the 
decision-makers are defeated and removed from office in favour of their rivals.19 The 
victors then have a window of opportunity to consolidate both their victory and on-
going social stability by blaming their vanquished predecessors for any failures with-
in the political economy, and claim that their victory represents the opening of a new 
era of competence and equitable distribution. This seems to be a process of blame 
and exclusion which has many of the features of the Single Victim Mechanism.
Miroslav Volf argues that the official narrative of “progressive and ever-expanding 
inclusion” in Western democratic societies conceals a counter-narrative of exclusion, 
conquest and enslavement which is no mere detail of history, but rather a central, if 
hidden, aspect of the story. This practice of exclusion was in fact the very power 
through which the inclusive “civilisation” of the West was created.20 
In ethnically-conflicted environments this  exclusionary aspect of democracy can 
result in the more or less permanent exclusion practised by a democratically-legitim-
ated ethnic majority which identifies itself with the “nation” over against others, cre-
ating, in the language of Seamus Deane, a distinction between “civilians”, for whom 
the state and its institutions create freedom and wealth, and lawless “barbarians” who 
remain on the margins of wider society as the objects of social suspicion and exclu-
18 Huntington, The Third Wave, 7.
19 Ibid., 48.
20 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 58.
203
sion.21 A case in point is Northern Ireland, where a “minimal winning coalition” of 
originally disparate and rivalrous Protestant groups held political power to the virtual 
exclusion of a large minority Catholic group: essentially a “dictatorship” of a major-
ity.22 
This is not to reject either the establishment of democracy or wealth creation as le-
gitimate projects to which the Church must make a positive contribution. It is, how-
ever, to say that the prescription of “more democracy”,  particularly as defined in 
straightforward procedural terms,23 or of “a larger economy”, cannot be the sole con-
tent of the Church's missionary engagement with the needs of Zambia. The Church 
needs to do all that it has been doing and continues to do without neglecting to reflect 
upon the root of Zambia's chronic instability. 
Behind the questions of conflicted human relationships lie  theological  questions 
which shape our understanding of society, and the Church's missionary engagement 
with it. Our methods have drawn particularly on the insights of Girard, who main-
tains that identity, both individual and communal, arises out of the conflicted human 
relationships which generate and maintain, and are generated and maintained, by so-
ciety;  his  understanding  of  Christianity  is  shaped  by this  insight.  Miroslav  Volf 
places reflection on identity at the very centre of theological reflection on social real-
ity.24 Ethnic or other forms of communal exclusion, argues Volf, cannot take place 
without an exclusion from a “situated self”.25 This “situated self” is a person in com-
21 Seamus Deane, “Civilians And Barbarians,” in Ireland's Field Day (London: Hutchinson, 
1985), 31.
22 See Keith Scott, Religion and Community Conflict in Northern Ireland (unpublished M. Phil. 
Thesis, Irish School of Ecumenics, 1992).
23 Huntington, The Third Wave, 6-7.
24 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 17.
25 Ibid., 57.
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munity, not only in the community of human beings, but in the community of all cre-
ation,  and the self  we need to  be is  one which freely accepts the interdependent 
nature of our being.26 Thus Volf's seeks to explore “what kind of selves we need to 
be” in order to live in social and communal peace with one another.27 M. Douglas 
Meeks suggests that there are what he calls “God concepts” underlying all economic 
and political systems.28 Often these concepts are concealed behind claims that eco-
nomic “laws” are objective statements of reality equivalent to the laws of physics. 
These laws are not, however, statements of how the universe is constituted, but a 
summation of humanly produced and profoundly interlinked social, political and eco-
nomic  relationships.  They,  and  more  fundamentally  their  legitimating  “God-con-
cepts”, need to be challenged theologically with alternative, more profoundly Christi-
an and Trinitarian “God-concepts”. The Church therefore needs to be engaged in a 
praxis which involves not only a reshaping of political or economic processes, but 
also the reshaping of “situated selves” of “persons” and the political and economic 
relationships by which persons are formed. 
7.2 The Person and Theology
7.2.1 Person and Trinity
The most uniquely Christian God-concept is that of God as Trinity, arrived at in at-
tempting to come to terms with the understanding that God had revealed the divine 
self in Jesus Christ and in the action of the Holy Spirit. This insight was achieved 
through a long series of interlinked debates concerning how God could be under-
26 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God (London: SCM Press, 1996), 112.
27 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 21.
28 M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy (Min-
neapolis: Fortress Press, 1989) Passim.
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stood to be incarnate and how God could be many and also one. In the development 
of an understanding of the Trinity classical contemporaneous understandings of “per-
son” common in both ancient Greek and Roman cultures were taken up, reshaped 
and subverted to fit the needs of theological expression. As we seek to offer a theo-
logy of relationship for contemporary Zambia we also need to take up and reshape, 
or subvert, concepts of “person” and “identity” available to us today in an effort to 
express the relationships of the Godhead. In doing so we must remain faithful to the 
most coherent and mature expression of the doctrine in the councils of Nicaea and 
Constantinople. To achieve this we first describe the development of the orthodox 
Trinity.
7.2.1.1 The Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity
The roots of an understanding of God as Trinity lie in the very earliest strata of the 
Church's tradition.  Although the limits  of the New Testament canon were not yet 
fixed, but the documents we now know as the New Testament were exerting a pro-
found influence upon the life of the Church by the early first century. The central 
core of the Church's witness and worship was that “God had sent His Son, the Messi-
ah Jesus, Who had died, risen on the third day, ascended to heaven, and would return 
in glory”.29 Often the very basic expressions of this proclamation would include a 
reference to the Holy Spirit as the inspirer of the prophets and the gift bestowed upon 
the Church. These became more and more settled and fixed as expressions of “the 
29 J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th ed. (London: Continuum, 2000), 88.
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rule of faith”, that is, teaching inherited from the apostles.30 Citations of the triadic 
formula appear throughout the early Church's documents, and are especially notable 
in connection with baptism.31 
The difficulty for the Church was to reconcile this “rule of faith” with the monothe-
ism inherited from Judaism. The earliest language which emerged to give expression 
to the relationship of Son to the Godhead was that of  logos or “Word”. This lan-
guage was ready to hand in the Fourth Gospel and had an intelligible meaning within 
the common religious and philosophical language of the day. It was understood to 
express the idea that the incarnate Son was the thought or mind of the Father.32 
The first use of the term “proswpon” or persona in relation to the doctrine of the 
Trinity appears to have been made by Tertullian and Hippolytus. At the time the root 
meaning of  proswpon was “face” or “expression”, it was used to denote the mask 
worn by an actor. John Zizioulas maintains that Ancient Greek thought did not have a 
true “ontology” of person, but rather conceived of all things belonging to a “unity”, 
the origin and source of all being. Any differentiation or distinction represented a de-
cline from this true origin and being of all things. Even God was understood to be 
bound by this “ontological unity”.33 The cosmos was understood to be “fixed” and all 
things, all events and actions “necessary” and “fated” to be.  True freedom is im-
possible. In the theatre, especially in the tragedies, the conflict between human free-
dom and the rational necessity of the cosmos is played out. The human strives to be-
30 Ibid., 88-89.
31 Justin Martyr: Apology 1, 61 in James Stevenson, ed., A New Eusebius. Based Upon the Col-
lection Edited by B. J. Kidd (London,: S.P.C.K., 1968), 65.
32 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 96.
33 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, New edition. (London: Darton,Longman & Todd Ltd, 
2004), 29-30.
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come a “person” “to rise up against this harmonious unity which oppresses him as ra-
tional and moral necessity”.34 The tragedies show that the human cannot, even in the 
uttermost strife, escape the fated nature of the cosmos, s/he can never become a truly 
free ontological “person”. The “mask” is just that, a temporary epiphenomenon and 
not a permanent part of the human u{postasij. The tragedy of the mask is that it can 
also be seen that for a brief and bitter moment the human has become “free”; be-
come, albeit impermanently a “unique and unrepeatable entity”.35 
According to Zizioulas classical Roman usage of the term “persona” did not differ 
significantly from the Greek proswpon. Persona did have a social legal dimension. 
However, this more social and legal usage never strayed far from the root idea of a 
“role one plays”, in legal terms “a role in society or within certain contractual ar-
rangements”.36 Again this idea offers no genuine ontological sense of “person” and 
no genuine freedom to act outside of predetermined roles allotted and fixed either by 
the fates or by the State or some legally constituted subsection of society. 
Despite this meaning it is argued that both Tertullian and Hippolytus intended that 
their use of “personal” language with reference to the Trinity should be thought of as 
expressing “the concrete presentation of an individual as such”37 Tertullian in particu-
lar seems to have had understanding of the Three encountered in the economy of sal-
vation as a manifestation of the immanent Godhead.38. Tertuallian's solution to the 




37 Kell, Ealrly Christian Doctrines, 115
38 Ibid. 114, 115.
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speak of each of the persons sharing one substantia. Thus he bequeathed to Western 
theology a distinction between persona and substantia which was to create consider-
able difficulties when it came to developing an insight into the Trinity which would 
also meet the concerns of Eastern thought. Further it seems that neither Hippolytus or 
Tertullian managed to convince the Western Church as a whole of the merits of their 
clearer, more concrete understanding of persona. A more conservative strand of theo-
logy, wary of any language which appeared to undermine the unity of the Godhead,  
and confining the use of persona to God in the divine unity is usually thought to be 
more representative of “official” Western theology at the time.39 
A more sophisticated version of the conservative strand was developed by Sabellius 
who gives his name to a whole strand of what is also known as “modalism”. Sabelli -
us may not have been responsible for all the aspects of the tradition, as his thought 
has become confused with that of Marcellus of Ancyra.40 The essence of this teach-
ing, whoever proposed it, appears to have been that the divine is encountered and ex-
pressed in three operations, or “modes”. The Father is the “Divine essence”, while 
the Son and Spirit are “modes” of his self-expression. These are not permanent “per-
sons”, but temporary “projections” of the One God.41 
Both the more “official” Western theology and that of Sabellius represent under-
standings of “person” which are firmly rooted in the older, less ontological meanings 





Eastern theology took a somewhat different route, influenced by the work of Clem-
ent and especially Origen. Both men were strongly influenced by the particular inter-
pretation of Platonic philosophy which was common intellectual currency of their 
day. While the Western theologians tended to start with a more “monarchical” ap-
proach, focused on the unity of the Divine nature. Eastern theologians, because of the 
Platonic conception of a  graded hierarchy tended to be able  think much more in 
terms of plurality. They also tended to use the term u{postasij and to identify it with 
persona or proswpon.42 It appears that u{postasij could be a synonym for o}usia 
and taken to mean “essence” or “substance” (substantia) – the term used by Tertul-
lian to describe the one divine nature. Origen uses it in this sense, but more often he 
uses it to denote an individual subsistence, that is a “person”.43 Origen attempts to 
maintain the unity of the Godhead with an insistence on a form of hierarchy. The Son 
and the Spirit are Divine, but are so by derivation, as having their origin in the Father 
who alone has no origin.44 In Origen this thought tended towards a full-blown subor-
dinationism, but orthodox Christianity, including the Cappodocian Fathers, always 
maintained the full equality of all Persons in the Trinity whilst also maintaining a 
form of hierarchical structure in their genetic relationships.
The emergence of Arianism in the Fourth century led to the debates which culmin-
ated in the formulations of the Creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople which so re-
shaped the concept of “person”. Arius did not immediately address the specific issue 
of the Trinity, rather he denied the full divinity of the Word. Inevitably this raised the 





Bishop, Alexander of Alexandria, but his teaching attracted powerful support from 
elsewhere and became a focus of tension within the Greek Church. The Emperor, 
Constantine, had recently adopted Christianity and, having finally gained control of 
the Empire,  needed the Church to  be united and at  peace with itself  in  order  to 
provide a bedrock for social stability. An ecumenical council was called, initially to 
meet at Ancyra, but it was subsequently moved to Nicaea and consequently met un-
der Constantine's direct control. In the resultant creedal formula the Word was de-
scribed as “one substance” (o{moousioj) with the Father, and a number of Arian be-
liefs specifically anathematised.45
The term o{uoosiouj was, however ambiguous enough to support a wide range of 
interpretations.46 Indeed Arius himself  could use the term.47 This ambiguity left  it 
open for politically astute Arians to re-establish themselves. The leader of this group, 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, a signatory of the Nicene formula, managed to engineer the 
downfall of three of the Arians' most trenchant opponents and to leave the way open 
for the revival of Arianism within the Church once Constantine had died.48
Those who were opposed to Arianism were split. As with the pre-Nicene debates 
much revolved around the difficulties of creating a concept of “person” which was 
capable of bearing the notions of permanent uniqueness while still maintaining Di-
vine unity.  Western theologians concerned with supporting the Nicene formula of 
o{moousioj in  the  face  of  Arianism  understood  the  seeming  plurality  in  Greek 
45 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 232. Kelly cites an English translation of the text of the 
creedal statement which all present were required to sign.
46 Henry Chadwick, The Early Church (Harmondsworth:: Penguin Books, 1967), 130.
47 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 235-236.
48 Chadwick, The Early Church, 133-136.
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thought with its assertion of three  u{postaseij (taken to mean  substantia) as ex-
pressing tri-theism. At the same time Eastern theologians saw Western theology, with 
its resort to the language of proswpon or persona and its reservation of substantia – 
taken  to  be  equivalent  to  u{postasij as  incapable  of  protecting  the  permanent 
uniqueness of each of the persons of the Trinity and therefore essentially Sabellian.49
Athanasius and Hilary of Poitiers had both been deposed and exiled, the latter spend-
ing some time in Asia Minor and thus in direct contact with Eastern thought. Both 
published works which were conciliatory towards Eastern theology, accepting East-
ern concerns as valid and recognising the adequacy of their position. A council was 
held at Alexandria under the chairmanship of Athanasius at which it was accepted 
that the actual terminology used was less important than the underlying theological 
meaning. At this council the formula of three u{postaseij was accepted by the West-
ern theologians as an expression of a valid understanding of the “separate subsistence 
of three Persons in the consubstantial Trinity” provided it did not intend the Arian 
meaning of three alien or distinct entities. Equally the formula of one  u{postasij 
was accepted by the Eastern theologians as expressing an important insight into the 
unity of the Godhead where u{postasij was taken as a synonym for o}usia.50 
A further significant element in the progress towards a resolution of the long de-
bates over the Trinity came with the development of an understanding of the Holy 
Spirit as fully Divine. The matter had been the subject of some considerable debate, 
and there was significant  resistance to  the idea.  Theologians from both East  and 
West, however, were able to accept the position expressed by Athanasius that the 
49 Chadwick, The Early Church, 114; Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 246.
50 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 254.
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Spirit was one in the Godhead with the Father and the Son and therefore consubstan-
tial with them.51 The long years of debate concluded in an agreed formula, built on 
the Cappodocian fathers'  formula of  one  o}usia existing in  three  u{postaseij or 
“ways of being”. This formuala identified persona/proswpon with u{postasij.52 
The Cappodocian Fathers dealt with the tensions between the unity and differenti-
ation in the Godhead by the concept which would be later termed “perichoresis” or 
co-inherence.  The  core  of  this  idea  is  that  God  exists  simultaneously  in  three 
u{postaseis. Each person is “in” the other: all that the Father is, is seen in each of 
the other two persons and all that each of the other two persons are, belong to the  
Father so that all three mutually indwell each of the others. 
Western theology was given its most mature understanding of the Trinity by Au-
gustine. His focus was on the unity of God and his starting-point was the one undi-
vided divine essence. He had therefore little difficulty in seeing the unity of the three 
persons and any problem with his understanding lay in its tendency to obliterate the 
differentiation between the persons. Augustine's solution to this problem was to em-
phasise the distinction of the persons in the divine work ad extra leading to a distinc-
tion in the persons which is grounded in their mutual relationships. 
The identification of  persona  or  proswpon with  u{postasij is thought by Ziz-
ioulas  to  be a  quite  remarkable  step.  He argues  that  it  significantly reshapes  the 
concept of “person”. “Person” is no longer a “mask” or “role”, an extraneous addi-




all beings. Two basic changes have taken place. The first is a recognition that the 
Biblical concept of creation ex nihilo entails that creation's origin is outside of itself, 
that is in God. This in itself breaks the closed cosmos of Ancient Greek thought, 
making the whole cosmos the product of an act of sovereign freedom on the part of 
God. Even more significantly the being of God is identified with a person, with the 
Father. Amongst the Greek theologians the hierarchical structure first espoused by 
Origen entailed that the true origin of the Godhead was not to be found in the divine 
“substance” but in the person of the Father who is the source and cause of the gener-
ation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit. This in turn means that God is not  
bound by the divine substance – that is, God's being is not an ontological necessity,  
but arises out of the will of the Father. There is no God outside the Trinity, no sub-
stance that is not in these modes of existence. Because the origin and source of the 
divine being is the hypostasis of the Father, the nature and being of God is identified 
with the person.53 
Adherence  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  was  always  a  little  uncertain  and  the 
Church always had a tendency to revert to some form of monarchism, at least for all 
practical purposes, while maintaining a theoretical adherence to Nicene orthodoxy. 
During the period of the Reformation examples of a clear and deliberate departure 
from orthodox Trinitarianism can be found both in the ill-fated Michael Servetus and 
in the emergence of a quite unrelated radical group of Unitarians at Rakow in Poland 
under the leadership of Fausto Sozzini, whose Latinised name – Socinius – later be-
came synonymous with the Post-Reformation Unitarian movement.54 While the un-
53 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 41.
54 Owen Chadwick, The Reformation (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1964), 198-201.
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derstanding of God as Trinity remained a core orthodox doctrine espoused by all the 
mainstream Reformers, at least in theory, the doctrine itself has had little impact or 
influence on common Christian praxis and piety, obliging Karl Rahner to note that 
most doctrinal statements from Medieval Scholasticism to the 20th century on both 
the doctrine of God and Christology effectively “say explicitly in cold print that we 
ourselves have nothing to do with the mystery of the Holy Trinity except to know 
something "about it" through revelation”.55 James Torrance similarly argues that the 
method of 20th century Western theological education which begin with an explora-
tion of philosophical reasons for belief in one God have led to a situation in which 
“Trinitarian  thinking is  controlled  by or  subordinated to  a  prior  'monotheistic'  or 
Unitarian concept of God”.56 John Zizioulas suggests that the situation in the Ortho-
dox tradition is little different: with many Orthodox bishops and priests being little 
concerned with the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity and instead being 
effectively Unitarian, at least in common practice.57 Thus we may conclude that up 
until the mid 20th century the Church maintained what was at best a half-hearted ad-
herence to the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine was something that Christians 
should “know about” without having any genuine impact upon worship or witness. 
For Zizioulas this represents a reversion to the closed cosmology of Ancient Greece. 
55 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, New edition. (London; New York: Continuum International Publish-
ing Group - Burns & Oates, 2001), 14.
56 James B. Torrance, “The Doctrine of the Trinity in our contemporary Situation,” in The For-
gotten Trinity A Selection of Papers presented to the BCC Study Commission on Trinitarian  
Doctrine Today, ed. Alasdair I. C. Heron (London: BCC/CCBI, 1991), 13.
57 John D. Zizioulas, “The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an Ecumenical 
Study,” in The Forgotten Trinity: A Selection of Papers Presented to the BCC Study Commis-
sion on Trinitarian Doctrine Today, ed. Alasdair I. C. Heron (London: BCC/CCBI, 1991), 20-
21.
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God is primarily “substance” and therefore a “necessary being” and only secondarily 
conceived of in terms of “Person”. Thus “Person” becomes an additional character-
istic, a mask, rather than the root and ground of being.58 
7.2.1.2 Barth, Rahner and Person
Western practice was criticised by both Karl Rahner and Karl Barth.59 Barth foun-
ded his whole dogmatic program upon the self-declaration of God in Christ. This in-
evitably led to an encounter with God as Trinity for the Church only knows the Trin-
itarian God in Christ.60 Thus all true dogmatic theology begins with, and is founded 
upon, the doctrine of the Trinity.61 
Barth was, however, wary of using the term “person” in his understanding of the 
Trinity. For Barth the concept of “person” means “an I existing in and for itself with 
its own thought and will”.62 He argues that this would lead to a fragmentation into tri-
theism. Instead he used the term “ways of being” which he argued gave a better un-
derstanding of what the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople meant by the term.63
To avoid a collapse into Sabellianism, Barth maintains that the divine ways of being 
are “specific, different and always very distinctive” and cannot be interchanged with 
one another in any way. The three-fold nature of God is “irremovable and the dis-
tinctiveness of the three modes of being must be regarded as ineffaceable”.64 The 
58 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 40.
59 Zizioulas, “Trinity Today,” 19.
60 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I.1, 1st ed. (London; New York: T.& T. Clark Ltd, 2004), 296, 
334.
61 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II.1 (London; New York: T.& T. Clark Ltd, 2004), 261.
62 Barth, Church Dogmatics I.1, 358.
63 Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, New edition. (London: SCM Press, 2001), 34.
64 Barth, Church Dogmatics I.1, 361.
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threefold nature of God is of the divine essence: God is God three times, in ways that 
are so different that God is only God in this differentiation. At the same time God is 
always the One God both immanently and in the economy. He accounts for the dis-
tinctiveness of the ways of being in terms of relationships.65
Barth remains hesitant about using personal terms even of God as “one” unless and 
if they become necessary.66 At the end of a long aside surveying the discussion on the 
use of “person” and its cognates in relation to God,67 Barth argues that the idea of 
God as “the One who loves” is vital, while the terminology of “person” is almost ir-
relevant. “The only thing which matters is that God's Word is proclaimed as the Word 
of the One, the One who loves”.68 This is not to say that Barth conceives of God in 
entirely impersonal terms. As the One who loves God is not a “thing” but a “person”,  
the One who speaks and acts.
Rahner was critical of Barth's terminology. While admitting that the modern meaning 
of the term “person” does carry unhelpful individualistic connotations, he argues that 
the long usage of the term means that there is really no more adequate terminology. A 
proper “economic approach”, he claims, allows one to show that the differentiation 
within God is properly “three-personality” and that in this context the concept of 
“person” implies nothing more than “what our starting point has derived from the 
testimony of Scripture.”69 
65 Ibid., 363.
66 Barth, Church Dogmatics II.1, 296.
67 Ibid., 287-297.
68 Ibid., 296.
69 Rahner, The Trinity, 44-45.
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Rahner does attempt to further define the concept of “Person”. The language is, he 
argues, a “logical” explanation of the claim that God has given the divine self to be 
known as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. By “logical explanation” he means that one 
clarifies or expounds a state of affairs only with reference to that state, without refer-
ence to outside events or other states of affairs.70 The language of “person” and “sub-
stance” always refers back to its origin, to “the experience of faith which assures us 
that the incomprehensible God is really as he is in himself, given to us in the (for us) 
twofold reality of Christ and His Spirit.”71 Like Barth, Rahner is aware of the dangers 
of a fragmentation into tri-theism posed by modern concepts of “person”. If the lan-
guage is to be retained despite changes in meaning then it is incumbent upon the 
theologian to explain what is actually meant by the term.72 Rahner's understanding, 
however, retains many of the features of Barth's caution about “person”. He carefully 
excludes the idea that the term could mean “three individuals” or “three centres of 
will, activity and of subjectivity”.73 Rahner therefore, falls back on “person” as hav-
ing always meant “only the distinct subsistence and co-signified the rational nature 
only indirectly”.74 If this is to be rephrased properly then it can be said that “God 
subsists in three distinct manners of subsisting”. This, he argues, is a stronger and 
more satisfactory account of “person” as meant by the Fathers than Barth's “ways of 
being”.75 It is, he claims, what Thomas means in adapting the definition of Boethius. 






75 Ibid., 108-109 The translation of Rahner here refers to Barth's phrase as "manner of being".
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something which can be seen as “subsequent”, as if it were added to a single unified 
Godhead. God is God in the manners of subsisting, and there cannot be any under-
standing of God in which the Godhead is prior to these manners of subsisting. 
Jürgen Moltmann objects to Barth's understanding of the Trinity, claiming that Barth 
developed his understanding out of the same “reflection structure” which informed 
Fichte, who spoke of the “bond of love” or “reflection which permits the two to be 
one”. The reflection structure creates a duality and it becomes difficult to justify the 
role of the Spirit in the Godhead beyond a basic appeal to the tradition of venerating 
the Spirit along with the Father and the Son. The resulting duality, claims Moltmann, 
then collapses into a monad, for the Father is strictly the only true personality. The 
phrase “God in Christ” therefore either means no more than a reflection in which the 
Father contemplates and finds only the divine self or that the three modes of being 
are objective to a fourth subject.76
Moltmann may well overstate his case somewhat. Barth's understanding of the Trin-
ity is a good deal more nuanced that Moltmann's comparatively short exposition. 
Barth, however, is strongly influenced by the Western theological tradition, and owes 
a considerable debt to Augustine. A good deal of Barth's language in attempting to 
understand  the  Trinity  echoes  that  of  this  wider  Western  tradition.  As  we  have 
already noted this tradition has always tended to understand the three-fold nature of 
God in terms of the unity of the Godhead, putting the emphasis primarily on the 
unity, whereas the Greek tradition has tended to seek to integrate the plurality of God 
into the one nature. It is this whole tradition that Moltmann understands as flawed, 
76 Jürgen Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God (London: SCM Press, 
1981), 142-143.
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and to a large extent his rejection of Barth seems to be a part of his wider critique of 
the Western tradition.77 Whether he is fair in his overall criticism, or even effectively 
achieves part or all of his goal, is, however, beyond our present purposes.
Both Barth and Rahner have a focus on the essence or substance of God and a hesit-
ation to identify this essence with a “person”. This would be entirely necessary if the 
concept of person was quite as individualistic as Barth and Rahner claim. This, how-
ever, is questionable. Moltmann maintained that Rahner had not come to terms with 
what he calls “personalist philosophy” “designed precisely to overcome modern indi-
vidualism.78 It seems, however, that the same criticism can be fairly levelled at Barth. 
Although Rahner  is  aware of  the  dynamics  of  changing meaning,  neither  he nor 
Barth show any sign of having engaged with the alternative concepts of person which 
have emerged through the 20th  century despite the fact that more relational and less 
isolated and individualistic alternatives were, and remain, available. Even as Barth 
was lecturing  amidst  the wreckage and the  rebuilding of  the  Kurfürsten  Schloss, 
Martin Buber's “I and Thou” was available, at least in English.79 A key element of 
Buber's philosophy was that a “person” was more than an isolated centre of activity, 
will and self-consciousness, a true “person” lived also in an “I-Thou” relationship:
The life of a human being does not exist merely in the sphere of goal-directed 
verbs. It does not consist merely of activities that have something for their ob-
ject.
I perceive something, I sense something. I think something. The life of a hu-
man being does not consist merely of all this and its like. 
All this and its like is the basis of the realm of It.
77 Ibid., 19.
78 Ibid., 145.
79 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Clark, 1970), 20. The German text Ich und 
Du appeared in 1923, the English I and Thou first appeared in 1937. Buber left Germany in 
1938 and the book ceased to be available in German until after WWII.
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But the realm of You has another basis. Whoever says You does not have some-
thing for his object.…Whoever says You does not have something; he has noth-
ing. But he stands in relation.80
Rahner argued that the doctrine of the Trinity must have soteriological - and there-
fore missiological – meaning.81 Our rationale for seeking an understanding of the 
Trinity is to address the tensions we have seen in Zambia, to reflect theologically 
upon the communal and personal identities of that nation in order that the Church 
might bear witness to something “conducive to our real salvation”.82 The understand-
ings of the Trinity proposed by Barth and Rahner, as important as they are in ground-
ing our understanding of God on what has been revealed, do not sufficiently bridge 
the gap between 20th century Europe and early 21st century Africa. Without a ground-
ing in a relational understanding of “person” the doctrines of the Trinity which they 
propose allow this vital missiological doctrine to remain imprisoned and isolated. We 
therefore need to engage with understandings of “person” which enable us to more 
effectively meet the missiological challenges of Zambia.
We are not alone in seeking to reshape understandings of “person” in more relation-
al terms rooted in understandings of the Trinity. James Torrance argues for a more 
dynamic concept of “person”: not simply an isolated individual, but one who finds 
true “being-in-communion with God and others”.83 In similar vein, Jürgen Moltmann 
calls for a concept of “person” in which “The modern individualistic concept of per-
son ought to give way to the earlier hypostatic concept of person, so that the person 
and nature of the human being can be seen together again.”84 
80 Ibid., 54-55.
81 Rahner, The Trinity, 15.
82 Ibid.
83 Torrance, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 15.
84 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 112.
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Our search for an understanding of “person” for the sake of communal peace in 
Zambia must be a search for a language which adequately describes the relationships 
of the Trinity while also providing an insight through which we as human beings can 
discern a true human personhood which is in the “image and likeness” of the person-
hood in the Triune God; an understanding which enables a constructive mimesis of 
that which is revealed to us in Christ. Such a notion of “person” must be relational 
rather than individualistic, open rather than exclusionary, shaped by the revelation of 
God as “three persons” rather than allowing mistaken individualistic understandings 
of “person” to prevail. We begin this search with an exploration of some general in-
sights into the formation of a “person”.
7.3 Relational Concepts of Person.
7.3.1 The Relational Person in James Alison and Miroslav Volf
A relational concept of “person” is at the heart of the insights of Girard and his fol-
lowers. The “I” or “me” of any person emerges only in a mimesis of a prior other.  
Through social relationships human beings learn what it is to be human, and these 
social relationships are rooted in mimesis. We are drawn into imitation of the anterior 
other, learning all that makes us members of a particular society and group. At the 
same time we are drawn by the same mimesis into those actions which make us 
rivals to the model and the model a rival to us.85 “So mimesis is both the condition of 
our attraction towards others and our separation from them, leading to the construc-
tion of our individuality and identity”.86 
85 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 43.
86 Ibid., 28.
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The self and the social group are both formed by two dimensions of mimesis: imita-
tion in space and repetition over time. The dimension of imitation in space consti-
tutes humans as “social” creatures, who do more or less the same things, which cre-
ates society, while repetition through time enables memory, keeping the individual 
stable over time and allowing the development of language, which in turn creates the 
“I” or identity. Both belong together and enable the emergence of the human being, 
whose framework of awareness and perception is shaped by relationships. 
As social cohesion is formed by mimesis, desire creates a certain element of indi-
vidual autonomy. Desire is the “draw” of mimesis not only to the model but also to  
the object which the model possesses. Alison uses the simple example of a rattle 
played with by an adult and then given to a baby, who in turn learns to play with it. 
So the infant is attracted not only to the model but also to an object which is external  
to the model, and thus we are pulled away from the model to the external object. This 
leads to a third step. Imitation of what the model has, the external object, leads to a 
rivalry in which the imitator not only wants to be like the model, or to have the ex-
ternal object of the model, but to be the model. This rivalry is resolved by an expul-
sion, in psychological terms the assertion of the self over against the model. Thus the 
self is formed in a struggle in which mimetic identification with the anterior other is 
resolved by an act of expulsion or “self” assertion.87
Miroslav Volf, despite his critical stance towards Girard,  accepts that the self is 
formed in a relationship of “struggle and violence”. He argues that there can be no 
“self” which is utterly without a centre. The “self”, he claims, is formed through 
87 Ibid., 29-30.
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“centering” on the “other”. The tension of identification is resolved by an assertion of 
the self. Volf attends subtly to the possibilities of over-identification where the self 
clings too closely to, and ultimately attempts to absorb or “smother”, the other, and 
the situation where the self is over-asserted against the other and the expulsion there-
fore becomes fuller. For Volf both are “exclusion”, an attempt to eliminate the “oth-
er”. The process through which the self is formed, he argues, is one in which “hu-
mans reproduce and configure themselves by a process of identifying with others and 
rejecting them”.88
Despite their differences, both Volf and Alison accept that the self as it is formed 
within the normal processes of human individuation is always being formed in a pro-
cess of struggle and expulsion which is born out of relationships with others. Both 
accept that we are not persons except as “persons-in-relationship”. A person is not 
therefore to be conceived in permanent or entirely substantial terms, but much more 
in terms of a malleable and relational “becoming”. There is little here that is conten-
tious or at odds with broadly agreed understandings of psychology and sociology; 
becoming a person through relationship is an essential element of being human rather 
than being “hard-wired” with a range of instinctual responses to the environment.89 
There is, however, a dark side to this dynamic “becoming”. The person and the com-
munity is always being formed in relationship to a prior other, which is itself, both 
collectively and individually, shaped by identification, rivalry and expulsion.90 
88 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 69-70.
89 Fleming, René Girard, 10; Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, 30.
90 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 33, 36-37.
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There is an element in the formation of a person which neither Alison nor Volf draw 
out clearly: that is the active role of the “prior other” in, to borrow Alison's phrase, 
“suggesting into being” personal identity. This becomes a little clearer if we consider 
the development of a young baby. Robin Skynner, reflecting with his former client, 
John Cleese, on the individuation of babies, describes a mimetic game played by 
mother and child which he terms the “eye dance”. Each gazes at the other and re-
flects the expressions the other makes in what is clearly an act of mutual mimesis.91 
This  generates  security and contentment.  Over  the months  of  early development, 
however, the game changes slightly. The mother not only reflects the baby's actions, 
but adds elements, adding aspects of herself as a separate person, encouraging the 
baby to develop “boundaries” which enable her to distinguish between “me” and 
“not me”.92 As a child develops so the process of individuation moves on, with par-
ental suggestion and support assisting the child in “owning” his/her internal conflic-
tual tensions.93 Through the later stages of child development “good enough” parent-
ing helps the child to set and clarify boundaries and develop a sense of “self”. These 
are the initiatives of the model, who takes steps to “give” or suggest into existence an 
identity in the other, enabling the development of a “self” which is distinct from oth-
er selves, including that of the model. Because this giving always involves not only 
the model, but a whole history of familial and cultural interactions,94 there is always 
an element of “ascription”, whereby elements of identity seem to derive from what is 
alien and external to the subject. The developing child, for example, not only ac-
quires those elements of himself which are given through interaction with his family, 






but also elements of identity which are ascribed by social structures and institutions: 
caste, ethnic affiliation, social status and so on, which are not simply “adopted” but 
also designated by others. 
There is little in this that either Alison or Volf would be likely to take exception to, 
indeed it is what Alison alludes to as “parental and ambiental human suggestion”,95 
provided it is continually remembered that the whole process is plagued by imperfec-
tion and entrapment in conflictual mimesis. Neither, however, explicitly place much 
emphasis upon the role that this active suggesting of identity plays in the develop-
ment of identity, which leads to a gap in their understanding of persons in relation-
ship and their theological reflections on “person”. 
Both Alison and Volf are, despite their differences, in general harmony with the 
more widely accepted thought that we are not “individuals” alone, but emerge as 
“persons” from relationships with people around us: our parents, siblings and wider 
community.  We therefore have the beginnings of a concept of “person” which is 
more relational and less individualistic. A person can only become and remain an in-
dividual distinctive, unrepeatable person in relationship with others. We need to de-
velop this thought further and in a way which is appropriate to our African context. 
The first step in this process is to explore the understanding of person common to the 
thought world of Southern Africa.
95 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong 17
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7.3.2 The Relational Person in African Thought
The defining mark of all “Bantu” languages is the use of the root ntu to denote hu-
man beings,  or human attributes. Thus in IciBemba the word  umuntu (pl  abantu) 
means a human being or a person. It is widely held that African cultures have a much 
stronger understanding of “ntu” as “person in relationship” than that which pertains 
in Western cultures with their emphasis upon individuality and personal independ-
ence.96 This is usually expressed in modern discourse by drawing upon the Nguni 
word  ubuntu.  “[Ubuntu] speaks of very essence of being human ...We belong in a 
bundle of life. We say 'a person is a person through other people'”.97 Although com-
ing from Nguni  culture,  the thought  is  widespread throughout  Bantu  cultures.  In 
IciBemba the proverb keka kanama: utuli tulili bantu (“What is alone is a little anim-
al, who are two are human beings”)98 expresses a similar idea: only where there is a 
plurality of  persons,  where people  are  in  community with  one another,  are  there 
properly “human” beings. Similar proverbs exist in other Zambian languages. These 
proverbs express an understanding that members of a community belong to, and are 
defined by, one another in some final and inextricable way. Seminary students in 
class discussion often expressed the idea that all members of a local community were 
part of the community: the weak, the elderly, the indigent, the dissident and disaf-
96 Michael Battle, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland, Ohio: Pil-
grim Press, 1997), 36-38.
97 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness: A Personal Overview of South  
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, New Edition. (London: Rider & Co, 2000), 34-
35.
98 I am grateful to Vernon Mwaba for this proverb and its translation.
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fected, as well as the strong, well-integrated and productive. At its broadest ubuntu 
includes not only the community of human beings, but the entire community of cre-
ation.99
The idea is deeply embedded in African world views and has profound religious di-
mensions.
The person one is to become "through other persons" is, ultimately, an ancestor. 
And, by the same token, these "other persons" include ancestors. Ancestors are 
extended family. Dying is an ultimate homecoming. Not only the living must 
therefore share with and care for each other, but the living and the dead depend 
on each other.100
Ubuntu is an important idea with a good deal of value, and we wish to propose a 
critical adoption of the concept, but it is important in a quest for a politics of the pure 
in heart that we do not over-romanticise African culture and African values. Ubuntu  
as an ideal of interdependent human relationships can fail disastrously.
Where was  ubuntu in  the Belgian Congo in  the early 1960s?  Why did the 
Rwandans forget ubuntu in 1994 and instead destroy one another in that most 
awful genocide that overwhelmed their beautiful country? I don't know except 
to say that honouring ubuntu is clearly not a mechanical, automatic and inevit-
able process.101
It seems we need to gain some insight into the limitations of ubuntu if the concept 
is to make a contribution to an understanding of the Trinity. 
99 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time (London: Rider 
& Co, 2005), 28.
100 Dirk J. Louw, “Ubuntu: An African Assessment of the Religious Other,” n.d., 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Afri/AfriLouw.htm (Accessed 1 June, 2009).
101 Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, 36.
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It is important to recognise that African cultures are, and remain, human cultures, 
with all the ambivalence that this implies. The concept of “ubuntu” emerged amongst 
small, close-knit communities, usually kinship groups with clear boundaries of mem-
bership and acceptability. Joseph Miller in his analysis of the rise of the Mbundu 
Kingdoms in what is now western Angola notes:
The Mbundu accepted as fellow human beings only people who had positions 
in  their  lineage system, either as holders  of one of the ngundu (kin group) 
names or as formal affiliates ('slaves', pawns etc.) of some descent group. Not 
to belong to an ngundu in theory excluded a person from the right to call on 
kinsmen for support, prevented him from marrying or growing food, denied 
him spiritual solace, and in practice often amounted to choice between certain 
death and abject subordination to the will of a patron with a place in the lineage 
structure.102
The Mbundu could accept as human beings those who were not kin-group members 
by the extension of kinship rights to members of societies specialising in certain 
activities, such as hunting. It was this extension, according to Miller, which formed 
part of the foundation upon which the larger multi-kin group nations were built.103 
Miller has little doubt that most of his observations about the Mbundu could equally 
apply to the peoples further East.104
Two clear points come out of this. First, the  ubuntu  as a “narrative of inclusion” 
also conceals acts of exclusion, in as far as the concept of “human” could be strictly 
limited. Empathy could be restricted or entirely absent at critical moments, allowing 
the outsider or the marginalised to be rejected or expelled, to suffer “certain death” or 
even to be actively killed by the ubuntu community.




The second point to emerge from Miller's comments is the widely noted danger of 
so over-emphasising the group identity that the individual becomes assimilated to the 
group in a form of “totalitarian communalism”.105
While Louw argues that the “derailment” of ubuntu in this way is “quite unneces-
sary” we have already seen that ubuntu conceals one form of exclusion. The assess-
ment made by Matthew Parris is likely to be a good deal more realistic than the more 
optimistic Louw:
I observe that tribal belief  is no more peaceable than ours;  and that it  sup-
presses individuality. People think collectively; first in terms of the community, 
extended family and tribe.  This rural-traditional mindset feeds into the “big 
man” and gangster politics of the African city: the exaggerated respect for a 
swaggering leader, and the (literal) inability to understand the whole idea of 
loyal opposition.106 
Neither South Africa's smouldering xenophobia nor reactions to Helen Zille in Cape 
Province during 2009 suggests that ubuntu has led to any extension of the attribute 
“human” beyond strict confines, or that deeper insights into the idea of “loyal oppos-
ition” have become available, even in democratic South Africa, where ubuntu some-
105 Louw, “Ubuntu: An African Assessment of the Religious Other.”
106 Parris, “Africa Needs God.”
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times seems to have been elevated to the status of a national ideology.107 Over identi-
fication is an inherent part of the praxis of ubuntu and for Volf this is an act of exclu-
sion.
This concealed narrative of exclusion makes the emergence of the Single Victim 
Mechanism more, rather than less, likely. The possibility of limiting or denying the 
humanity of the marginalized, dissident or outsider creates exactly the situation in 
which the mimetic flow can coalesce upon that one single individual whose full hu-
manity is denied, and therefore from whom the ubuntu group can legitimately with-
draw empathy. At the same time the pressure to agree and conform allows decisions 
to be “projected” onto the hierarchical leadership or onto some “cosmic” or spiritual 
powers. This in turn allows responsibility for actions to be “disowned”, concealed 
behind the values of group conformity and obedience to the chiefs, kings or oracles 
as manifestations of the ubuntu community of the living and the “living dead” of the 
ancestors.  Something  of  this  is  caught  by Chinua  Achebe  when  he  recounts  the 
murder of Ikemefuma, the boy sacrifice, in conformity to the command of their vil-
lage oracle.108 Fear and suspicion suggests that the concealed exclusion extends as 
widely as the ideal of inclusion and belonging, as Parris observes:
107 “BBC NEWS | World | Africa | Rally against Zille in Cape Town,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8069570.stm (Accessed 3 July, 2009); “Zille shakes up 
SA politics - Mail & Guardian Online: The smart news source,” n.d., http://www.mg.co.za/art-
icle/2009-06-07-zille-shakes-up-sa-politics (Accessed 3 July, 2009); “Xenophobia still 
smoulders in Cape townships - Mail & Guardian Online: The smart news source,” n.d., 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-06-19-xenophobia-still-smoulders-in-cape-townships (Ac-
cessed 28 July, 2009); “SA doesn't roll out welcome mat for all immigrants - Mail & Guardian 
Online: The smart news source,” n.d., http://www.mg.co.za/article/2005-08-22-sa-does-
nt-roll-out-welcome-mat-for-all-immigrants (Accessed 28 July, 2009); Loren B. Landau, “Lov-
ing the alien? Citizenship, law, and the future in South Africa's demonic society,” African Af-
fairs (London) 109, no. 435 (April 1, 2010): 213-230.
108 Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (London: Heinemann, 1958), 40-43.
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Anxiety - fear of evil spirits, of ancestors, of nature and the wild, of a tribal 
hierarchy, of quite everyday things - strikes deep into the whole structure of 
rural African thought. Every man has his place and, call it fear or respect, a 
great weight grinds down the individual spirit, stunting curiosity. People won't 
take  the  initiative,  won't  take  things  into  their  own hands  or  on  their  own 
shoulders.109
In as far as the person one is to become in the ubuntu relationship with others is an 
ancestor, then the original ancestor is the ultimate model for mimesis. Yet, as many 
African myths of origin make clear, the ancestors themselves are people who are 
formed by, and continually enter into, mimetic rivalry.  Thus the Bemba myths of 
Chiti and his brothers show the Bemba ancestors as creating the Bemba nation out of 
a clearly rivalrous relationship with their father Mukulumpe, to say nothing of the 
further rivalries that spread between the brothers, and between the brothers and the 
peoples amongst whom they sought to settle.110 
Ubuntu as a “raw” concept is therefore generated by and continues to generate the 
same tensions, rivalries and conflicts which lead to the Single Victim Mechanism. 
Like the law and social hierarchy ubuntu acts as a break, restricting the emergence of 
conflict by providing a sense of belonging to and empathy with other members of the 
community and by offering an imperative to constructive resolution of conflict when 
it  does  occur.111 Nevertheless,  when  this  mechanism inevitably  fails  and  conflict 
threatens the entire community, it provides for the legitimation of an act of projection 
and expulsion which discharges the tensions through the Single Victim Mechanism.
109 Parris, “Africa Needs God.”
110 Stephen Belcher, African Myths of Origin (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), 233 ff.
111 Louw, “Ubuntu: An African Assessment of the Religious Other.”
232
Walter Wink draws attention to the fact that what he terms “The Powers”, the spir-
itual realities of all cultures, are good, are fallen and will be redeemed.112 In a rush to 
correct the undoubted failures of the past and to affirm the validity of African culture 
there has been a tendency to forget or ignore the Christian insight that all human 
nature and all that humans produce is embroiled in what Christian doctrine terms 
“original sin”, that is, it is “fallen”. “[W]e cannot be saved from the powers by any-
thing within the Power System, but only by something that transcends it”.113 The cul-
tural product of ubuntu, as fine and as valuable as it is, is a human product, not some-
thing transcendent. 
Ubuntu is a widespread notion in African culture, more than an interesting piece of 
social philosophy; it is foundational to the African religious world-view.114 It has its 
limitations, and its praxis is erratic; nevertheless it is also open to redemption. It re-
mains an important ideal with a clearly understood imperative within African culture. 
It is, for example, high praise to say of someone “he has  ubuntu.”115 It has an ex-
tremely widespread deployment in Southern African literature, turning up in the most 
unlikely of reflections.116 If early African communities restricted their sense of be-
longing to one another to other members of the same kin group, the already noted 
112 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 65.
113 Ibid., 69.
114 Corne Bekker, “Ubuntu Kenosis Mutuality: Finding the Other in Southern African Business 
Leadership,” 2008_Ubuntu-Kenosis_Bekker, April 2008, 19, http://www.regent.edu/acad/glob-
al/publications/rgbr/vol2iss1/2008%20April_Ubuntu-Kenosis_Bekker.pdf (Accessed 22 Janu-
ary, 2009).
115 Tutu, God Has a Dream, 26.
116 Bekker, “Ubuntu Kenosis Mutuality: Finding the Other in Southern African Business Leader-
ship,” 18.
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fact, that the concept could be expanded to include a membership which extended 
beyond the kin group suggests that the concept of ubuntu can be further expanded in 
inclusive directions.
The African notion of  ubuntu offers an African dimension to understanding “per-
son”, particularly in attempting to gain some insight into the idea of Divine persons 
in the revelation of God as “Trinity”. Therefore the language of ubuntu is culturally 
appropriate for our focus on the Zambian context. It is also already imbued with rela-
tional dimensions which offer ways of addressing those concerns expressed by Barth 
and answering the calls of Torrance and Moltmann by offering a notion of “person” 
in which belonging in relationship with other persons is of the essence of the “per-
sonhood”. A growing taste for the term amongst Western Church leaders117 suggests 
that  this  genuinely African  insight  is  already being  taken up and  integrated  into 
already existing Western notions of person-in-community in an effort to rethink inter-
personal relationships, even if some of these efforts are overly optimisitic. An ad-
equate adoption of the notion, however, can only be made if the idea can be liberated 
from the limitations we have noted above, limitations essentially imposed upon it by 
the conflictual mimesis of desire.
7.3.3 Assessing Relational Persons
In the preceding material we have explored some concepts of “person” which are 
relational rather than individualistic. The concepts espoused by Girard and Alison, on 
the one hand, and Volf on the other, differ in a number of aspects, but their core ele-
117 The Most Rev. Katharine Jefferts-Schori, “Opening Address to the TEC General Convention 
2009,” July 7, 2009, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/documents/070709_PBopeningaddress.p-
df (Accessed 29 July, 2009).
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ments are that persons become individuated, unique unrepeatable persons in relation-
ships with others. These relationships are, in human beings, conflicted relationships. 
Their broken and conflicted nature, however, is not inevitable, and the universe from 
which these relational persons arise is not “necessary” or closed. Volf draws upon the 
general  trends  of  secular  psychology,  with  its  themes  of  conflict,  repression  and 
power relationships. Even the more secular versions of modern psychology do not 
see the “person” as merely a mask, an actor who is nothing more than a focal point 
for inevitable conflictual relationships. For most psychological understandings of the 
person it is possible to gain self-awareness and some element of growth and positive 
change.118 Thus the “person” is not a product of impersonal and “necessary” or inev-
itable forces which have a pre-determined or “fated” outcome but is  genuinely a 
“person” in the ontological sense with hope and some possibility of “redemption”. 
While these secular models do not say all that Christians would wish to say about 
hope and redemption they are not inconsistent with Christian insights. Alan Falconer 
reflecting on the conflicted roots of all efforts to gain human rights and deal with hu-
man difference draws upon the work of Rollo May. Conflict and the power of indi-
viduation which conflict brings, he argues, can be shaped in positive and constructive 
ways. Christians are challenged by God in Jesus Christ to use their personal individu-
ation and power positively in imitation of the kenosis of God in Christ, to enable oth-
er human beings to be human.119 Falconer does not develop this much further, but 
does point us towards the questions of our understanding of Jesus Christ as the pres-
118 Skynner and Cleese, Families and How To Survive Them, 36.
119 Alan Falconer, “Theological Reflection on Human Rights,” in Understanding Human Rights:  
An Interdisciplinary and Interfaith Study, ed. Alan Falconer (Dublin: Irish School of Ecumen-
ics, 1980), 196-223.
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ence of the Trinitarian God with which we have been wrestling. Miroslav Volf ex-
plores this further in the light of an understanding of the Trinity and we shall exam-
ine the adequacy of his insights in the coming chapters. 
René Girard's understanding of “person” also takes up the themes of conflict, re-
pression and power. At first sight there is a necessity about mimesis and conflict  
which suggests that “persons” are simply “masks” or actors whose role emerges from 
inevitable mimetic conflicts within society. There is more than this, however, to Gir-
ard's insight, and to explore this we must examine his understanding of Christianity, 
and explore how these insights have been taken up to formulate an insight into “per-
son” in the Trinity.
The Southern African understanding of “person” is also “relational”. Although of it-
self, unsurprisingly, it carries none of the insights into the conflicted nature of human 
identity found either in modern psychology or in Girard. It is not, however, inconsist-
ent with these insights as espoused by either Alison or Volf. In our examination of 
this notion, however, we have seen that the individual person does not emerge clearly 
as a free, distinctive and unrepeatable individual. This reflects more general tenden-
cies in Southern African cultures.  Zambians,  for example,  name their  children in 
highly stylised ways, sometimes because of their place in the family, or in response 
to significant events or communal celebrations at the time of the birth or to invoke 
the spirit (mupashi) of an ancestor who is thought to be present in the child. This, to-
gether with the observations made by Parris,120 suggests a sense of “necessity” in the 
African world-view, of the cosmos being closed and of the person being an “actor” 
120 Parris, “Africa Needs God.”
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playing a communally allotted and therefore pre-determined role within society with 
little sense of the possibility of redemption. Ultimately death leads to the shadow 
world of the “living dead” which continues to interact with the world of the living 
and whose inhabitants may return either as a mupashi re-born in a living individual 
or as a non-physical entity who acts either as guardian or disturber of the community. 
The concept needs to be given that “ontological” dimension which proswpon took 
on through the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. Desmond Tutu has taken 
up the idea of ubuntu and sought to integrate into his understanding of Christianity. 
His work will be examined in the coming chapters. 
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8 Person, Trinity and Zambia
In the previous chapter we explored the concept of “person” in the development of 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  In  classical  Greek  and Roman  thought  “person”  was 
thought of as an epiphenomenon given temporary shape in the rationally predeter-
mined essence of a “closed” Cosmos. In the course of the development of the doc-
trine of the Trinity “person” was given a new “ontological” dimension. This allowed 
“person” to be thought of as a genuinly free and unrepeatable individual with a genu-
ine hope of redemption within an “open” cosmos. We noted that the doctrine of the 
Trinity quickly became isolated from Christian praxis, and that the Church, both East 
and West tended to fall back into a form of monarchianism. In the twentieth century 
Barth and Rahner sought to restore an emphasis upon the revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ and consequently the doctrine of the Trinity to the centre of the Church's wit-
ness. However, they had reason to be suspicious of the way in which the concept of 
“person” had developed in their context. 
While Barth and Rahner give an adequate account of the Trinity within their own 
constraints, our understanding of the context of Zambia shows that a major challenge 
faced by that nation is one related to identity. We have seen that in Zambia a repetit-
ive cycle of mounting conflict resolved by a cathartic expulsion. The outcome is that 
“persons” become actors filling roles determined by their ethnicity or social location. 
They are not “free”; instead they live in a society which appears to be locked into an 
inevitable closed pattern of destructive relationships which in turn hamper economic 
and social development. In this context our theology needs an understanding of “per-
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son” which can speak the Good News of liberation from the seemingly inevitable 
closed cycle of conflict and expulsion. Neither Barth nor Rahner provide an under-
standing of the Trinity which can bear this particular weight. 
In order to address this challenge we have sought a concept of person which can be 
used as an adequate expression of the Church's understanding and articulation of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. We have discussed a number of concepts of person in which 
relationship is a key component of personal being. None of these concepts are, as we 
have left them so far, capable of bearing the weight of the truly redemptive Word of 
the Gospel. In order that they may do so, they must be drawn into some account of 
Christianity, an account which provides a clear and adequate understanding of the 
Trinity in terms of persons in relationship. In this way we hope to construct an under-
standing of “person” based upon the “pacific” or constructive mimesis of one in 
whom there is no conflict, no urge to power, but only free creativity and the offering 
of life. We are not the first to attempt such a task and we must now engage with a 
number of theologies, most, but not all of which arise as a response to conflicted so-
cieties. We begin with the work of René Girard, whose insights do not arise from a 
specific conflict but from a reflection upon conflict in general. We have already dis-
cussed and made use of the more “anthropological” aspects of Girard's work, and this 
has provided us with a very effective understanding of Zambia's transition to political 
independence and its present circumstances. We must now turn to Girard's under-
standing of Christianity.
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8.1 Girard and Christianity
Biblical literature, according to Girard, offers a unique insight into the working of 
the scapegoat  mechanism.  There  are  profound similarities  between many biblical 
stories and the myths of other religions. The mimetic cycle is embedded in both, and 
both tell stories of figures who have been victims of the scapegoat mechanism. The 
myths tell their stories from the perspective of the community to which the mechan-
ism has brought some temporary relief. The victim is understood as having, in some 
way, been at fault, and has become demonised as the source of the dis-ease within the 
community. Often the victim, once murdered, undergoes the second transformation 
to divinity, as his/her murder brings sudden and longed-for harmony to a community 
riven by conflict. Thus the myths share with biblical literature stories of mimetic con-
tagion where the victim/hero is violently expelled only to become exalted. Girard 
reads both the Oedipus myth and the story of Joseph in this way. His comparative 
reading shows up one crucial difference: the perspective from which the stories are 
told. Myths conceal the truth about the events which surround the murder and emer-
gence of the victim/god of their story. Myth, ritual and prohibition are all “cultural 
forms that double as both recollections and misrecognitions of victimage”.1 Girard 
uses the term “méconnaissance” for this phenomenon and argues that the confusion 
or distortion involved is necessary for myth, ritual, and taboo to be effective in the 
function of maintaining peace within society.2
1 Fleming, René Girard, 77.
2 Ibid., 55.
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The Biblical story is written from the point of view of the victim. The hero/victim is 
clearly declared innocent of the charges laid against  him/her showing up the real 
cause of his/her violent expulsion as mimetic rivalry. The Joseph story, the Psalms, 
the Book of Job are all expressions of the Single Victim Mechanism written from the 
point of view of the victim, against whom all are conspiring. “In all these texts those 
who are in the right are not the executioners, as in the myths, but the victims. The 
victims are innocent, and the executioners are guilty, guilty of persecuting innocent 
victims.”3
The biblical texts often portray the Single Victim Mechanism under the figure of 
Satan.  Satan presents himself  as a model to imitate and seductively invites us to 
abandon ourselves to all our inclinations and desires. Desires which are not really 
ours,  but  the desires  we have learnt from our model.4 Satan then becomes trans-
formed from seducer to forbidding adversary, the obstacle between us and our desire, 
the scandal which causes us to fall into mimetic conflict. This is the conversion from 
mimetic model to mimetic rival which plagues the whole of human existence. The fi-
nal and most profound transformation of Satan is to become the means of refashion-
ing order in the midst of the disorder which he has sown through the mimetic cycle. 
To achieve this Satan becomes the “Accuser”. “At the height of the mimetic crisis  
Satan becomes the violent contagion that persuades the entire community, which has 
become unanimous, that this guilt is real.”5 




Girard uses the name Satan in a “demythologised” sense. Satan is not a “god” of 
evil, he is, rather, a parasite on the creation of God, imitating God in a jealous and 
rivalistic sense. Thus Satan has no actual personal being. The false sense of personal 
reality associated with Satan is derived from the emergence of “A false transcend-
ence”6 like the profligate emergence of deities from the Single Victim Mechanism. 
In refusing the allure of Satan, the biblical texts refuse to divinise the victims of the 
scapegoat mechanism. The Gospels, however, follow the Single Victim Mechanism 
through to the point of affirming the divinity of the victim. This immediately gives 
rise to the suspicion that Christianity is nothing other than a myth, essentially no dif-
ferent from other ancient myths of death and resurrection. The New Testament, how-
ever, tells the “foundational” story from a different perspective. Like the texts of the 
Hebrew Scriptures, the Gospels declare Jesus as the innocent victim of the scapegoat 
mechanism. There is no prior demonisation of Jesus by the disciples. Those caught 
up in the mimetic snowballing are revealed as duped, as “knowing not what they do”, 
while it becomes clear that Jesus is the victim hated without cause. The divinity of 
Jesus is maintained, not by the unanimous mob after the event, but by the dissidents 
who separate themselves from the unanimity established by the collective violence.7 
The Gospels are unique in their subtle deconstructive revelation of the Single Vic-
tim Mechanism. The Passion Narratives show the whole power of the mimetic conta-
gion. The Jewish and Roman authorities, those crucified with Jesus, even the dis-
ciples themselves, are all caught up in the unanimous polarisation against Jesus. Yet 




Victim Mechanism, a disruption small enough to ensure that the effect occurs, yet 
sufficient to ensure that revelation will come. “Thus the Gospels reveal the full and 
complete truth about the origin of myth, about the illusory power of mimetic snow-
balling, about everything that the myths do not and cannot reveal because they are 
duped by it”.8 This revelation is crowned by the Resurrection and divinisation of Je-
sus. The Resurrection sheds the only light possible on the full truth of the origin of 
human culture. It shows the true nature of the divine in Jesus. The risen ascended Je-
sus is not a god produced by the unanimity of sacred violence. The full truth revealed 
is the God who does not emerge from the myth-understanding regarding victims, but 
one who voluntarily assumes the role of victim “and makes possible for the first time 
the full disclosure of the Single Victim Mechanism”.9 Thus we are obliged to distin-
guish for the first time between the false transcendence of the Single Victim Mechan-
ism together with the demon-gods which emerge from it, and the true transcendence 
which destroys  the mythical  illusions  and leads away from the mythic contagion 
which poisons human communities.
8.1.1 New Life
Girard notes that not all mimesis is necessarily either bad or conflictual. Mimesis is 
an inevitable part of being human. There can be mimesis, even a kind of rivalry,  
which is necessary to the order of a community, even constructive. There is a mimes-
is in which each rival and seek to out do one another in the effective performance of 





obstacled”, occasionally referred to as “pacific mimesis”.11 There is a naïve form of 
this in which the model and the disciple do eventually become obstacles or scandals 
to one another. There is a much more arduously acquired form of pacific mimesis 
which requires a conversion: a stepping outside the rivalistic mimesis, which entails 
learning a whole new way of being human. This is the form of mimesis which is  
taught in the New Testament as the mimesis of Jesus Christ. 
All human models are, at best, no better than ourselves. We cannot imitate them 
without becoming entrapped in the projected illusions of power and prestige which 
beset all human existence. A mimesis of Jesus is rather different. Imitation of Jesus 
begins as the invitation to imitate the desire of Jesus. This is, to a certain extent, para-
doxical, for Jesus does not have a proper desire of his own. His desire is to do the 
will of his Father, to become the perfect imitator of God the Father. It is to this that  
Jesus calls us. He does so because: 
Neither the Father nor the Son desires greedily, egotistically. God “makes his 
sun rise on the evil and on the good, he sends his rain on the just and on the un-
just”.  God  gives  without  counting,  without  marking  the  least  difference 
between us … If we imitate the detached generosity of God, then the trap of 
mimetic rivalries will never close over us.12 
There is more to this than the simple “Imitation of Christ” which Thomas à Kempis 
encouraged, and much more than that encouraged by Pelagius.13 The self-giving of 
Jesus as the perfect revelation of the Father gives true insight into creation, which is 
inextricably bound up with our understanding of redemption. Both are acts of gra-
11 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 13.
12 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 14.
13 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 12; Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 13.
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cious self-giving without exclusion, violence or vengeance, both are before all that is, 
and all things are ultimately formed by relationship with pre-existent gratuitous love. 
This is more than simply shedding some light on a piece of information previously 
available, or revealing something previously not known. It reveals an insight into 
reality that was not previously available, involving a shift in human understanding.14 
As such it provokes a whole new reading of the Hebrew Scriptures in the light of the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus.15
It is only through the revelatory presence of God in Christ that we can gain know-
ledge of and insight into the “foundational murder” upon which human culture is 
built. Yet this knowledge is strictly from within the human processes of discovery. 
Revelation is therefore a process in which the reality of human nature is uncovered in 
ways which are entirely consistent human ways of discovering and knowing, a “sub-
version from within”. Yet it remains inaccessible to us without an external revelation 
which also involves, and is impossible without, an act of absolution.16 This is in ef-
fect a conversion, a change of heart or “self” as we are re-formed through the mimes-
is of Jesus.17
Girard’s reading of the Scriptures is powerful and true to the texts. There is little 
doubt, for example, that he is correct to identify the revelation of the workings of the 
Single Victim Mechanism in the Book of Job, or in many of the Psalms. The social  
sources of much of the Hebrew Scriptures are to be found amongst those who have 
been marginalized, for whatever reason, by society and find themselves as ready vic-
14 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 77.




tims when the need arises. There are powerful expositions of persecution and scape-
goating in the Psalms and Prophets, and these are most certainly carried forward into 
the New Testament, finding themselves a ready echo in the events which surround 
the death of Jesus. Jesus is the one who “went about doing good”, yet he was demon-
ised, persecuted and destroyed by the authorities.18 It is clear too, that a central aspect 
of the Christian calling is the imitation of Jesus as the true image of God. Paul sum-
mons the Philippian community to “Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ 
Jesus”19 and the Corinthian community to the relational values of love, faith and hope 
in place of rivalry and conflict over ecstatic gifts and social status.20 In the Gospels 
Jesus calls his followers to be like the Father in their overflowing generosity and to  
reject judgement and blame.21 It seems incontrovertible that, whatever else repent-
ance and new life might mean, we are indeed called to reshape our lives and model  
them, not on the rivalries and conflicts of the human world around us but on the self-
giving of God in Jesus Christ. A gospel which failed to address the conflicted nature 
of human relationships as a central theme would indeed be no gospel at all.
There are, however, more voices than those of the persecuted in the Scriptures. As 
well as the marginalized, the potential and actual victims there are the voices of the 
powerful - the Court Psalmists singing the praises of the King and his bride, or celeb-
rating the violent suppression of the enemy within or without, or just simply celebrat-
ing for sheer unnamed joy. There is the extreme bitterness and raw anger of a people 
enslaved and exiled calling for vengeance. There are, above all, portrayals of viol-
18 Acts 10:38-39
19 Philippians 2:5-11
20 1 Corinthians 13
21 Matthew 7:1. The whole preceding passage calls the disciples to reject the objects of desire 
around them in favour of striving for the Kingdom of God.
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ence, including violence committed at the command of God, God's punishment either 
upon Israel or upon the nations. It has therefore appeared to some that the Bible is  
little more than one more expression of recurring mythic themes. Girard has some 
sympathy with this thought, but argues that the very reworking of these myths repres-
ents a “subversion from within” through a retelling of their stories from the point of 
view of the victims.22
Girard  offers  a  highly  significant  insight  into  the  revelation  which  Christianity 
brings to us. As a recognition that the Scriptures offer a revelation of the shadowed 
roots of the human personality, it is particularly pertinent to highly conflicted societ-
ies.  Girard's  further claim that his  “revelatory anthropology” offers a “subversion 
from within” allows the Gospel to be drawn into the imagery and rituals of a culture 
and at the same time draws cultural imagery and ritual into the proclamation of the 
Good News, subverting and reshaping culture as it is indwelt by and indwells the 
Gospel.23
However, Girard’s account of Christianity is limited at a number of vital points. His 
account, for example, offers little in the way of insight into “the last things”. Chris-
tianity works its revelatory power gradually; progressively liberating human society 
from the ills of conflictual mimesis. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ liberates 
human persons from a closed, fixed universe in which conflict is inevitable, but the 
new creation  is  evolutionary,  emerging  slowly within  the  process  of  history and 
without a transformative or transcendent “horizon” framed in either eschatological or 
22 Fleming, René Girard, 116-117.
23 Andrew F. Walls, “The Translation Principle In Christian History.”
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apocalyptic  terms.  This  in  itself  excludes  the  significant  apocalyptic  element  of 
Christianity, an element which many other modern theologies have had difficulty in 
comprehending.24
Girard’s concept of God is also limited. He places great emphasis on monotheism 
over polytheism as a central aspect of the revelatory power of the Gospel. The multi-
plicity of gods in polytheistic systems is a result of a multiplicity of ancient victims.  
The pantheon grows as new victims are divinised. While there is truth in this, the 
outcome is rather too static and closed an understanding of God, and although Girard 
does speak in Trinitarian terms, a coherent understanding of the Trinity is absent. 
This leaves a potential weakness in his account of the potential reformation of iden-
tity, whether as individual or as communal identity. It is only as the revelation of the 
one in whom God is incarnate and present in the world of conflicted identities that 
the account of the life and death of Jesus has redemptive power. A mimesis of Jesus 
is only a new life, new creation, if it is a mimesis of one whose identity is without 
any conflictual element. This ultimately leads back to an understanding of Jesus as 
the Son, and to a proper understanding of the place of the Son in the Godhead, to the 
Trinity and to the persons in relationship in the Trinity. 
Girard is the first to admit that his understanding of Christianity is neither exclusive 
nor complete.25 He has his followers amongst the theological community who have 
tried to extend his understanding of Christianity at various points. James Alison has 
24 Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Basingstoke: Marshall 
Pickering, 1987), 3.
25 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 25 citing "la route antique des hommes pervers".
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sought to expound Girard's insight in terms of the traditional doctrine of “Original 
Sin”. In doing so he has also outlined an understanding of the Trinity in Girardian 
terms.26
8.1.2 James Alison: Person as “Holon”
Alison  adopts  Oughourlian's  language  of  “holon”  to  replace  “person”.  For 
Oughourlian a person is never a person alone, rather he thinks in terms of “a rappor 
interdividuel...between two holons.” It is this language that provides Alison with a 
concept of “Person” which acts as an analogy for the Persons in the Trinity.27 
The analogy breaks down at the point of desire in the Trinity. No holon can claim 
its desire is original to itself without becoming locked into mimetic rivalry with an 
anterior other whose desire the holon is in fact imitating. In the Trinity there is no an-
terior other to the Father. All desire therefore originates with the Father, who is “un-
originated love”. The Son is the exact image of the Father, except that the Son has an 
origin in the Father. Yet the Son is not exactly originated either, but shares in the un-
originated givenness of the Father. As the exact image and likeness of the Father he 
receives completely the fullness of the Father's nature, and as the perfect likeness in 
turn gives completely as the Father gives. In this relationship there is no rivalry, no 
illegitimate “appropriation” of originality, only gracious givenness and equally gra-
cious reception, and the mimesis of the Father by the Son is so perfect that the two 
are one unoriginated nature “different inflections of love within that givenness”.28 





between the Father and the Son. The Father gives his likeness to the Son, who in per-
fect mimesis of the Father both receives that givenness and freely offers his likeness 
to the Father “and the Father imitates the Son, and the Son the Father, and so on ad 
infinitum – which is traditionally called perichoresis”.29
The mimetic “rapport interdividuel” which constitutes the Father and the Son as 
two holons is the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is both the unoriginated love - giving of the 
Son by the Father - and the mimetic reciprocation of that love by the Son who is the 
given likeness of the Father. In the perfection of the mimesis there is no distinction 
between what the Father gives the Son and what the Son gives the Father. The Son 
and the Spirit share in the unoriginated giving of the Father, except that in the Son 
and the Spirit, it is not unoriginated giving, but being given, or being the giving of 
the given. In the case of God alone the relationship described as “rapport interdi-
viduel” is itself a holon: “since it is the same unoriginated love as the holon Father 
and holon Son and is their perfect imitation”.30 The Spirit is thus a holon constituted 
by perfect unobstacled mimesis of gracious giving and receiving between the Father 
and the Son.
Between the holons there is perfection of mimesis without appropriation or rivalry. 





“[I]n God difference does not mean separation, but mutual enjoyment of the 
same by the same, so that the holons constantly foster and cherish each other in 
ever more joyous imitation rather than appropriate the given over against each 
other”.31
In order to avoid re-introducing mimetic rivalry into the Divine relationships, Alis-
on prefers the term “distinction” to describe the differentiation within the Divine 
nature, rather than “difference”, arguing that “difference” implies obstacled sharing 
leading to rivalry, while “distinction” makes possible unobstacled or pacific mimesis 
and sharing in unoriginated giving.32
Alison shares with Moltmann and Torrance, amongst many others, a concern for re-
lational notions of “person” as appropriate for constructing adequate images of the 
Trinity. Alison's unique contribution lies in founding this upon Girard's understand-
ing of the person as constituted mimetically, and in his exploration of how the per-
sons/holons of the Trinity might be conceived of in ways which give rise to a genuine 
notion of persons constituted in a mimesis of love: a giving and receiving which is 
not “over against” others. These are important gains which allow us to think in terms 
of “person” or “ubuntu” in ways not constituted by rivalry and exclusion, but purely 
upon giving and receiving. They are gains which must be preserved if we are to de-





Alison claims that his language is more adequate and less confusing than the term 
of “person”.33 However, “holon” is even more “artificial” than Barth's language of 
“ways  of  being”,  and  therefore  gives  rise  to  a  number  of  difficulties.  The  term 
“holon” has little readily accessible meaning outside of a particular academic envir-
onment. It therefore further separates any doctrine of the Trinity from genuine con-
tact with common Christian faith and praxis, leaving it evacuated of soteriological 
and missiological import for most Christians.
Further no language is entirely “value free”. The term “holon” carries overtones 
from its origins in the thought of Arthur Koestler and its current use in Systems The-
ory into its theological deployment. For Koestler,  holons are identifiable parts of a 
larger whole.34 A holon is, however, not an entity as such, but “are posited and ‘fixed’ 
only out of the relational rules and strategies that help us make sense of reality”.35 
They are therefore relational conceptualisations rather than being actual differenti-
ated structural parts of a system.
In Alison's usage, a  holon does not exist by itself but, following Oughourlian, he 
sees it as a “purely psychological entity, a structure in permanent becoming at the 
heart of continuous exchanges with other similar structures”.36 This therefore raises 
the question as to whether this language adequately guards against the collapse of the 
Trinity into an undifferentiated monad.
33 Ibid., 52.
34 Mark Edwards, “A Brief History of Holons,” n.d., 
http://www.integralworld.net/edwards13.html (Accessed 29 July, 2009).
35 Ibid.
36 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 50.
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In Alison's understanding the Father is unoriginated, the Son is like the Father in all 
things except in being unoriginated. Yet:
He is not exactly originated either, because he shares completely in the pure 
gratuitous givenness ... of the Father ... He receives it completely, because he is 
the exact image and likeness of the Father, able therefore to receive the Father, 
and, as a perfect likeness, completely reciprocate the giving.37
Volf,  commenting  on  Ratzinger's  understanding  of  the  Trinity,  argues  that 
Ratzinger's mistake is to conceive of both the self-giving of the Son and his accept-
ance of the Father's presence as being “complete”. Once the self-giving is complete, 
there is no “self” to do the giving. And once the “complete” presence of the other has 
been accepted, it is impossible to see how the complete presence of the “other” is to 
be distinguished from the one doing the accepting. The same criticism can be applied 
mutatis mutandis to Alison. Once the giving and receiving of the other is exact, per-
fect and complete, it is impossible to conceive of a differentiated self which does the 
giving and receiving. This makes it equally impossible to conceive of a differenti-
ation within the Trinity, where differentiation is necessary if there are to be any inter-
personal relationships at all. This difficulty seems inherent in the language which Al-
ison chooses to use: 
The key to this is imitation so perfect that the Other is the same. There is no 
difference between the holons, which would imply an over-against, an envious 
mimesis, but merely the distinctiveness of acceptance of the giving or the en-




The difficulty is that once the Other is the same, where is the “otherness” of the 
Other, and therefore the distinction between the model and the imitator. Thus Alison's 
Trinity is essentially modalist. The Persons revert to being “masks”, or “actors”, im-
permanent epiphenomenal manifestations of the one Divine reality rather than de-
scriptive of the Divine reality as essentially differentiated.
Without a clear sense of “person” with an ontological dimension, there are no inter-
personal relations, no differentiation, only an isolated, impersonal, monadic entity, a 
necessary being, more “the machine” than “the ghost”. There is only a “necessary” 
closed cosmos without hope or genuine redemption, simply the repetitive patterns of 
destructive mimesis and conflict played out by human actors who, without genuine 
persons with whom they might enter into unobstructed mimesis, can never become 
genuine, free, unrepeatable, unique individuals.
8.2 From Girard To Wider Theology
So far we have investigated the viability of Girard's understanding of “person” as 
formed in mimesis for an adequate account of the Trinity. Girard's thesis sees the per-
son created in a struggle which ends in self-assertion and expulsion. We have found 
that Alison, at least in his proper concern to avoid introducing a destructive mimesis 
of desire has been unable to clarify how the differentiation of persons is to be prop-
erly established, and thus how a genuine unique and free person is to be understood. 
Yet without an adequate sense of “person” in the Trinity we do not have the Trinity 
of real persons which is necessary for our context. 
254
In response to this we need to engage with other theologies from conflicted envir-
onments in order to establish a more substantial understanding of “person”. There 
are, however, important aspects of Girard's theory worth taking up as part of an un-
derstanding of the Trinity. The first of these is the understanding that a “person” is 
formed in mimesis of a prior other. This is not inconsistent with the biblical revela-
tion of the Trinity. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus speaks of “doing the works of the Fath-
er” and of “doing the Father's will”, of acting in imitation of the Father. The Spirit 
will take what is his and make it known.39 
The second point which we may subsume into any understanding of the Trinity, is 
Girard's understanding of “pacific” or unobstructed mimesis. This is a mimesis in 
which the invitation to “be like me” is not barred by the forbidding “do not be like 
me”. Persons in a relationship of unobstructed mimesis are not entrapped in a pattern 
of conflict. In order for genuine personal formation to take place, however, we shall  
have to clarify how the genuine distinctiveness of the persons is maintained without 
an expulsion. 
The third point to take forward is that a person formed without the adversarial con-
flict and expulsion generated by the double-bind must become present to and in hu-
manity in order to make a genuine and unobstructed invitation to human beings to 
“be like me”. This would entail a revelation of the roots of human constitution in 
conflict which enables and liberates human beings into new relationships. It must 
also entail a revelation of God as God genuinely is, persons in unobstructed mimesis 
39 John 16:14
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of one another and this revelation must also be an invitation to participate in the un-
obstructed mimetic relationships of the Trinity, which is also and always an act of 
grace. 
One further  point  which we need to extrapolate  from Girard's  understanding of 
Christianity and incorporate into any theology of the Trinity is his recognition that 
the revelation of God must be a revelation of grace which is known by grace.40 It is 
only by being drawn into participation in the life of the Trinity through Christ that 
human beings become truly substantial persons, no longer simply actors playing out 
the human conflicts which shape our cultures and ourselves, but genuine unrepeat-
able individuals in relationship with one another and with God: the “New Creation”. 
This is not something which can be acquired, for once we human beings seek to ac-
quire  our  own being  we  are  once  more  entrapped  in  the  patterns  of  conflictual 
mimesis. True personhood must come to us as a gift; only as that which is “given” 
without  obstruction  can  it  be  true.  Personhood  acquired,  is  personhood acquired 
through conflictual mimesis from a conflicted model. This is personhood as a mask 
or actor, a repetitive re-enactment of the conflicts and exclusion which establish our 
culture. With this in mind we continue our search for an understanding of “person” 
by examining the work of Desmond Tutu. 
8.2.1 Towards a New Ubuntu: The Theology of Desmond Tutu
We have noted that African cultures have a relational concept of “person” but that 
this concept has a number of weaknesses. One effort to express the notion of ubuntu 
in Christian terms has been made by Desmond Tutu, whose theology is characterised 
40 Barth, Church Dogmatics II.1, 27.
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by Michael Battle as an “ubuntu theology”.41 Tutu's theology has been developed in 
the context of the struggle against Apartheid in his native South Africa. His experi-
ences of that struggle and the positive and surprisingly peaceful final transformation 
of South Africa into a considerably more democratic society provides Tutu's theology 
with its  characteristic  tone of faith in  the redemptive power and purpose of God 
which he claims is both realistic and imbued with the vision of hope.42
Tutu appropriates the African idea of ubuntu as a centrepiece of his theology, draw-
ing strongly upon African traditional culture and its ideals of interdependence as a 
counterpoint to Apartheid's ideology of segregation and racial hierarchies. This is 
more, however, than ancient African cultural wisdom. It is something which is foun-
ded ultimately upon a biblical understanding derived from the narratives of creation 
and redemption. For Tutu the narrative of creation endows all humanity with the im-
age of God. It is this which gives every human being infinite worth.43
The story of redemption is also a narrative of human worth and harmony in Christ 
who was lifted up to draw “all” humanity to himself.44 Redemption also shapes the 
future of both humanity and individual human beings. One is transformed by the en-
counter with the “unknowable God” who makes the divine-self known in Christ so 
that one becomes a person in Christ. “This is the terrifying process of losing one's 
identity in order to emerge a redeemed person with respect to God and other selves”.
45 
41 Michael Battle, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland, Ohio: Pil-
grim Press, 1997).
42 Tutu, God Has a Dream, vii-viii.
43 Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, 11.
44 Tutu, God Has a Dream, 20.
45 Battle, Reconciliation, 63.
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Tutu is aware of the danger of subsuming individual identity into that of the com-
munity:46 He counters this with an emphasis upon the value of individuals and upon 
the value of diversity. Human divisions founded upon ethnicity, religion or culture 
are not relevant to the love which God has for people, neither should they be relevant 
to the love people are called to have for one another. At the same time each individu-
al is of value to God as created in the divine image. Human diversity, whether of cul-
tures or of individuals, is of immense intrinsic value, with each human and each hu-
man culture needing the differing gifts and insights of the other for full ubuntu; full 
human existence.47
Tutu uses the image of the rainbow, a sign of prosperity and peace. God's people are 
the “rainbow people” to which each diverse culture and each diverse individual con-
tributes their individual and diverse gifts.48 This “rainbow” community is thought of 
in terms of a family in which relationships cannot be renounced despite any differ-
ences or disputes. The family is characterised not by monochromatic sameness but 
by respect for diversity and the ability to differ, or even disagree while still pursuing 
the relationship of love.49 It  is  the interlinked community of diverse humanity to 
which each belongs and in which each makes a unique contribution, the “rainbow 
people” of all colours, which Tutu expresses as ubuntu and which makes the “we” of 
the true human community to which all belong by default.
46 Ibid., 52, "Alternatives to Apartheid".




Tutu's understanding of the nature of God is harmonious with that strand of Christi-
an theology which is characterised by a kenotic understanding of the nature of God 
as revealed in the Incarnation.50 For Tutu God is transcendent, and the whole com-
pany of heaven “veil their sight” as they worship in the divine presence. Yet this tran-
scendent God creates out of divine love. Tutu refers to the Rabbinic story quoted by 
Austin Farrer, which speaks of the God who “drew back the skirts of his glory to 
make a little space where he was not and there he created the world”.51 The idea of 
creation as an act of self-limitation on the part of God is a common theme in kenotic 
understandings of God.52 The “self-limitation” of God extends to a divine need for 
human beings to act in partnership with God in the divine mission.53
Tutu balances the particular and universal elements of Christianity through a focus 
on the Incarnation. Jesus is a Jew, whose religious imagination, as well as that of his  
early disciples and interpreters, is shaped by the story of Israel's election. He is “the 
Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world” which is a priestly act which is 
expressed in distinctly Jewish terms. Yet this priestly act, which takes away the sins 
of the world, is also an act of redemption which creates new ubuntu identity for all, 
in which no one culture is given pre-eminence over another. As the act of taking 
away the sins of the world it is also an act of judgement which reveals the sin in all  
50 Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” in The Work of  
Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorn (London: SPCK, 2001), 192-210.
51 Battle, Reconciliation, 59.
52 Jürgen Moltmann, “God's Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World,” in The 
Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorn (London: S.P.C.K., 2001), 145.
53 Tutu, God Has a Dream, 59-60.
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human cultures. It creates a new identity for the individual, whose full, final and true 
nature can only be known in and by Christ, rather than by the parameters of ethnic 
classifications which are ultimately contingent human creations.54
Tutu's  understanding of God is  Trinitarian.  God is  “relational”  or,  as Battle de-
scribes it, “familial”:
What God is, is what God does. God's [care] is from all eternity in which there 
is a ceaseless movement of love, an outpouring, a giving, sacrifice at the heart 
of the divine life. God gives to God the Son all of [God's] being and empties 
[the divine self] in the [love] of the Son who is coequal, coeternal with God, 
light of light, very God of very God ... all eternity returns the love and the life 
and the being that the Son receives and gives back to the Father in equal meas-
ure, emptying himself totally without remainder, always giving, always receiv-
ing, always giving without end and this movement of life, of love of being, is 
God the Holy Spirit, who binds the Father and Son and we have the eternal, in-
effable triangle of love.55
Tutu's fusion of ubuntu with kenotic imagery is an important step forward in mak-
ing the idea of  ubuntu a serviceable concept for Christian mission in Africa.  For 
Zambia, in particular, the fusion offers a vital ingredient in a Christian critique of 
political behaviour. Tutu's re-articulation of the concept of ubuntu in terms of a new 
transcendent identity in Christ created by Christ are particular gains. 
Tutu's theology is strongly shaped by his lived experience, as all praxis theologies 
are, indeed as all theology which seeks to pass beyond “mere theology” must be. His 
writings are interspersed by moving and powerful anecdotes of the experience of 
black South Africans under the appalling and demeaning oppression of Apartheid, 
54 Battle, Reconciliation, 71-73.
55 Ibid., 75.
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and illustrate how a racist world view can be deeply internalised.56 A good deal of his 
life has been dedicated to countering Apartheid, both at the level of theology/ideo-
logy and at the level of the pastoral needs of a community which has been subject to 
oppression  and  constant  humiliation.  He  has  thus  developed  a  theology  which 
grounds an affirmation of human dignity and the consequent opposition to oppres-
sion and exclusion  in  the  Christian  narrative  of  creation  and redemption,  with  a 
strong focus on developing black African consciousness and self-worth in the face of 
the ethnic and cultural supremacist ideology of Apartheid. To a large extent his theo-
logy could be defined as a “Black Theology” in the vein of James Cone. The task of 
“Black Theology” has been defined as “transforming the black condition from op-
pression to authentic humanity ... to free the black mind from those beliefs and atti-
tudes which frustrate the impulse and movement toward liberation.”57 That Tutu pur-
sues, and to a very large extent achieves, this without resorting to the denigration of 
the culture and values of White South Africans, Europeans or North Americans is 
both remarkable and indicates the depth and range of his Christian values. This, how-
ever, poses a difficulty for the commentator seeking to adapt Tutu's theology for dif-
fering contexts.
While much of what Tutu has to say is of universal relevance and needs to be adop-
ted in Lusaka, (or for that matter in Washington or London) as much as in Johannes-
burg or Cape Town, his theology cannot be directly lifted out of its formative context 
without doing it the disservice of making it “mere theology” a theoretical construc-
tion which loses its prophetic edge and power. Zambia's circumstances differ consid-
56 See for example Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, 15-19.
57 William Jones, “Assessing Black Theology,” n.d., http://www.nathanielturner.com/assessing-
blacktheology.htm (Accessed 17 May, 2010).
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erably from those of South Africa. The contestants for power in today's Zambia are 
more “equal” in power, and no form of cultural or ethnic segregation or hierarchy is 
enshrined in its constitution. In this more equal environment all groups are all the 
more open to the entrapment to which Volf points: that those who are, or claim to be, 
oppressed are not necessarily innocent of their own mimesis of desire and rivalry and 
are all too readily drawn into the mimetic cycle.
However, while showing the inevitable limitations of any good contextual theology, 
Tutu's insights still provide an important source for our development of a theology 
for Zambia. He is, for example, deeply suspicious of the tendency of all human soci-
eties to found themselves on the values of competition, rivalry and domination.58 He 
is equally well aware of the dangers of becoming entrapped in a cycle of destructive 
mimesis and “doubling” and his understanding of ubuntu involves an adoption of the 
values of forgiveness, reconciliation and service rather than a mimesis of the viol-
ence and oppression,  the desperate scramble for “kudos” which drives conflictual 
mimesis.
Social Harmony is, for us, the summum bonum – the greatest good. Anything 
that subverts or dehumanises this sought-after good is to be avoided like the 
plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive 
competitiveness, are corrosive of this good. To forgive is not just to be altruist-
ic. It is the best form of self-interest. What dehumanises you, inexorably dehu-
manises me. Forgiveness gives people resilience, enabling them to survive and 
emerge still human despite all efforts to dehumanise them.59
58 Tutu, God Has a Dream, 39.
59 Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, 35.
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Ultimately Tutu's understanding of ubuntu is therefore one of self-emptying, a com-
mitment to service carried out in a mimesis of God in Jesus Christ.60
Tutu's more recent writings contain little in the way of a specific and theological ar-
ticulation of the key Christian doctrines of Incarnation and the Trinity, although they 
are strongly implicit in his approach. This is, perhaps, inevitable. Tutu does not claim 
to be constructing anything like a systematic theology, he aims to meet the real and 
pressing needs of the moment felt by the congregations in the townships and rural 
communities of South Africa rather than to meet the very different requirements of 
the academy in its ivory towers. Even in God Has a Dream in which he has seeks to 
give “cumulative expression” to his life's work, his thought remains more contextual 
than “systematic”.61 This, however, leaves us with some work to do in order to trace 
the roots of Tutu's admittedly very satisfying concept of ubuntu and to ground it in a 
model of the Trinity. We do so by turning to one more theology developed as a re-
sponse to a conflicted society. If we can find an insight into the Trinity as an ubuntu 
community in which unity and diversity are intrinsic values and from which rivalry 
and conflict  are  absent,  then we have a path to  an available  model  for a  pacific 
mimesis for Zambia, or for that matter, elsewhere.
60 Tutu, God Has a Dream, 79, 121.
61 Ibid., ix.
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8.3 Towards an adequate understanding of the Trinity
8.3.1 Volf and Moltmann
Miroslav Volf is a Croatian Protestant theologian whose book Exclusion and Em-
brace was written in response to a question Jürgen Moltmann put to him, “Can you 
embrace a Četnik?” For Volf the Četnik was “the evil other” who had shortly before 
devastated his native Croatia. Volf wrote conscious of the profound tensions at the 
heart of Christian belief and praxis: “the tension between the message of cross and 
the world of violence”, between the desire to follow the crucified and the disinclina-
tion to either to see others crucified or be crucified oneself. The book is a product of 
his own personal and committed struggle to make sense of these tensions.62 The core 
of the book is the development of an understanding of human relations in which the 
balance between otherness and relationship is maintained. His concern is to maintain 
“inclusion”, through which the other is embraced, while at the same time maintaining 
appropriate boundaries and hence differentiation. Reading Nietzsche, he notes that 
exclusion can and does arise from a “knowledge of the good”. The “good and just” 
are those who instigate and participate in the crucifixion. He takes up Foucault in a 
similar vein: the moral and civilized self, like the good and just self, rests all too of-
ten on the exclusion of what it construes as immoral and barbarous.63 
As much as “inclusion” is necessary, the escape into “total inclusion” can be de-
structive. Some element of exclusion is necessary, for example, for a praxis of dis-
cernment and judgement, especially concerning those matters which pertain to good 
62 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 9-10.
63 Ibid., 61-62.
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and evil. “Intelligent struggle against exclusion demands categories and normative 
criteria that enable us to distinguish between repressive identities and practices that 
should be subverted and unrepressive ones that should be affirmed”.64 For Volf to 
take a stance which does not name exclusionary practice as “evil” in a final and ulti-
mate way is to descend into non-order, chaos and death.
The main thrust of Volf's resolution of the dilemma of exclusion and inclusion is a 
sustained argument in favour of “differentiation”. Differentiation, he argues, is both 
“separation-and-binding”. Separation alone ends in exclusion; binding alone ends in 
the formless chaos of non-creation. A true binding requires differentiation, a belong-
ing together of those who are different yet united. To a large extent he echoes the 
concerns of David Lochhead, who argues that distinction is actually necessary for 
true and constructive interaction. In choosing between partnership and dialogue as 
models of relationship, Lochhead argues that partnership does not maintain sufficient 
distinction. A better model is based upon the relationship between the divine and the 
human  in  Christ.  Lochhead's  model  is  essentially  incarnational.  Traditional 
Chalcedonian Christology rejects any model based either on expulsion or isolation in 
favour of a model in which the divine and human natures remain different yet open 
to the other.65 In Jesus, God and humanity are free to address and to be addressed, to 
respond in openness and love.66
64 Ibid., 63.
65 David Lochhead, The Dialogical Imperative: A Christian Reflection on Interfaith Encounter 
(Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1988), 96.
66 Ibid.
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Volf argues that a properly differentiated human identity requires connection, and 
that proper connection requires differentiation. Identity, therefore arises out of both 
the binding of identification and the separation of exclusion.67 Sin is therefore two-
edged, in Volf's view. On the one hand it is that which by violence separates those 
differentiated beings that God has joined together, an act of expulsion in which inter-
dependence is denied. On the other hand it can also be that which artificially joins or 
absorbs that which God has differentiated, marking out the different as inferior, to be 
denied the right to separate existence by being absorbed or subjugated. Both of these 
Volf sees as “exclusion”, for both ultimately exclude “otherness” or difference from 
the self or the community.68 
To achieve the balance of “differentiation” in the Godhead, Volf adopts Moltmann's 
synthesis of substantial and relational notions of “person” into an imagery of the per-
sons of the Trinity as “individual, unique, non-interchangeable subjects of the one 
common divine substance, with consciousness and will”.69 Thus each of the three 
persons are independent in as far as they are divine, but also inextricably interde-
pendent with one another. Rather than being subsistent relations, the divine persons 
“subsist in the common divine nature; they exist in their relations to one another”.70 
There can be no relationships without distinct differentiated persons between whom 
the relationships exist; neither can there be persons except in relationship to one an-
other.71
67 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 66.
68 Ibid., 66-67.
69 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 171.
70 Ibid., 173 (Italics original).
71 Ibid., 172-173.
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Volf sees the Cross as the central revelation of the Trinity. There are, he argues, two 
dimensions to the Passion: self-giving love and the creation of an interior space in 
which Christ receives humanity. The self-giving and the reception of the other are 
two essential aspects of the internal life of the Trinity. No person in the Trinity can be 
defined except  in  terms of  a  relationship of  self-giving and other-receiving.  Volf 
draws upon the notion of “perichoresis”, which he designates as “mutual interiority”. 
This mutual interiority depends in turn upon a clear sense of differentiation in order 
to prevent the concept from collapsing into a form of modalism. The Father is “in” 
the Son, the Son is “in” the Father, but the two are not identical.72 The Trinity as re-
vealed in the Son is “open”, turning towards the world; the Son and the Spirit envi-
sioned as two open arms, with which God embraces the world. This embrace results  
in the cross where, the rhythm of the dance of mutual self-giving is broken, “in the  
agony of the passion the movement stops for a brief moment and a fissure appears so 
that sinful humanity can join in”.73 In as far as the Persons receive and “make space” 
in  themselves  for  the other  this  model  is  essentially kenotic,  for  they must  each 
“empty themselves” in order that the other may have space to be.74 
Volf's model presents effective gains.  It  is only possible to conceive of genuine 
unique individuated persons if we understand that this means persons who belong in 
relationship together but who also have appropriate boundaries through which dis-
tinction is maintained. This also seems implicit in Tutu's understanding of ubuntu. In 
describing clearly both elements of what he defines as “exclusion”, on the one hand 
an act of expulsion and on the other an act of assimilation, the model of persons in 




relationship is more clearly differentiated than in Alison's model. The outcome is a 
model of the Trinity which opens the possibility of a much more diverse and comple-
mentary set of personal and ethnic relationships than is possible with Alison. 
The difficulty is that Volf does not make clear exactly how the personal differenti-
ation is to take place, although he appears to be in broad agreement with Alison that 
individuation results from a conflictual process which involves identification and re-
jection.75 To leave the Trinitiarian persons as constituted by a process of identifica-
tion and exclusion leaves the persons of the Trinity constituted exactly as human per-
sons. Volf argues that:
In the Trinity ... distinct persons are internally constituted by the indwelling of 
the other persons in them. The personal identity of each is unthinkable without 
the presence of others in each; such presence is part and parcel of the identity 
of each.76
There are a number of possible readings of Volf's argument to take into considera-
tion here. One possible way to read this is as implying that there are distinct persons, 
whose personal existence is well established logically prior to the relationships, for 
only a well-established self is sufficiently secure and stable to admit and be so open 
as to bear the internalised presence of the other without entirely collapsing or losing 
identity. This would seem to suggest a coalescence of three pre-existing entities into 
one relational community: a form of tri-theism. Another possibility is to read this as 
implying that the relationship is logically prior to the persons. The persons formed in 




leaving behind a partially-formed self, distinguished but not quite distinguished from 
the others.  This, however, would inevitably collapse back into a formless monad. 
Clearly Volf intends neither; however he does not clearly establish a balanced posi-
tion in which both are impossible.
Moltmann goes some way towards addressing this problem by arguing that neither 
the persons nor the relationship are logically prior to the other, the two are inextric-
ably connected and “arise simultaneously and together”. The Divine unity is consti-
tuted  by “perichoretic  circulation”.77 Moltmann's  understanding  of  a  “hypostatic” 
conception of a person involves an element of “substance”. The Latin term persona 
must be changed from its root meaning:
It must no longer describe the interchangeable mask as role; on the contrary it 
must describe the non-interchangeable untransferable individual existence in 
any particular case.”78
In Moltmann's understanding, while the unique and non-interchangeable persons 
have the Divine nature in common, “their particular and individual natures are de-
termined by their relationship with one another.”79 This represents some progress, but 
it still leaves open the question as to how these particular individual persons might be 
conceived as being differentiated from one another without some element of exclu-
sion.




With this in mind we now wish to propose a cross-fertilization of the models of the 
Trinity in  an effort  to retain what  we hold as valuable in Girard's  insights while 
guarding against both a collapse into modalism and any form of individuation which 
becomes entrapped in the double bind leading to a fragmentation in the Godhead. 
8.3.2 An Alternative Proposal
We begin with the hierarchical view of the Godhead attributed to Origen and held 
by the Cappodocian Fathers, which understands the Father as the origin of the God-
head.80 To understand the Father as the origin of the Trinity affirms the “ontological 
freedom” of God, offering an inherently personal and redemptive insight into the 
nature of God. If God's existence is rooted in some impersonal substance, then God 
is a “necessary being” whose nature is determined from the outset. This in turn binds 
all creation into a pre-determined and necessary existence. If the Divine Nature is, on 
the other hand, determined by the free Person of the Father, then there is hope for 
creation, because neither the nature of God nor creation is determined out of neces-
sity, but in freedom. Thus God is free to share the Divine life with creation and cre-
ation is free to participate in the life of the Trinity.81
The idea of the Father as origin of the Godhead also leads us logically to a concept 
of eternal generation. “Father” is a relational term: that is, it cannot be thought of ex-
cept in terms of “Father of someone”. This requires a “generation” or a “begetting”, 
to deploy more traditional language, not an “extrusion” or “expulsion” of the Son. It 
is a free giving, in which the Father is logically prior to, but is never without the Son, 
80 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 265.
81 Zizioulas, “Trinity Today,” 25.
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nor are the Son and the Spirit “less than” or subordinate to the Father. The hierarchy 
we are trying to elucidate is closer to what Paul Laurent and Giles Paquet refer to as  
a hierarchy of complimentarity than what is commonly thought of as a hierarchical 
structure.82
While we may conceive of the Father as “logically” prior and as “origin”, we are 
nevertheless thinking in terms of an eternal generation whereby the Father is from all 
eternity “Father” in relationship with the Son and the Spirit. Equally, we may see the 
Father as logically the origin of the Trinity, but only in as far as the Father determines 
the constitution, personal nature and oneness of the Divine being. In the perichoretic 
life each of the persons are, as Moltmann argues, equal, and in equality engage in the 
mimetic dance of love with one another. Each reflects, constitutes and freely gives 
being to and freely receives being from the other. The Father possesses divine “sub-
stance” of himself, the Son and the Spirit have it from the Father in their own indi-
vidual ways. The Father is the “'origin without origin' of the Godhead” and the divine 
hypostases of the Son and the Spirit are derived from the Father. The Father therefore 
forms the “monarchical unity” of the Godhead. Moltmann avoids “subordinationism” 
by  distinguishing  this  “monarchical  unity”  from  the  inner  life,  or  “perichoretic 
unity”, of the Trinity: “The three Persons themselves form their unity, by virtue of 
their relation to one another and in the eternal perchoresis of their love”83 In the peri-
choretic unity of the Trinity all three Persons are equal, the monarchy of the Father 
being only valid for the constitution of the Godhead.84 
82 Laurent and Paquet, “Intercultural Relations,” 179.
83 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 177.
84 Ibid., 176.
271
The Father is himself a “Person”, but without a model or rival, for there is nothing 
and no-one prior to the Father. For Alison, this is necessary in order to recognize that 
the Father is logically prior to the Son and the Spirit so that there can be a mimesis of 
gracious receiving and giving of love. All desire has its origin in the Father as “unori-
ginated love”.85 The constitution of the person of the Father cannot therefore involve 
any exclusion, either as expulsion or assimilation, for there is no prior model with 
which to identify, enter into rivalry, or expel. Since the Father determines the nature 
and constitution of the Trinity the persons of the Trinity are all determined by one 
who is without rivalry and exclusion as either expulsion or assimilation. In order for 
the other two persons to be genuinely “true God from true God, one in being with the 
Father”,  the Father must gift  his being to the other two Persons: a being without 
mimesis and rivalry. 
This gift must include “personal” being and differentiation, as well as a participa-
tion in the unoriginated nature of the Father. As a partial analogy, it is possible to 
consider the mimetic dance or “eye game” to which we alluded in an earlier chapter. 
The parent and child play a mimetic “game” in which the child is given a sense of 
“differentiation” from the parent. Neither the Father nor the Son are human children 
or parents, yet differentiation of the Son from the Father is a gift, analogous to the 
gift of differentiation and self awareness given by the parent, given by the Father in a 
careful and loving relational “dance”. It involves a mimesis between Father and Son 
and the Spirit which is eternally without rivalry or exclusion. The Son and the Spirit 
look to and imitate the Father, the Father looks to and imitates the Son and the Spirit,  
but there are always elements of differentiation introduced by the Father so that the 
85 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 51.
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Son remains the Son, the Spirit remains the Spirit and the Father remains the Father 
and none is absorbed into the other. Always and eternally the Father is the one who 
originates, giving the free gift of difference in the dance, always and eternally the 
Son receives the gift by which he becomes a true Person not a “holon” but a true 
“umuntu”: both a differentiated individual from the Father and relational to the Fath-
er. It is equally true that the Father is always and eternally a true “umuntu”. At the 
same time the Father is always the Father, never without the Son and the Spirit, al-
ways in relationship with them.
For the persons to be truly persons they must have boundaries, albeit porous bound-
aries in which the other may “step through”, in order to properly mutually indwell 
the other. This is implied in the gift of personal being. These boundaries cannot be 
established by an expulsion, they must therefore be established by a “withdrawal” or 
“making space” for the other to be differentiated. Volf and Moltmann suggest a with-
drawal or making space so as to include the “other” within the established self. What 
we propose is an extension of this. The Father, and by mimesis the Son and the Spir-
it, must also withdraw to an extent in order for other persons to have “space to be” 
“outside” of the other, that is to be a differentiated person. This element may well be 
implicit in Volf and Moltmann, however in their proper concern to establish peri-
choresis and to avoid a fragmentation into tri-theism it does not seem to be made en-
tirely explicit. The logic of their argument, however, would suggest that perichoresis 
depends upon a clear individuation. 
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It may well be possible to argue from the point of view of Girard that what we sug-
gest catches the Trinitarian relationships in the double-bind of “imitate” and “do not 
imitate me”. For it would seem that in withdrawing from the other each must forbid 
the other some element of themselves.  However,  this  is  not necessarily the case. 
Rather, the withdrawal is part of the gift of participation in the free personal being of 
the other. It is an essential part of the gift. It is both an act of empowerment and, as 
all acts of true empowerment must be, an act of “kenosis” in order that the differenti-
ation of the persons is not overwhelmed. As such, it is an essential part of the “imit-
ate me”, in that mimesis must be a mimesis of a free person who has freely determ-
ined to give personal being. In turn, the Son and the Spirit freely accept the gift of the 
personal nature, including the gratuitous gift of their differentiation. In their kenosis 
they are not locked into a rivalry through appropriation of personal being as their 
own, or through an over-identification which ends in exclusion. Once it is understood 
that personal differentiation is given and accepted as a gift, then it becomes possible 
to conceive, however imperfectly, of a personal nature that is constituted without ex-
pulsion, constituted gratuitously in a manner which includes the gift of differenti-
ation, of “personal space”, to deploy a popular phrase. 
The Son and the Spirit are given “space” for personal being both within the Father 
and as differentiated persons in the way that the Father withdraws himself in order to  
give them individuation. The Son and the Spirit both in their own unique ways re-
ceive this as a gift. In turn the Son and the Spirit act in mimesis of one another and of 
the Father, thus allowing the Father to exist “within” them and also creating space for 
the  Father  to  exist  as  differentiated  with  truly personal  being.  The mimesis  is  a 
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mimesis without any form of conflict or rivalry, for there is no conflict or rivalry to  
imitate: the Father does not cling to being, nor does He become the forbidding ad-
versary to the Son and Spirit. Therefore it is the mimesis of perfect love in which all  
give each the freedom to be, each welcomes and receives the others as “mutually in-
dwelling” so that there is neither over-identification, nor expulsion, the three are dif-
ferent, but one. The unity of the Trinity consists, as Moltmann argues, in perichoretic 
circulation. In this perichoresis three genuine persons, constituted by giving and re-
ceiving the gift of individuation, mutually indwell each other and in mimesis mutu-
ally reveal or “represent” each other so that each is present both substantially and mi-
metically in the other. 
The individuation of the persons in the Trinity involves a costly withdrawal, a “ken-
osis” in which the “space” in which the other may be different is created. There is 
also a sense in which the receiving of individuation is costly, for each person must 
relinquish something in order to receive the gift of differentiation: a kenosis in which 
the persons empty themselves in order to receive the gift of true personhood. The 
hymn Paul quotes in his letter to the Philippians offers something of a paradigmatic 
pattern. Christ Jesus “empties himself” and through the self-emptying and humili-
ation of his most abased death is given the “name above every name”.86 The Cross 
and Resurrection do not just  reveal something about human victimisation,  nor do 
these events only reveal something about God. They reveal and issue from the very 
depth  of  the  kenotic  nature  of  the  Divine  Trinity.  The  Father  gives  the  Son the 
greatest and most terrible gift of individuation, relinquishing the Son to freedom and 
differentiation, even to the point of forsakenness, in order that the Son may become 
86 Philippians 2:5-11
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the truly risen Person. The Son, relinquishing himself in his relationship with the 
Father to the point of being forsaken, receives this gift in pain and humility, the gift  
of true risen and Divine personhood, the name above every name.87 In this view the 
Incarnation, the Cross and the Resurrection arise from within the fundamental nature 
of God, rather than being a divine “emergency response” to creation's plight.88
To a degree this gift of freedom and differentiation is also apparent in creation. Ar-
thur Peacock argues that creation as understood in modern science is consistent with 
a view of God as creator.89 He argues that the creative activity of God can be seen in 
the processes by which the cosmos has come into existence as described by the sci-
ences. This involves, however, a recognition that God allows creation a certain ele-
ment of “autopoiesis”: “God gives existence in divinely-created time to a process 
that itself brings forth the new”.90 This gives creation an element of genuine freedom, 
and genuine distinction from God. It is the creative action of God which is identified 
in the process of creation, not the Divine self. The freedom granted, the “risk” taken, 
the joy and the suffering entered into in this act of creation, truly allows creation to 
be creation.  The alternatives would be an over-identification which amounts to a 
form of pantheism, some vision of creation as a non-entity, as a puppet manipulated 
according to Divine Providence or an over-separation which would expel God en-
tirely from the process of creation, essentially Deism or Gnosticism. The platform 
Peacock builds for his reflection on the costly suffering of God in creation and re-
87 The core of this idea was developed in a private conversation with Prof. Drew Gibson.
88 David Runcorn, Choice, Desire and the Will of God: What More Do You Want? (London: 
SPCK, 2003), 1-3.
89 Arthur Peacock, “The Cost of New Life,” in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John 
Polkinghorn (London: SPCK, 2001), 21-42.
90 Ibid., 23.
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demption is one which fits well with Volf''s concept of creative separation and bind-
ing. Creation is separated from God, yet in its difference from the Divine is bound to 
God in the relationship of creation and creator. 
A third important element comes into view here. Humanity is formed through mi-
metic rivalry and it seems from Girard's account that conflict and victimization are 
inevitable and unchangeable parts of human existence. Walter Wink rightly identifies 
ancient myths as portraying a certain inevitability to an hierarchical society founded 
upon violence.91 The myths project this onto the cosmos in the form of a violent sup-
pression of the forces of chaos. Alison argues that the revelation of Genesis, partial as 
it may be, read again in the fuller light of the Resurrection shows a creation which is  
ex nihilo and without violence.92 In these revelations we are confronted with the God 
who  is  prior  to  us,  with  persons-in-relationship  who  are  not  formed  in  mimetic 
rivalry but in the mimesis of love in kenosis. This God calls and entices us through 
the Incarnation into this same mimesis, into “the terrifying process of losing one's 
identity in order to emerge a redeemed person with respect to God and other sel-
ves”.93 There is therefore nothing inevitable about conflict and exclusion; they are 
neither inherent in creation nor are they an inevitable part of the transcendent destiny 
of creation. 
The fourth element of this understanding of the persons of the Trinity is that God is  
constituted in  grace.  The giving and receiving of  personal  being  is  gratuitous.  It 
arises in origin from the will and choice of the Father who gratuitously, and without 
91 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 15.
92 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 97.
93 Battle, Reconciliation, 63.
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any compulsion, gives personal being to the Son and Spirit. Each person therefore 
comes into being through a mimesis of grace which is inherently unobstructed and 
pacific.
The "coming down" from heaven to earth of the person who is formed in kenosis, is 
the goal of the whole history of salvation: God came into the world so as to make hu-
man beings, created in the image of God, live with one another and with God in the 
kind of communion in which Divine persons live.94 This has Christological implica-
tions. In Jesus we are confronted with the person of the Son made incarnate. The 
meaning of the hypostatic union of the two natures must involve yet another element 
of separation and binding whereby God gives the gift of the divine self in the person 
of the Son and yet at the same time “makes space” for true humanity to exist with in-
tegrity in a relationship in which neither is absorbed into the other yet in which both 
are united in one person. 
In Jesus we are confronted with a Person who is formed entirely without the exclu-
sion which so shapes human life. Alison is properly concerned to avoid anything 
which suggests that  the human nature of Jesus is  so confounded with the divine 
nature that the example of Jesus becomes obstacled. So it is necessary to maintain 
that at the same time this confronts us with a genuine human being who has a human 
desire, a human will formed in relationship with that which is logically prior to him 
but formed in a non-rivalistic mimesis “which is in principle a possibility for us” 
once it is revealed to us.95 This entails that we are formed as the “new creation” in 
mimesis of the presence of the Father in the Son, and all that this implies in terms of 
94 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 181.
95 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 55.
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the divine mimesis of love. If this were not so, then there would be the double-bind 
of “be like me/do not be like me” for we would be called into a non-rivalistic mimes-
is, a life “in Christ”, which would be in principle impossible for us, and thus would 
have no real concrete redemptive implication. This returns us to the thought that the 
Incarnation involves a “subversion from within” of what it is to be human. 
8.4 Some Conclusions
In this chapter we have explored a number of concepts which may offer a way for-
ward for Zambia. The usual prescriptions of democracy and development, while pro-
foundly important to stability in any nation, do not alone offer a sustainable way for-
ward. Zambia's tensions are rooted in conflictual mimesis. While any improvement 
in living standards for Zambia is, in general terms, a good in itself, neither abundance 
nor scarcity directly dispel or cause conflictual mimesis. This became clear in the 
earlier chapters of this work where we saw that while there has never been any genu-
ine scarcity of land, nevertheless conflictual mimesis has occurred in Zambia with 
land as a focus. One only needs to reflect that in other countries in the region there 
are potentially abundant valued resources - diamonds, oil and gas in Angola, dia-
monds, gold and other desired minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo – yet, 
despite their abundance, these resources, and the vast wealth they have generated, 
have fuelled rather than prevented conflict. Democracy, too, has its own problems, 
and while it must be part of any resolution in conflicted societies it cannot stand 
alone. Other societies, like Northern Ireland, have operated a passing semblance, at 
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the very least, of democracy, but have, nevertheless, been highly conflicted societies. 
At the heart of Zambia's tensions lie human relationships; relationships between situ-
ated persons. 
In order to seek an insight into these relationships, into how they might be reshaped 
more adequately in the image of God, we have explored the concept of “person” as 
person-in-relationship,  and  focused  on  an  African  insight  into  the  concept  of 
“person”. We concluded that the idea of “person” needs to be drawn into an insight 
into person-in-relationship which is outside of human conflict. In doing so we have 
come to propose an understanding of the Trinity as persons-in-relationship who exist 
as both differentiated and mutually indwelling persons in a mimetic dance in which 
identity is given and received as a gift. At the very heart of this dance lies a kenosis, 
a self-emptying which issues in creation and redemption, in the Cross and Resurrec-
tion which lie at the very heart of the Divine Trinity. In the following chapter we 
wish to draw out a little of the meaning of this for the Church in Zambia today.
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9 Ubuntu in The Mission of the Church
Over the course of this work we have carried out an exploration into the conflicted 
aspects of Zambian life and developed a theological response to that particular con-
text. In order to be a properly contextual theology, and to match Schreiter's criteria 
our theology must be capable of giving rise to a new and reshaped praxis for the 
Zambian Church as it engages in mission in and to Zambia. Our concern is not just 
for the life of the Church in itself but rather that the witness and worship of the 
Church becomes what David Lochhead calls a missiology “for the world”.1 The most 
appropriate response which the Church in Zambia can make is to offer a mimesis of 
Christ which is itself a call to a mimesis, to be “imitators of me as I am of Christ”  
without obstacle.2 Thus our purpose in this chapter is to offer some brief indications 
of how the Church in Zambia might offer this mimesis of Christ together with some 
of the issues and questions connected with this missiological task. We begin with a 
brief examination of the life of the Church in Zambia today.
9.1 Church Praxis in Zambia.
In comparison to European Christianity the Zambian Church is a very new com-
munity; the main missionary advance, given impetus by Livingstone's death in 1873, 
began  around  1880.3 As  a  European  foundation  the  Church  remained,  for  many 
1 Lochhead, The Dialogical Imperative, 96.
2 1 Corinthians 11:1
3 Taylor, Christians of the Copperbelt; The Growth of the Church in Northern Rhodesia., 2.
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years, European in character and has only slowly developing an indigenous leader-
ship.4 Even today the main churches remain strongly influenced by Western culture 
and Western Christianity.5 
The Church, therefore, has not yet permeated local culture to the same extent that 
Christianity has permeated European culture. This leaves Zambia open to shallow 
and “a-cultural” versions of Christianity. The most pervasive form of Christianity in 
popular urban culture is that of the North American tele-evangelist. The only ground 
based alternative to the government TV station,  Z.N.B.C., is Trinity Broadcasting 
Network (hereafter T.B.N.), the influence of this form of Christianity is almost uni-
versal in the urban areas. One often finds upon entering Zambian homes where there 
are TV sets that they are tuned in to T.B.N., often for several hours in the day. The 
vacuous nature of the material broadcast by T.B.N., with its emphasis on “miracles”, 
“prosperity  gospel”,  raw  showmanship  and  constant  appeals  for  donations,  does 
nothing to address any of the real needs of Zambian society and makes no appropri-
ate effort to engage with local culture. Instead it portrays the lifestyles of its wealthy 
and largely North American supporters, hosts and performers. Those Zambians, like 
Nevers Mumba, who have adopted the teaching and habits of their North American 
models have themselves become pale mimetic representations of their North Americ-
4 Ibid., 21.
5 One Roman Catholic Bishop is an Irish SMA missionary, with many European missionary 
priests Two of five Anglican Bishops have degrees from English universities, while two more 
have degrees from the essentially Western environment of South Africa. The Anglican Semin-
ary relied heavily on European staff until 2008. The UCZ trains all its clergy through a pro-
gramme designed in and validated from South Africa, while the Brethren remain overly reliant 
upon expatriate missionaries. 
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an counterparts, living the “blessed” life of wealth and access to power. Such Chris-
tianity offers only “opium for the people”, encouraging rather than subverting preda-
tion and mimetic conflict.
The outcome of the slow pace of inculturation and the anaesthetic effect of tele-
evangelism means that many Zambians seem to live in religiously parallel worlds, 
which neither touch nor mutually indwell one another. People acknowledge and prac-
tice some form of Christianity while at the same time they are shaped by African Tra-
ditional Religions, as evidenced by the popularity, not to say wealth, of many “tradi-
tional” healers and herbalists,6 and the real fear which anything resembling witch-
craft generates. Others, usually belonging to one of the many Pentecostalist tradi-
tions, have turned away from their culture altogether, rejecting completely most as-
pects of their culture as “Satanic”.7 While this happens at the level of conscious de-
cision one suspects that African culture still retains a powerful grip at a less obvious, 
and more potent, level.
9.2 Towards A praxis of Contextualisation
The Church has the opportunity to engage with Zambian cultural life. The history 
of mission in Zambia has left the Church in a position to build an effective and genu-
inely contextual out-reach. There are Christian communities, old mission stations and 
medical  centres  in  even  the  remotest  rural  regions.  During  the  Protectorate  the 
Church played an important role in the provision of education. It remains an import-
6 Some traditional healers for example, can afford expensive regular advertisements in the na-
tional press and have their “clinics” in relatively high rent locations in Lusaka.
7 A good deal of Zambian ambivalence about Christianity and African tradition was apparent at a 
conference entitled Christianity and Culture held at the Pentecostal Transafrica Theological 
College in Kitwe in 2007 at which the writer presented a short paper.
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ant agent in the provision of basic health care, and in social and economic develop-
ment. Throughout the history of both Northern Rhodesia and Zambia the Church has 
played an honourable and constructive role in promoting social and political change. 
The  declaration  that  Zambia  is  a  “Christian  Nation”,  whatever  its  ambivalences, 
gives the Church an influential role within current society. Tele-evangelist Nevers 
Mumba spent a short, if profoundly unsuccessful, time as Vice-President.8 Presidents 
are invited to, and attend, significant church services9 and it is not unknown for gov-
ernment to seek to co-opt the support of the Church for government programs.10 The 
Church is therefore in the position to make a positive contribution to the common life 
of Zambia, to influence public policy debates and to offer insights which will give 
people the resources to become genuinely free and unique persons - if it can make an 
effective effort at contextualisation.
A praxis of contextualisation involves the subversion of a culture from within. Its 
model is the Incarnation through which the Gospel becomes embodied in a com-
munity and its culture,  but must also re-shape that community around the pacific 
mimesis of Christ.11 Like the scribe trained for the Kingdom, the practitioner of con-
textualisation brings out treasures old, in the form of cultural meaning systems, and 
treasures  new, in  the shape of  the  revelation  of  the Good News.12 Both  must  be 
present and both must indwell and appropriately shape one another. 
8 “BBC NEWS | Africa | Zambian leader sacks his deputy,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3715032.stm (Accessed 4 September, 2009); “BBC NEWS | 
Africa | From TV evangelist to Zambia's vice president,” n.d., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2956122.stm (Accessed 4 September, 2009).
9 President Mwanawasa, for example, attended the consecration of the Anglican Bishops of 
Northern Zambia and Luapula at Copperbelt University in Kitwe.
10 This writer took exception to the Deputy Minister for the Copperbelt claim that the Church was 
giving uncritical support to Government programmes.
11 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 454.
12 Matthew 13:5
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Miroslav Volf argues that Christians, like Abraham, must make a “departure” from 
their culture of origin. This involves the complex relationship of “critical distance” 
from one's own culture which in turn requires a proper judgement upon evil as it oc-
curs in every culture. This arises not through fleeing from culture and the cutting of 
all ties, neither does it come some form of multiple cultural personality. Instead it 
emerges from the act of giving allegiance to God within the context of one's culture.13 
Thus the Church is not some isolated sect. In response to the Gospel Christians “have 
stepped, as it were, with one foot outside their own culture while with the other re-
maining firmly planted in it. They are distant, and yet they belong. Their difference is  
internal to the culture”.14
An integration of both distance and belonging is therefore necessary; one requires 
the other if there is be neither a collapse into an amorphous whole nor a fragmenta-
tion into the isolation of fissiparous and rivalrous sects. This is true to the meaning of 
ubuntu and of those African proverbs to which we alluded in a previous chapter. Hu-
man beings are only human beings within cultural order. The Christian is called to be 
“salt” and “light”; that is to be a “subversive” person, participating in the mission of 
God to redeem cultures. However, a Christian can only be a subversive person from 
within human culture. 
What is proposed is a dialogical and incarnational approach in which Zambians 
“depart” from their own culture without leaving, become “different” without being 
“outside” or “beyond”. They “indwell” their culture as Christians. This is the Christi-
an calling to participation in the redemptive mission of God in Christ. This is not 
13 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 39-40.
14 Ibid., 49 (italics original).
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done in individualistic isolation any more than any other aspect of human existence. 
It is done only in the new ubuntu of the Church within which people are called to live 
redeemed and redemptive relationships; live the mimesis of Christ. In what follows 
we propose to examine two significant areas in which the Church has an opportunity 
to practice the mission of subversion. 
The first of these involves an engagement with the rituals of modern African cul-
ture. Rituals mark crucial points in human life, birth, coming of age, marriage, death. 
These rituals give our humanity its particular cultural form, making us members of a 
particular people whose story is told in the rituals. The difficulty, we have already 
seen, is that the rituals are all mis-recognitions, concealing the full truth of the expul-
sions and murders at very foundation of our cultures. The Church has its own rituals, 
which have a revelatory and redemptive purpose. We will focus particularly on the 
ritual of the Eucharist.
9.2.1 The Eucharist as “Subversive Memory”
Human institutions remain ambivalent, and no-one familiar with the politics of any 
Anglican Province would ever consider that the Church is exempt from falling back 
into the mimesis of rivalry and conflict. The Church, however, retains the memory of 
the sacrifice of Christ, the Eucharist, at the very heart of its life. The modern ecumen-
ical concern with the concept of “anamnesis”15 indicates that the Eucharist bears a 
close resemblance to the ritual that accompanies myth in any human culture. Myths 
are recounted in ceremonies through which the myth is "lived". The sacred events are 
15 “Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry (Faith and Order Paper no. 111, the "Lima Text"),” n.d., 
http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-commissions/faith-and-order-commis-
sion/i-unity-the-church-and-its-mission/baptism-eucharist-and-ministry-faith-and-order-paper-
no-111-the-lima-text.html (Accessed 11 September, 2009).
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re-enacted in a way surpassing bare commemoration. Time itself is transcended, and 
one becomes contemporary with the sacred events, present before the Supernatural 
actors. One enters the mythic time, witnessing the divine works, re-learning their cre-
ative lessons.16 
Commenting on the resurrection scene set in the garden in John’s Gospel, Alison 
notes that the garden setting evokes the creation. “Here is something quite clear: we 
have a foundational scene of origin in reverse, in which the victim is uncovered and 
given back in order to permit a new sort of foundation that does not depend on a cov-
er-up”.17 The Eucharist is the ritual through which time is transcended and the Chris-
tian community enters this “foundational scene in reverse” in order to become “re-
tied” to one another and to God.
This structural similarity means that ritual of the Eucharist,  like the texts of the 
Scriptures, is a subversion of myth and ritual. The Eucharist does not enact a delu-
sion in which the founding events are distorted and unrecognized but rather reveals 
the reality of the self-giving of Jesus and thus the painful truth of the foundation of 
human culture and identity. In the Eucharist we do not enter into the story of Jesus 
ourselves, as if it was something which we could appropriate, rather we receive as 
gift incorporation into the life of the Divine Trinity.18 As Christ is received in the 
Eucharist each communicant becomes, in Volf's phrase, “an ecclesial person”:19 one 
who is drawn back into the events of the Cross, into the mimesis of God in Christ, 
one who receives identity and differentiation as a gift and also to whom all the other 
16 Eliade, Myth and Reality, 19.
17 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 77.
18 Torrence, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 6.
19 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 129.
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members of the community are internal. Thus the “Catholic Personality” is a reflec-
tion of the Trinity, as each person of the Trinity is differentiated yet mutually interior 
to the other so it is for each ecclesial or catholic person.20 This is not a dissolution of 
one into a formless all, but on a differentiation in which one is “in” the other as all  
are “in” Christ, yet each is maintained in their own identity. It is this that keeps alive 
the pacific mimesis of Christ in the Church, maintaining both the members of the 
community and the whole community in its identity given in Christ in the midst of its 
own human reality.
The ubuntu community of the Church's proclamation of the gift of God is therefore 
an inclusive community of Christ. Here the African forms of address to others - “my 
father”, “my mother”, “my brother”, “my sister” - have genuine meaning as from all 
and to all. The true extended family is all  abantu. At the same time the community 
affirms the identity of the person as one who has been given the gift of genuine dif-
ferentiation, a genuine individual umuntu, gifted for and in his or her differentiation 
from other abantu.  Without this individuality there can be no relationship, no com-
munity,  no  ubuntu.  All  this  is  collectively  celebrated  and  received  in  the  ritual 
through which the community “remembers” its foundation, the ritual to subvert all 
ritual: the Eucharist. 
As we receive our identity in Christ, so we are received in Christ. God in Christ 
gives the divine self to us and makes space in the Divine life for us,21 and we are 
called and enabled to give ourselves and to receive Christ within us. In turn, we too 
must enter into relationships of mutual receiving and self-giving with those created 
20 Ibid., 51.
21 Ibid., 126, 129.
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others with whom we share the world. This applies to all relationships which may be 
categorised as relationships with any other. In order to live in peace with one another 
we as individuals,  as communities.  ethnic groups or nation states must recognise 
ourselves  as  receiving  identity,  and  as  being  affirmed  in  the  particularity  of  our 
selves, while learning to “make space” for the identity of others. 
9.2.1.1 Subverting Ritual
An important part of the missionary engagement of the Church will involve a sub-
version of older cultural rituals which define and transmit the identity of communit-
ies.  These  older  rituals  must  be  brought  into  a  redemptive  engagement  with  the 
rituals through which the anamnesis of the self-giving of Jesus is enacted. Through 
the transformation of the rituals whereby a culture identifies itself, and expresses its 
foundation in the misrecognition of the Single Victim Mechanism, the culture itself 
can be gently but effectively subverted from within. 
Zambia has had its share of creative practitioners in this respect. Mabel Shaw, a 
London Missionary Society (hereafter L.M.S.) missionary teacher in the early 20th 
century at Mbereshi carried, out an unusual and challenging experiment in incultura-
tion.
Mabel Shaw created a school for girls based on traditions from African village 
life and an English boarding school. Regarding the school as a 'tribe in mini-
ature', living a life centred round an invisible Chief .... Worship at the school 
developed an idiosyncratic style as, under Shaw’s direction, the tradition of a 
Free Church chapel combined with ritual taken from everyday life in the Cent-
ral African bush.22
22 Julia Allen, “Mabel Shaw's Theology in the Context of Her Work as a Christian Missionary 
Teacher in Northern Rhodesia 1915--1940,” Feminist Theology 16, no. 2 (January 1, 2008): 
199.
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This effort at inculturation, allowing Christian and African traditional rituals to im-
pact upon one another, had considerable effect. The school was considered highly 
successful, and Shaw herself received an OBE for her work.23 The local governing 
body of the Church emerging from the mission commissioned a group to write a re-
port  on evangelism and spiritual nurture.  The report  shows the deep influence of 
Shaw's ideas and language, language never before seen in L.M.S. documents.24 She 
became a trusted confidante to many young Zambian women and most importantly 
her work influenced many ordinary and extraordinary Zambian women, like Kenneth 
Kaunda's wife Betty.25 Her efforts at inculturation and the written reflections based 
upon them leads Julia Allen to the assessment that:
Her radical thought on issues surrounding Christian spirituality had implica-
tions for the Christian movement as it became an agent of change in Central 
Africa.26
If the Church in Zambia today is to continue to be an agent for change, contributing 
effectively to building a true ubuntu community out of what is currently a highly 
conflicted society then it must be receptive to African culture and find ways in which 
the practice exemplified in the work of Mabel Shaw can be revived and renewed in 
Modern Zambia. The myths and rituals through which the distinctiveness of human 
cultures is maintained only by a concealed exclusion must be reshaped so that dis-






9.2.2 Towards Ubuntu Leadership in Zambia
The second focus we wish to take for our suggestions for a missionary praxis is 
leadership. Throughout the history of the Church, leadership and the Eucharist have 
been inextricably entangled.  The Church's leadership quickly became the point at 
which the historical and revelatory nature of the Gospel was preserved in the face of 
the clear danger that it would be transmuted into one more myth, one more mis-re-
cognition, by gnosticism.27 Thus the ritual of the Eucharist was preserved as a “sub-
versive memory” rather than a deluded memory.  The Church's understanding and 
praxis  of  leadership  can  therefore  never  be  separated  from the  revelatory events 
which the ritual remembers. Leadership in the Church must thus always reflect the 
grace and enable the pacific mimesis through which human beings become true indi-
viduals.
9.2.2.1 Hierarchy and Complementarity
We have seen that in Zambia leadership has taken the form of predation and con-
flictual mimesis. The identities of the contestants are appropriated through conflict 
and are fluid mimetic representations of the identity of those who were “logically pri-
or”, the previous ruling party or President. Each new incumbent has become an inter-
changeable actor filling a role in the mythic cycle. This has maintained conflictual in-
stability and exclusionary praxis at the heart and focus of a national identity which is 
itself precarious and exclusionary. Society is ill at ease with itself, groups and indi-
viduals take on identities which are also fluid and interchangeable roles, shaped by 
27 Irenaeus III.3,4 in James Stevenson, A New Eusebius 117..
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the seemingly inevitable mythic cycle. Zambia therefore needs a praxis of leadership 
which builds structures and habits within society which generate the dynamics of 
separation and binding through which people receive genuine ontological identities. 
Noting that many people prefer to live in environments in which they are surroun-
ded by others of similar ethnicity Laurent and Paquet explore the idea of social “en-
capsulation”: mechanisms which create both physical and social separation between 
groups. These range from the enforced segregation of Apartheid to more voluntary 
arrangements such as the Swiss cantons, each with their own separate cultural, lin-
guistic and ethnic identity. Alongside encapsulation they suggest mechanisms of re-
distribution whereby it is ensured that power, wealth and other social and economic 
goods are redistributed amongst separate ethnic communities. In conjunction, these 
two mechanisms create “social distance and hierarchy”. Hierarchy does not involve a 
domination of one by the other but rather is conceived in terms of complementarity.28 
This entails a recognition of the permissible and essential otherness of the other. 
The idea of a hierarchy of complementarity represents  a positive gain which is 
clearly harmonious with the concept of Trinity which we have proposed as the root 
model for human relationships. Their idea of encapsulation, is however, redolent of 
notions of a separation in which there is no real “binding”, but at best a form of “am-
icable divorce”, which when combined with the notion of “redistribution” suggests a 
carefully equitable division of the marital property. It might well be as much as one 
could expect, at least as a temporary measure, in highly conflicted societies. The sug-
gestion seems to promote a mutual agreement to live in the absence, or at best only in 
28 Laurent and Paquet, “Intercultural Relations,” 179.
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the remote presence of the other, like Jacob and Esau,29 but it lacks a sense of mutual 
empowerment and interiority. The accompanying redistribution of social goods may 
well  mitigate  tensions  consequent  upon this  partial  reconciliation,  but  cannot  do 
away with them altogether.  It  is  hard to see how one could prevent the situation 
arising whereby each will accuse the others of distorting or taking undue advantage 
of any redistribution or of receiving more than a fair share, which is what appears to 
have happened during the Kaunda régime. The danger that the whole arrangement 
will collapse into a mimetic crisis is even more acute in a situation where any redis-
tribution has to address a prior imbalance.30
In arguing the  case  that  the  British  legal  system should  offer  some element  of 
“space to be” to both Islamic and Orthodox Jewish systems of jurisprudence, Arch-
bishop Rowan Williams envisions a differentiation in which there is a plurality of 
identifiable communities.31 He maintains that states can, and do, recognize and “give 
space” to alternative identities, even those which dissent from the official identity. He 
argues that the function of the law in society is  to secure the freedom of groups 
which dissent from the “official” religious and cultural identity the freedom to act ac-
cording to the precepts of their own specific culture or religion.32 This could mean 
the right to refrain from the practices of wider society on the grounds of religious or  
other cultural scruples, or to carry out certain actions not necessarily approved by 
29 Gen 33:1-15
30 Something of this is apparent in the accusations common amongst European settlers in Aus-
tralia that “Aboriginal people get more than their fair share of social resources”, amongst 
White South Africans who resent the “Black Empowerment” programmes, North American 
Whites who object to “positive discrimination”, or the language of the British National Party 
which complains that” ethnic British” people are disadvantaged by race relations laws. 
31 “The Archbishop of Canterbury - Archbishop's Lecture - Civil and Religious Law in England: a 
Religious Perspective,” February 7, 2008, http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (Ac-
cessed 19 June, 2009).
32 Ibid.
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wider society on the grounds of religious or cultural obligations. In order for this to 
be possible Williams advocates a type of “hierarchical” structure in which a plurality 
of  overlapping jurisdictions  is  recognized within  an over-arching structure  which 
protects the rights of members of dissenting groups to access all the rights and bene-
fits granted to all citizens. 
[T]he situation should not arise where membership of one group restricted the 
freedom to live also as a member of an overlapping group, that (in this case) 
citizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the abandoning of reli-
gious discipline, any more than religious discipline should deprive one of ac-
cess to liberties secured by the law of the land, to the common benefits of secu-
lar citizenship – or, better, to recognise that citizenship itself is a complex phe-
nomenon not  bound up with any one level  of  communal  belonging but  in-
volving them all.33
What Williams proposes is a mutual indwelling and belonging which neither expels 
nor  assimilates  individuality on the basis  of  differentiation.  Identity is  given and 
made secure within a structure. The hierarchical arrangement is a logical hierarchy 
within which all forms of belonging are equal as well as different. There are elements 
of the sort of Trinitarian thought which we have been proposing in his argument. 
This is a pattern towards leadership in Zambia should move the nation. This in turn 
involves the leadership in a changing their patterns of behaviour to take up what 
Laurent and Paquet term “renouncement”.
33 Ibid.
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9.2.2.2 The Praxis of Leadership
Laurent and Paquet draw the idea of renouncement from Girard's work. They argue 
that it is not a mechanism which has been used in the circumstances of inter-cultural 
tension, being “most utopian”. Nevertheless Girard's renouncement is proposed as a 
feature of a “civil theology” in combination with what they term “encapsulation” and 
redistribution of social goods.34
It is highly debatable that “renouncement” is quite as “utopian” as they suggest. 
Robert Bates argues that the “predatory behaviour” of African leader creates instabil-
ity. Stable political order occurs when the élites refrain from predation and instead 
use their power to create the security within which the wider population may gener-
ate wealth. The pay-offs are less immediate than the wholesale looting of state re-
sources, but the gains over the longer term are greater.35 As much as there is an ele-
ment of self-interest in act of restraint on the part of a political élite it nevertheless 
also involves an element of exchanging rivalry and exclusion for mutuality and inter-
iority. This is, in essence, a form of renunciation, however imperfect it may be in 
practice.
In similar vein, Ghani and Lockhart argue that “The true legitimacy of the sover-
eign government, which arises from the empowering of the populace, is not a matter 
of an “ought”: it is a matter of an “is””.36 States work in as far as they “create space” 
and offer the gift of security and identity to the citizen. The state and the powerful 
within the state “withdraw” their power and act gratuitously to empower the citizen. 
34 Laurent and Paquet, “Intercultural Relations,” 177.
35 Bates, When Things Fell Apart, 15-29.
36 Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 22.
295
States in which the leadership does not practice some form of renunciation or self-
limitation are liable to collapse into a formless chaos in which identity disintegrates 
as internal security collapses, and communities fragment into gangs of the violent 
and careless whose very fragile and temporary identity is founded only upon exclu-
sion.
Corne Bekker argues that there is an “emerging paradigm of leadership [which] has 
helped South Africans begin to think of leadership as something that is done in com-
munity rather than through a privileged individual.”37 Bekker,  making a synthesis 
between ubuntu and kenosis, argues that:
...ubuntu and kenosis find common ground in the value of mutuality, where the 
wall of separation between leader and follower is removed as they locate and 
redefine one another in their common humanity and so set in motion a renewed 
ethical movement that facilitates the (re)building of a just and caring society.38
Bekker's understanding of ubuntu is too uncritical, nevertheless adding an appropri-
ate critical dimension to  ubuntu of the sort which we have proposed would deepen 
rather than seriously undermine the concept. His proposal is for precisely that form 
of leadership which would tend to build the hierarchy of complementarity for which 
we have argued above.




9.2.2.3 Modelling an Alternative: Church Leadership
Zambia  has  followed a  strongly centralised  and hierarchical  pattern  of  political 
leadership. All power flows through the office of the President and all political de-
cisions ultimately lie with him. This is a pattern which is repeated throughout Zambi-
an society. Observing Anglican diocesan offices one gets the distinct impression that 
little gets decided or acted upon until the bishop is present. This pattern of centralisa-
tion and hierarchy is not necessarily one a particular bishop has wished upon himself. 
It is part of the mimetic pattern of any Zambian organisation, and one finds it in gov-
ernment offices and small businesses as much as in Diocesan Offices. Within the 
Church it is a pattern found in the UCZ, even in the Pentecostal Churches, which 
claim not to have the same hierarchical forms of leadership. The Church needs to ex-
amine its patterns of leadership. Instead of become mimetic representations of polit-
ical leadership in wider society the Church must offer an alternative ubuntu model of 
leadership as part of its lived missiological engagement with wider society. Church 
models will need to be based on the ideas of kenosis and service which we have 
already described.
9.2.3 Some Conclusions
We have examined the way in which our “redeemed” notion of ubuntu,  can make 
some impact on the life of Zambia through a praxis of contextualisation which in-
volves a “departure” from one's culture of origin “without leaving”, an indwelling of 
culture as a Christian, whose very participation in culture is shaped by distinction. 
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The new umuntu in Christ is a person whose life is shaped by membership of the 
Christian ubuntu community, whose foundational scene is recalled in the ritual of the 
Eucharist. This ritual is the “subversive” memory of the Cross and Resurrection as 
the revelation of the true nature of human identity founded upon mimetic conflict and 
exclusion enable human beings to receive their identity as “given” in Jesus Christ 
and to live in pacific mimesis of him. We have offered some thoughts on the praxis  
of leadership and the praxis of engaging with and shaping traditional African rituals 
in Christian terms and allowing African rituals to impact upon Christian ritual. 
This provides us with the directions with which to answer the last part of the ques-
tion with which we began: the question of how the life of Zambia might be reshaped 
in the light of what we have understood of its history, and of the influence of mimetic 
conflict over the identity of Zambia. We suggest that the life of Zambia may be ef-
fectively reshaped by an incarnational approach whereby the Zambian Church, as de-
nominations and as one community, seeks to “subvert from within” the life of the na-
tion. It can most effectively do so by making real and present in its own life and 
praxis and in its proclamation and call to both the community at large and to leaders 
and élites the new ubuntu revealed in Jesus Christ. The ubuntu modelled upon the re-
lationships between the Divine Persons in the Trinity and made present to humanity 
in the incarnation, Cross and Resurrection. 
The proposals are modest and exist only in outline. This is partly because they are 
an offering of a musungu, an “outsider” who has sought to indwell Zambian life and 
sought  the indwelling of  Zambia and her  cultures for  a  time.  They are therefore 
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offered as suggestions and encouragements, not as prescriptions. In the end the Zam-
bian Church must find her own way to incarnate the Gospel and to proclaim Jesus 
Christ before the eyes of her peoples.
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10 Testing The Thesis
In the introduction to this work we put forward a thesis for testing, having asked if 
it is possible to construct an adequate and effective theological response to an ad-
equate  and  effective  understanding  of  the  conflicted  aspects  of  Zambian  society 
drawing upon the “revelatory anthropology”1 of René Girard. We have accepted from 
the outset of this work that in sociology, and thus also in contextual theology, much 
turns on the presuppositions and interests of the interpreter.  Any interpretation of 
something as complex as a human society will leave aspects which do not quite fit in 
to the interpretive scheme which must be left for another examination. Our focus has 
been on issues of conflict and identity and there are other aspects of Zambian life to 
which we have not attended. This work is therefore an abstraction. Abstraction and 
an ineluctable remainder are inevitable in any understanding of the world,2 and we 
have proceeded on this understanding. The question which we must now answer is 
not whether our work is an abstraction but rather whether or not this abstraction en-
ables us to gain a new and more adequate insight about the whole. It is therefore our 
purpose to explore what we have achieved, and in particular to test our interpretative 
framework founded upon the work of René Girard. 
This is far from the only work which has taken up Girard's as a basis for additional 
exploration. Chris Fleming has noted a number of the thinkers in a strikingly wide 
range of fields who have incorporated Girard's ideas into their own research.3 This 
1 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 25.
2 Fleming, René Girard, 163.
3 Ibid., 153-157.
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broad range of further exploration suggests that Girard's abstraction leads to a fruitful 
understanding of the larger and more complex whole in a variety of fields. Simple 
and spare as Girard's basic insight is, it seems to unfold to reveal an interwoven com-
plexity in which the cycle of mimesis and conflict appears to create complex fractal 
patterns throughout every aspect of human interactions. It is this breadth in the ap-
plication of Girard's work which has provoked the accusation that Girard has created 
an overly systematized “theory of everything”. This in turn requires us to make an 
assessment of Girard's work as providing an adequate interpretation of the facts of 
the particular Zambian context. 
10.1 Girard and Culture
According to Girard, human culture emerged from the murder of the victim.4 This 
founding murder on its own is not enough to create a culture. Social stability and or-
der also require the repetition of the founding murder through ritual. All our cultural 
institutions emerge from rituals which pervade early human culture at every level. 
Ritual is therefore the foundation of all culture, moderating the conflicts which are an 
inevitable part of mimetic desire.5 
Girard argues that the New Testament identifies the nations of the world as the 
“principalities and powers”. These have both an earthly nature and a transcendence 
which, although illusionary, is effective in cloaking their true nature with the appear-
ance of ultimate cosmic reality. The powers have a deep ambivalence. While they are 
tributaries of Satan, they themselves are not “Satan”. Although their spiritual dimen-
4 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 87.
5 Ibid., 90-91.
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sion is a false transcendence they represent a stability and order, which is necessary 
in a world alienated from the Kingdom of God, their rituals keeping the mimetic con-
tagion at bay.6 
Walter Wink, although accepting much of Girard's thesis, rejects the idea that the 
mimetic cycle underlies human culture. He draws upon some anthropological evid-
ence on remote contemporary communities as well  as archaeological  evidence to 
suggest that societies can and do exist without endemic violence, maintaining that 
human beings are not “genetically hard wired” for violence, and that human societies 
can live without violence.7 Widespread violence, the Powers, and Satan, he argues, 
are late arrivals.8 The evidence which Wink brings forward is difficult to assess, and 
Wink himself accepts that it is open to alternative interpretations.9 Quite apart from 
the uncertain nature of the evidence, Wink's case misses the key point in Girard's 
thesis which is that mimesis occurs precisely because human beings are not “hard-
wired”, whether for violence or anything else. Even those most basic drives are mal-
leable and mimetic.10 Most human conflict is therefore not based on some instinct for 
violence, but in mimesis.11
Wink argues that early human societies were a good deal less violent and acquisit-
ive than those which succeeded them. He argues that it was not until the early Bronze 
age that militaristic societies emerged which had the basic features he detects in the 
“domination system”. As militaristic societies spread through conquest other societ-
6 Ibid., 95-98.
7 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 96.
8 Ibid., 39.
9 Ibid., 38.
10 Fleming, René Girard, 11.
11 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 11.
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ies were forced to become their mimetic doubles in order to resist them. “The irony 
is that successful defense against a power-maximizing aggressor requires a society to 
become more like the society that threatens it”.12 What Wink does not say is how or 
why previously peaceful societies existing should suddenly become such militaristic 
threats to their neighbours. His claim that human societies “stumbled into a chaos 
that had never before existed” seems unlikely.13 It seems a good deal more likely that 
human societies were simply progressing along a logically inevitable path laid down 
for them by the chaotic non-being of mimetic violence - a path which began with 
conflict in smaller societies where the less aggressive began to resemble the more ag-
gressive through mimesis. Those original militaristic societies of the early Bronze 
age  simply  arrived  first  at  the  point  where  a  full-blown  parasitic  military  élite 
emerged.
We may therefore conclude that, in the absence of a more adequate explanation of 
the, admittedly slender, evidence, Girard's thesis is correct. At the root of all human 
culture lies a founding murder and its ritualistic repetition. The whole mimetic cycle 
Girard, argues, is the work of “Satan”. Satan is both the principle of disorder and also 
the principle of order. It is Satan who robs humanity of its true individuality entrap-
ping  us  in  the  mimetic  contagion.14 Ultimately  this  is  because  Satan  is  himself 
without true stable being. “To clothe himself in the semblance of being, he has to act 
as a parasite on God's creatures” existing only in the mimetic contagion.15 Human be-
ings are drawn by the invitation to “be like me” into this parasitic nature, and en-
12 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 40.
13 Ibid.
14 Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 34-36, 87.
15 Ibid., 42.
303
trapped in the same non-being. Thus a human person is not truly a person so long as 
they remain caught up in mimetic rivalry. Human autonomy is nothing more than an 
illusion created as we seek to appropriate our being in conflict and exclusion. The 
more we strive to assert that delusional autonomy the more we become enslaved to 
our human mimetic models, themselves slaves to the mimetic contagion, and thus the 
more entangled in mimetic rivalry with them, the more subject to the power of Satan.
16 Our search for a theology for Zambia has been a search for a theology by which 
people  can  be  freed  from  this  entrapment  by  and  in  “non-being”  and  come  to 
ourselves, to our true being in God.
10.2 Assessing the Thesis
Two interrelated but distinct questions must now be answered in order to assess our 
thesis. The first is have we achieved an adequate interpretation of the facts as they 
are and an insight into the possible path which Zambia might take over the next few 
years? The second question is have we provided a theological and missiological re-
flection which is both faithful to the witness of the world-wide and historical Christi-
an community and which can also shape the further praxis of the church in Zambia? 
10.2.1 Sociological Questions
To answer the first of these questions we need to explore how far we can now an-
swer the four questions asked in Sociology which we discussed in our introduction: 




In assessing our ability to respond to the first two questions we need to briefly sum 
up what we have uncovered. If we are to understand what is happening and why it is  
happening we need to understand the context in which the events are set. We began 
with an account of Zambia's formative history and found that prior to the arrival of 
the Europeans there were a number of disparate ethnic groups in the territory which 
became Zambia. Some of these groups seem to have been in a process of identifying 
with one another in an effort to resist invasion from further south. At the same time, 
there were ethnic groups who may well have had little contact with, or knowledge of, 
one another  prior  to  the emergence of the Protectorate's  industrial  economy.  The 
question  as  to  why  Zambia  emerged  from  the  British  Protectorate  of  Northern 
Rhodesia therefore seems to force itself onto our agenda. Girard's thesis provides a 
particular insight into the process of mimesis and conflict which offers an elegant 
and  satisfying  understanding  of  Zambia's  emergence  through  the  “liberation 
struggle”.  Zambia's  very  existence  is  the  mimetic  double  of  the  Protectorate  of 
Northern Rhodesia. Its identity is founded upon the expulsion of the British colonial 
power  as  the  “Scapegoat”.  The model/rival  being  displaced,  African  Nationalism 
took its place and became what it displaced, mimetically appropriating the identity of 
the  Protectorate.  Zambia  therefore  could  not,  without  becoming  self-destructive, 
even consider the possibility of anything other than retaining the identity it had ap-
propriated and those political boundaries which were an intrinsic part of it.
Our use of Girard's work allows us to pose this question, which seems not to have 
been previously posed at all, and answer it in a way which is consistent with the 
available historical knowledge. The answer, once we come to it, seems simple and 
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commonplace. Even those without a Girardian framework seem to concur that con-
flict was the cornerstone to the formation of a “common” African nationalist, and 
therefore Zambian, identity.17 It is the Girardian framework which allows us to see 
with precision what exactly happened in the transition to independence, and recog-
nise that Zambia emerges as a result of a founding expulsion.
Our method has therefore allowed us to reach an insight into the historical back-
ground against which the events and patterns of Zambian life are set. It is this under-
standing of Zambia's history which allows us to understand the events of Zambia's 
post-independence life, particularly the cyclical pattern of crisis and catharsis. When 
we come to this insight it seems once more to be commonplace and obvious. The fact 
of a cyclical pattern whereby movements based upon inter-ethnic alliances emerge, 
take power and fragment, has been discerned by others. Our method has enabled us 
to offer a greater insight into, and explanation of, this pattern. Each new movement 
for political liberation is itself a mimetic representation of the first liberation move-
ment, its identity emerging out of rivalry with and by exclusion of its model, each be-
coming the double of the one which preceded it, each creating a new Zambia which 
has displaced and become the Zambia which preceded it, created in the image of the 
past. We are therefore in a position to understand the original founding events as a 
template for a continuing cycle. Zambia is caught in a mythic cycle of collapse and 
recreation which continues to echo that original template.
17 Mulford, Zambia, 333; Pettman, Zambia. Security and Conflict, 65.
306
There has been some debate as to whether Zambia's conflict is rooted in strictly 
“ethnic” issues, or whether there are other axes of division.18 It is clear from an ana-
lysis of the 2008 elections in Zambia that Larmer and Fraser on the one hand and 
Daniel Posner on the other hand are both “half right”19 in as far as the axes of divi-
sion are constructed on both ethnic and “class” bases and that both interpretations 
must make space for the other.20 This appears to be a relatively new development, as 
the 2006 and 2002 elections seemed to indicate a strong ethnic component to the 
country's divisions. It seems that there is, as yet, little discussion on the meaning of 
these events. Our interpretation, however, provides one satisfactory explanation of 
what is happening. Girard maintains that identity arises out of the conflict rather than 
the  conflict  arising  out  of  a  clash  of  identities.  A dialectic  relationship  emerges 
between conflict and identity, so that as identity emerges in the conflict there also 
emerges a series of mythologised justifications for “our identity” and to explain the 
conflict. As the conflict intensifies, smaller group conflicts become subsumed into 
one another, new mythologies are generated to justify alliances that did not previ-
ously exist, to explain the new group identities which have emerged and to legitimate 
the new shape given to the conflict. This allows us a great deal of flexibility. Divi-
sions can be both along ethnic and other axes at one and the same time, with one 
conflict being subsumed into the other until the conflict intensifies and reaches cath-
arsis. 
18 Cheesman and Hinfelaar, “Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zambian Presid-
ential Election of 2008,” 69.
19 Ibid., 74.
20 Ibid., 69, 75.
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Our understanding of Zambia links together the facts we have uncovered in Zam-
bia: the concepts and stories of “ethnic cousinage”; the changing boundaries of eth-
nic and language group coalitions; the “both and” of ethnic and class conflict; and in 
an understanding of identity as fluid, in which alliances, the axes of divisions and 
group identities can and do change. Our interpretation of the evidence of Zambian 
life suggests that the mythic cycle which we have discerned will tend to continue to 
repeat itself. We have suggested that the patterns of the 2008 elections, together with 
a number of other pieces of evidence, indicate that there is a small movement in the 
direction of the construction of an inter-ethnic alliance. News reports from within 
Zambia indicate that an alliance, albeit very unstable, between Sata and Hichelema 
has been established.21 There is, it seems, a very strong possibility that this alliance 
will collapse, but the very fact that it has become possible is a further indication that 
the cycle is still turning. 
Girard's thesis has therefore supplied us with an interesting and effective means of 
interpreting Zambian society and life. We have been able to answer clearly the first 
two questions asked in Sociology, “what is happening?” and “why is it happening?”. 
Furthermore, we have been able to offer a tentative insight into what might happen if 
the mythic cycle is not interrupted.
The third question sociology asks concerns  what  life  is  like for  Zambians.  The 
methods we have used do enable a clearer insight into what life is like for most Zam-
bians. Any visitor to Zambia will catch glimpses of the profound poverty and deep 
21 Wallen Simwaka, “PF-UPND Pact futile dream - Mukuni,” Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka, July 
26, 2010), http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?
category=8&id=1280092341 (Accessed 26 July 2010). 
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deprivation which most Zambians experience. Those working for an aid or develop-
ment agency or with the local church will gain more insight into life in the com-
pounds - the anxious mother nursing the fevered child without money for the user 
fees  for  the  government  clinic  or  effective  anti-malaria  medication,  the  woman 
bruised and battered by her partner, the unemployed man so drunk he is attempting to 
hold a conversation with an ant-hill. What is less obvious is the conflict and rivalry to 
which we have drawn attention. Even the experienced observer sees Zambians as 
easygoing and good-humoured. The atmosphere of the compounds, permeated with 
upbeat music, casual chatter, and the piping voices of the children at play, can seem 
surprisingly relaxed. Yet tensions simmering below the surface of township life give 
rise to sudden outbreaks of domestic violence,  brawls in the bars,  fighting at  the 
scene of a road traffic accident, the “instant-justice” mob murdering someone ac-
cused of petty theft. Our methods have enabled an insight into these tensions, which 
disrupt human relationships and swallow distinctive individuals into the non-being of 
temporary mob identities. It enables us to become aware of the narratives of exclu-
sion and isolation, hidden behind the inclusive concepts of the extended family and 
ubuntu, which provide the necessary conditions for the Single Victim Mechanism to 
mark out the elderly, women, the marginal and the criminal, to isolate and vilify a 
community leader, politician or president. This would remain invisible without the 
interpretative perspective provided by Girard's work. Yet this profound dis-ease with-
in society is a fundamental part of what life is like for Zambians.
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The fourth question asked in Sociology is whether what is observed is good or bad 
for human beings.  The short  answer to this  question is  that nothing we have de-
scribed is  good for  human beings.  Zambian life  is  not  an  unmitigated  disaster  - 
people still love, care and reach out to one another - and there is still some hope and 
a determination to make things better. Our focus has been on the conflicted aspects of 
Zambian life. While it may be possible to derive a positive outcome from conflict, 
we have described a repetitive pattern of conflict in which Zambia is seemingly inex-
tricably entangled. The consequent politics of predation leads to the neglect and mis-
management which we have described, the crumbling infrastructure, the all but col-
lapsed health, education and social welfare systems and a justice system which is 
paralysed by corruption. It would be difficult to arrive at any other conclusion than 
the one to which we have come. It is a conclusion made in the light of our interpret-
ative framework. 
We have been able to propose answers to the four sociological questions which we 
outlined in our introduction. We have gained some important insights into the nature 
of Zambia's formation and continuing life. These insights have been uncovered by 
our engagement with the work of René Girard. It is our use of Girard's theory which 
enables us to see the full and repetitive nature of the mythic cycle as an entrapment 
in the “non-being” of mimetic rivalry. It is this which leads us to the theological 
question of how human beings might come to their true selves.
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10.2.2 Assessing Theology
If our understanding of the state of Zambia is an adequate understanding of those 
elements of Zambian life upon which we have focused, we now need to discuss how 
far Girard's thesis has contributed to an adequate theological response. Any adequate 
theology must match all five of Schreiter's criteria discussed in the introduction to 
this work: The Cohesiveness of Christian Performance,  The Worshipping Context 
and Christian Performance, The Praxis of the Community and Christian Perform-
ance, The Judgement of Other Churches and Christian Performance and The chal-
lenge To Other Churches and Christian Performance.22 We must now attempt to as-
sess our theology against these criteria 
10.2.2.1 The Cohesiveness of Christian Performance
This criterion is the most complex to measure any theology against - indeed the 
most complex to actually articulate as a criterion. This is because the Church's Chris-
tian performance is, to some extent, dynamic and there is an element of dialectic 
between culture and Christian doctrinal and ethical insight in which each quite legit-
imately shapes the other. The long history of the development of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, the changing perceptions of the role of women in the church, the debates 
about sexual identity all indicate that a concept of “orthodox” is not always easy to 
arrive at. Schreiter's appeal to the hierarchy of truths does little to clarify matters.  
While the idea that certain truths touch more deeply upon the fundamental identity of 
the Christian community seems simple common sense, there is no real clarity about 
22 Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, 117-121.
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even the fundamentals of how to go about creating such a hierarchy.23 New develop-
ments, or the recovery of old and neglected insights, may take many years of intense 
debate before the entire church comes to a conclusion concerning its adequacy, and 
one must accept that the whole catholic church may never reach a final agreement. 
The centuries of unresolved acrimony over the filioque clause tells us that much. For 
our purposes it will be enough to be able to justify our theological insights against 
this criteria in broad terms. 
The theological insight we have attempted to create is an understanding of the Trin-
ity. We have noted the roots of this doctrine and some of the difficulties that the 
church had in arriving at an adequate expression of the concept. The church had to 
find a way of expressing a careful balance between a substantial notion of person and 
maintaining the unity of the one God. Our theology has been driven by a similar need 
to express an understanding of person which is substantial, free from a foundation in 
exclusion and yet is so in such a manner as not to endanger the unity of the Godhead. 
We will discuss the manner in which we have used Girard's understanding in this 
project more fully below. For the time being, it is sufficient to say that we have been 
unable to draw directly upon the notions of the human person found in Girard and his 
followers. We have found that these lead too readily to a collapse into Sabellianism. 
We have similarly been obliged to alter African notions of ubuntu in a more substan-
tial direction. On the other hand, we have found the more European notions espoused 
by Moltmann and Volf are likely to lead to a fragmentation of the Godhead into tri-
thesim. Instead, we have rooted our understanding of the Trinity in a traditional and 
23 Ibid., 118.
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widely-held notion, that of the hierarchy within the Godhead in which the Father is 
the origin of the Godhead. We have noted that our understanding of the Godhead was 
in accordance with notions of God as love, and as inherently gracious.
In broad terms, therefore, our understanding of the Trinity does accord with the 
widely-held and well-established understandings of the Trinity and does not require 
significant alteration of understanding of other widely held doctrinal symbols. Where 
our theology does diverge somewhat from more traditional views is in the espousal 
of a kenotic understanding of God. Kenosis is a means of speaking of the self-limita-
tion of God in creation and redemption, and involves a significant modification of 
the classical understanding of God.24 One understanding of this kenosis is that God's 
power is properly seen as “the empowerment of other beings rather than as power 
over them”.25 Barbour sees five themes in kenotic understandings of God: the rise of 
modern science and the increasing recognition of the integrity of creation, difficulties 
with the problem of evil, the reality of human freedom, the Christian understanding 
of the Cross, and feminist critique of patriarchal models of God.26 Kenotic models of 
God are, therefore, a response to the context of the modern and post-modern Western 
intellectual world. They also represent a recovery of understandings of God in which 
the implications of the concept of “incarnation” are fully worked out. They take seri-
ously the recovery of the centrality of revelation and the identification of the eco-
nomic with the immanent Trinity, concepts expounded at length by both Barth and 
Rahner. The God who revealed the divine self in the folly and weakness of the cross 
24 Ian Barbour, “God's Power: A Process View,” in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. 




is God as God is in the divine being. Kenotic models of God therefore have strong 
justification, and have at least the potential, to be more adequate than those of clas-
sical theism.
10.2.2.2 The Worshipping Context and Christian Performance
There are few real difficulties inherent in this criterion. Local doctrinal symbols 
should enable a local community to find locally appropriate forms of worship. We 
have drawn attention to the idea of the Eucharist as a “subversive memory” which in-
volves a proclamation of the story of God's self-revelation in Christ in such a way 
that persons are called and enabled into the mimesis of Christ. This must lead dir-
ectly to worship which is both consistent with Scripture and expressed in local forms 
as a “subversion from within” of local culture and myths of redemptive violence.
10.2.2.3 The Praxis of the Community and Christian Performance
The idea, inherent in the theology which we propose, that Christian praxis should 
empower others, is a core Christian value about which there is little real discussion. 
Our theology issues in a praxis of kenosis in mimesis of God in Christ.  Kenosis as 
understood in our theology is more than simple renunciation: it involves “making 
space” for others to be or, as Barbour argues, active empowerment of others, becom-
ing poor to make many rich. As a direct consequence, to take up Schreiter's particular 
concern, this is a theology which cannot, with any integrity, issue in a call to viol-
ence. Our theology would meet any call to violence with the immediate suspicion 
that it represented a turn to the non-being of mimetic contagion. It would not neces-
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sarily exclude violence  a priori  but any appeal to, for example, a theology of just 
war, would have a considerable amount of work to do in order to overcome the inher-
ent resistance to the praxis of violence implicit in our theology.
10.2.2.4 The Judgement of Other Churches and Christian 
Performance
This is a somewhat more complex criterion in practice than it first seems. Issues 
such as a judgement upon a theology which legitimates Apartheid, or some other 
form of oppression, are reasonably clear. A local Church which does not hear and re-
spond to the widespread concerns of the whole Christian community on such sub-
jects  has  lost  its  centre  in  Christ.  There  is,  however,  a  nice  balance  to  maintain 
between an appropriate local response which may be quite different from what is ac-
cepted practice elsewhere, and reshaping praxis in response to the judgement of the 
wider Christian community. The tensions within the world-wide Anglican commu-
nion over questions of sexual identity are a case in point. In what is a complex ethical 
debate - which asks how one weighs particular core Christian values against other 
core Christian values in particular cultural contexts - which community should give 
ground and reshape its praxis? Any openness to judgement must therefore be on the 
basis of equality and partnership which maintains the communion of the church and 
accepts that in many cases “judgement” will require a common exercise of explora-
tion of ethical and pastoral issues in open dialogue rather than an attempt to impose 
the judgement of one upon another.
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The theology which we have proposed fulfils this criteria. Our understanding of the 
relationships of the Trinity being relationships of unobstructed mimesis would entail 
seeking a relationship of mutual support and exploration of ethical and pastoral is-
sues. The understandings we propose would advert to the dangers of mimetic rivalry 
in relationships, and would encourage communities to seek ways to draw back from 
the spiral of conflict and seek mutually supportive and constructive ways of dealing 
with disputes. It would also provide a strong foundation for a critique of practices or 
theologies which promotes forms of blatant victimisation or oppression.
10.2.2.5 The Challenge to Other Churches and Christian 
Performance
This study has sought to develop an understanding of “persons-in-relationship” to 
meet the needs of a particular context. Girard's concepts, however, are not confined 
to a particular cultural setting, but rather give insight into the emergence of all cultur-
al identities through the mimesis of desire. This gives our study a particular dimen-
sion, as arising from the study of one context. We believe, however, that our insights 
into and careful adoption of ubuntu as a reflection of the Divine Persons-in-relation-
ship have their own universal application.  There are two areas which we wish to 
briefly point to as areas in which the theology which we have developed here might 
well make a contribution.
The first of these is the question of the balance between the individual and the com-
munal in society.  Bishop Katharine Jefferts-Schori claimed that the great Western 
heresy is individualism and argued for an adoption of the concept of ubuntu as a cor-
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rective response.27 Whether or not she is correct in her diagnosis or fully understands 
the concept of ubuntu she raises an issue which needs discussion, if only in the con-
text of North America. We believe that what we propose here would have a con-
structive contribution to such a discussion. 
The second area to which we wish to briefly draw attention, is the question of eco-
logy and “creation theology”. There can be little doubt that human activity has put 
the planetary ecology under considerable pressure. If we are to take contextualisation 
seriously then this is a challenge to which the Church must give some serious theolo-
gical attention. James Lovelock drew attention to his theory that the whole planet, 
both organic and biological, functions as a system to produce and maintain those 
conditions which are optimum to life in the edition of  New Scientist published on 
February 15, 1975. Unusually for a scientist, Lovelock is willing to raise theological 
issues.28 These are increasingly important questions about place of humanity in the 
interrelated web of creation to which our adoption of the concept of ubuntu can offer 
important insights. 
10.2.2.6 The Fidelity of This Theology
The first of the creation myths encountered in the Scriptures asserts that humanity 
in all its diversity of gender and culture is created in the image of God. The Divine 
purpose in creation and redemption is therefore that all humanity should be indwelt 
by and indwell the Divine life: the dance of mutual giving and receiving, the mimesis 
of love. That the mimesis of love is still far from the life of humanity is obvious. The 
27 Jefferts-Schori, “Opening Address to the TEC General Convention 2009.”
28 “What Is Gaia? Text by James Lovelock,” n.d., http://www.ecolo.org/lovelock/what_is_Gai-
a.html.
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church, however, is called to bear witness to the revelation of God which makes us a 
“new creation”, the new ubuntu in Christ. That message has a universal as well as a 
particular element. It is relevant to both highly conflicted and relatively peaceful so-
cieties. It is as relevant to the fragmented isolation of modern Western urban life-
styles as to the crushing communal conformity of the rural village in Africa. It is a 
proclamation of the mission of God in Christ.
We thus believe that we have satisfied Schreiter's criteria sufficiently to claim that 
our theology can be understood to be faithful to the witness of Scripture and early 
church tradition and in conformity with the ongoing praxis of the church as the com-
munity which seeks to be faithful to that same witness. We must now move to the 
third level of this test and consider how we have interacted with Girard's work in our 
theology.
10.3 Girard's Place in this Theology
The understanding of mimesis which Girard has put forward has allowed us to gain 
a considerable insight into the formation of Zambia, its present circumstances and 
possible future course. Girard's work grants us an insight into an element of the “sys-
tematic distortion” which pervades human life and blinds us to the truth of God in 
Christ. It encourages us to practise the “hermeneutics of suspicion”29 in interpreting 
any culture, or any cultural product. We have seen, for example, in our analysis of 
ubuntu that as an ideal and a challenge to Western individualism it has much to com-
mend it, but our interpretative framework has led us to a recognition that underlying 
its narrative of inclusion is a concealed praxis of exclusion.
29 David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity (London: SCM, 1988), 73.
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Girard's account of Christianity is, however, restricted to his focus on the decon-
struction of the Scapegoat Mechanism. Others have taken up Girard's thinking in an 
effort to shape a broader theological account and in this thesis we have engaged with 
the work of James Alison. It is at this point that we encountered a problem. Alison's 
language of “holon” is entirely relational, and does not encompass a “substantial” un-
derstanding of person. Two difficulties emerge from this entirely relational account 
of “person” in  the divine.  The first  is  that  a person whose personal  formation is 
simply described in terms of relationship is not a permanent “person”, but a fluid and 
temporary focal point in the, essentially undifferentiated, divine substance. This leads 
us immediately to the consequential second difficulty. For any human person to be-
come an authentic person, a model of authentic personhood is necessary. It is pre-
cisely at this point that mimesis opens us to the potential of our full humanity in the 
image of God. This, however, can only be so if we find in the Trinity a concept of the 
fully authentic person, one who is not merely a focal point for interpersonal relation-
ships but one whose substance is never “naked” as Zizioulas puts it, but who always 
subsists as person, as person who wills to exist as persons-in-communion.30 Alison's 
difficulty is one which has been inherited from Girard's confinement of his reading of 
Scriptures to the anthropological. 
In order to answer this difficulty we examined a more “substantial” notion of per-
son,  moving away  from  Girard  to  engage  with  a  broader  range  of  theological 
thought. This engagement, however, returned us to Girard. Volf establishes his ac-
count of personal formation to human persons and the persons of the Trinity without 
examining the differences or similarities between human and divine persons. As a 
30 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 41, 44.
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consequence, his understanding of the divine persons has been formulated without 
due attention to his understanding that human personal individuation is only estab-
lished by conflict and expulsion. This concept of “person” would lead to a fragment-
ation of the Trinity into a tri-theism. 
The theology we have constructed attempts to reach beyond human persons and the 
problems of human identity to the person of the Father. Our model of the persons of 
the Trinity is made necessary by Girard's understanding of the mimetic contagion. It 
is this contagion which enslaves us. It makes us blind to ourselves, unable to under-
stand our own actions as it entraps us into actions which we know, outside of the mi-
metic contagion, to be destructive. Even as we find limitations in Alison's work, we 
recognise that divine persons must be constituted differently from that of a human 
person, while at the same time there must be an unobstructed invitation to mimesis, 
both  a  revelation  and the  gift  of  true  personhood.  Girard's  thought  has  therefore 
proved vital to those insights we have gained, providing a foundation upon which we 
have been able to achieve an adequate theological response to the challenges of mis-
sion in Zambia. Without Girard's insights we would have found it a good deal more 
difficult  to  move beyond the  difficulties  presented by the  theologies  of  Volf  and 
Moltmann. 
We have established this theological understanding as a response to the understand-
ing of the conflicted aspects of Zambian life which have entrapped Zambia's people, 
poisoned the whole of Zambian life and pushed the state to the brink of failure. Our 
abstraction has therefore resulted in a deeper insight into the wider whole. In this un-
derstanding Girard's work has proved to be vital. Without his insights into the forma-
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tion of identity through mimesis, conflict and catharsis we could not have recognised 
the entirety of what has and continues to happen in Zambia as a “mythic cycle”. We, 
therefore, believe that our thesis has been sufficiently proven, and that it has been 
possible to construct an adequate and effective theology based upon an adequate and 
effective understanding of the conflicted aspects of Zambian society based upon the 
“revelatory anthropology”31 of René Girard.
31 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 25.
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